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Foreword 
The struggle against and repudiation 
of Browder' s revision of Marxism-
Leninism constitutes an historic stage 
in the development of the Communist 
Party of the United States. 
A whole period has elapsed since the 
special National Convention, held on 
July 26-28, 1945, which decisively re-
jected Browder' s policies and recon-
stituted the Communist Party. In this 
period life itself has added overwhelm-
ing evidence of the complete bank-
ruptcy of Browder's revisionist policies 
at the same time that it has fully con-
firmed the correctness of the policies 
adopted by the National Convention 
and further developed by the meeting 
of the National Committee of the Com-
munist Party held on November 16-18, 
1945. 
This period has seen the develop-
ment of big strike struggles instead of 
the era of class peace and harmony 
envisaged by Browder. It has seen the 
growth of unemployment and the ma-
turing of all elements which, despite 
the possibility of a short-lived upturn 
in production, will lead inevitably to a 
new cyclical crisis instead of an era of 
uninterrupted flourishing of American 
3 
capitalist economy as forecast by Brow-
der. It has seen armed intervention. in 
China by American imperialism on the 
side of the reactionary Chiang· Kai-shek, 
bloody armed suppression of the na-
tional liberation struggles of the Indo-
nesian people by British and Dutch 
imperialism instead of the -liberation 
of the colonies through arrangements 
between the imperialist powers as en-
visaged by Browder. It has shown that 
the Teheran agreement did not change 
the nature of American and British 
imperialism, and that Big Three unity 
as the cornerstone of enduring peace 
must be. fought for if it is to be main-
tained and if departures from it, as at 
the London Conference, are to be 
checked and reversed. 
If Browder' s revisionist policies had 
not been rejected and if the Commu-
nist Party had not been reconstituted, 
it could not now be playing the vital 
role it is in the current economic and 
political struggles, in rallying the 
masses for the building of a broad 
coalition of all democratic forces for 
political action independent of the two 
major · parties. 
But the complete rejection of Brow-
derism by the Communist Party does 
not relegate the struggle against re-
visionism, or its profound lessons, to 
the category of an interesting phenome-
non to be reviewed academically as a 
matter of past history. 
The struggle to root out all rem-
nants of Browder' s revisionism, the 
struggle against all forms of opportu-
nism, is a continuing one. It is part 
and parcel of the process by which our 
Party is making itself a mass, fighting 
Communist Party. It accompanies our 
fight today on all fronts and is a pre-
coq.dition for the successful waging of 
this fight. 
The lessons of the struggle against 
revisionism are not dusty lessons about 
the past. They are, above all, lessons 
for today and for tomorrow. 
The documents, articles and speeches 
collected in this booklet summarize the 
chief points of the enormously rich 
discussion carried on in the freest pos-
sible fashion by the membership of the 
Communist Party in the whole period 
prior to and culminating in the special 
National Convention in July, 1945, 
which, with the exception of the lone 
vote of Earl Browder, repudiated his 
revisionist theories and policies and re-
constituted the Communist Party. 
A careful study of the documents, 
articles and speeches collected in this 
booklet will reveal the nature and 
essence of the system of revisionist 
theories and policies rejected by the 
Communist Party. And these docu-
ments, articles and speeches must be 
so studied because they represent what 
is, from now on, an indispensible ele-
ment in the education and develop-
ment of all those who wish to master 
Marxism-Leninism. 
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Browder' s revmon of Marxism-Len-
inism was not confined to one or an-
other individual question hµt repre-
sented a whole system of ideas the 
different aspects of which were put 
forth with a greater or lesser degree of 
theoretical elaboration. 
This system of ideas · comprised, in 
the main, the following elements: 
I. Rejection of the Marxist theory 
of the class struggle and its replace-
ment by the concept of a harmony of 
interests between the working class and 
the capitalist class; abandonment of 
the class struggle in favor of a policy 
oi class collaboration and class peace. 
2. Rejection of Lenin's analysis of 
imperialism as the final stage in the 
development of capitalism, as mori-
bund capitalism, and advocacy of the 
theory of the ending of the epoch of 
imperialism; of the development of 
monopoly capitalism as a progressive 
force in society. 
3. Rejection of the Marxist analysis 
of the laws of development of capital-
ist economy, in particular the inevita-
bility of unemployment and crises un-
der capitalism and the advocacy of the 
bourgeois political economy of the 
Keynesian school. 
4. Rejection of the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of the state leading to the ideal-
ization of bourgeois democracy and 
falsification of the real relation of the 
trusts and monopolies to the develop-
ment of fascism. 
5. Rejection of the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of the national and colonial 
question as reflected in the abandon-
ment of the principle of the right of 
self-determination for the Negro peo-
ple; and in the advocacy 9£ a theory 
of colonial liberation through arrange-
ments between imperialist powers. 
6. Rejection of the Marxist-Leninist 
concept of the role of the working 
c1ass as the most decisive and the lead-
ing force in modern society, subordi-
nating it to the "liberal" bourgeoisie 
which is declared to be the most de-
cisive force in modern society. 
7. Rejection of the goal of Socialism 
as the ultimate aim of the working 
class and the substitution for it of a 
liberal bourgeois utopia. 
8. Rejection of the Marxist-Leninist 
philosophical standpoint of dialectical 
materialism and the adoption in its 
place of a voluntarist, pragmatic stand-
point; abandonment of the struggle on 
the theoretical front against hostile and 
alien ideological influences coupled 
with a gross distortion of the relation-
ship between theory and practice. 
9. Dissolution of the Communist 
Party representing a complete aban-
donment of all Marxist-Leninist teach-
ings on the necessity for, the nature 
and role of, the vanguard party of the 
working class, the Communist Party; 
\'iolation of the principles of democratic 
entralism and the establishment of 
bureaucracy as a system of work in 
the vanguard party of the working 
class. 
It is clear from all this that, despite 
its specific features which bear the im-
print of the special relation of forces 
existing internationally_ and within the 
United States on the basis of which this 
revisionist system arose and developed, 
Browder' s revisionism is, in its funda-
mentals, a continuation and further 
development under new conditions of 
the revisionism of Bernstein, Kautsky, 
Bukharin and Lovestone. 
The bourgeois influence and pres-
sures which generate tendencies to re-
visionism as typified by Browder are 
inherent in the situation in which the 
working class and its vanguard Com-
munist Party in all capitalist countries 
lives and fights today. This is shown 
by the varying degrees of influence ex-
erted by Browderite policies on a num-
ber of Communist Parties in certain 
countries outside of the United States. 
These influences and pressures manj-
fested themselves with particular acute-
ness in the United States, first, because 
of the influence of the whole "Roosevelt 
decade" and, secondly, because Ameri-
can imperialism is the; strongest impe-
rialist pow r within a generally weak-
ened world capitalist system. 
But the fact that such a svstem of 
revisionism actually dominatecl' the poli-
cies of the Communist Party of the 
United States for a period of time is 
a result of the fact that the Commu-
nists in the United States have not yet 
fully mastered and completely assimi-
~ated the teachings of Marxism-Lenin-
ism. 
The truggle to master Marxist-Len-
inist theory in the course of the gigan-
tic struggles in which the working 
class is now engaged, and in which 
the Communist Party is playing a vital 
and indispensible role, is therefore 
supreme conclusion to be drawn from 
~he struggle against Browder' s revision-
ism. 
The materials collected in this book-
let must be studied on the basis of an 
intensified study and re-study of the 
teachings and writings of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and Stalin, especially Lenin's 
articles on revisionism which are now 
being published by International Pub-
lishers in a special addition to its Little 
l.enin Library series, Stalin's Master-
ing Bolshevism, Lenin's Imperialism, 
Stalin's Foundations of Leninism and 
the classic History of the C.P.S.U. (Bol-
sheviks). 
Armed and equipped with that 
knowledge we can and will go for-
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ward to the more rapid building of a 
mass, fighting Communist Party capa-
ble of successfully fulfilling all the 
heavy responsibilities which history 
places upon its shoulders. 
MAX WEISS. 
FOSTER'S lHIER · TO . · 
·THE NATIONAL. COMMITTEE 
SUBMITTED JANUARY 20, 1944 
--
To THE MEMB-ERS OF. THE NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE, C.P~U.S.A., 
Dear Comrades: 
In Comrade Br.owder' s report to the 
recent meeting of the National _Com~ 
mittee, which wa$ adopted as our 
Party's policy, there are, in my opinion, 
a number_of serious errors which must 
be corrected. After listening to Com-
rade Browder' s report, of which I had 
previously seen only some parts, I 
placed my name on the speakers' list 
to reply to the proposals that he had 
made. However, several Polburo mem-
bers urged that I should not make the 
speech, arguing that it would cause 
confusion in the party and that further 
Polburo discussions would clarify the 
situation. So I refrained from voicing 
my objections at the time, proposing 
instead to take them up in the Polburo. 
As I consider Comrade . Browder's 
errors to be · of an important nature, · 
I feel myself duty bound to express 
my opinions to the National Commit-
tee. · 
In his report Comrade Browder, in 
attempting to apply the Teheran de-
cisions to the United States, drew a 
perspective of a smoothly working na-
tional unity, including the -deci.sive 
sections of American finance - capital, 
not only during the war but also in 
the postwar; a unity which (with him 
quoting ~ approvingly from Victory-
And After), would lead to "a rapid 
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healing of the--terrible wounds of the 
war" and woulq extend on indefinitely, 
in · an all-class peaceful collaboration, 
for a "long term of years." In this 
picture, 1\merican imperialism virtu-
ally disappears, there remains hardly 
a trace of the class struggle, and So-
cialism plays practically no role what-
ever. . 
In his Bridgeport speech, Comrade 
-Browder said that "Old formulas and 
old p~ejudices are going to be of no 
use whatever to us as guides to find 
our way in the new world." But this 
must not cause us to lose sight of .some 
of the most basic principles of Marx-
ism-Leninism. 
_ It seems to me that Comrade Brow-
der's rather rosy outloqk for capitalism 
.is based upon · two errors. The first 
of these is an underestimation of .the 
deepening of the crisis of world capi-
talism ca used by the war. When ques-
tioned directly in Polburo discussion, 
Comrade Browder agreed that capital:. 
ism has been serious! y weakened by 
the war, but his report would tend to 
give the opposite implication. Th~ im-
pression is left that capitalism has 
somehow been rejuvenated and is now 
entering into a new period of expan-
sion and growth. Characteristically, he 
says that there is general agr~ement 
that .there · is "no valid reason why. the 
sarrie (American-W.Z.F.) economy, 
including agriculture,- should not pro-
duce. _.at -.a ppro~imatel y the _ same level 
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(as during the war-W .Z.F.), and that 
no plan is worth considering that pro-
ceeds from any other basis." Contrary 
to this picture of a flourishing, easily 
recovering capitalism, I would say, the 
reality is. a badly weakened world 
capitalist system, whose weakness will 
also be felt in postwar· United States. 
The problems of reconstruction, in this 
country and especially in devastated 
Europe, will be gigantic, and, in the 
long run, insoluble under capitalism. 
This is not to say, however, that there 
may not be a temporary postwar eco· 
nomic boom in some countries and 
possibly also an increase in the pro-
ductive forces. It does assert, however, 
that the gravity of the postwar recon-
struction will not admit of any such 
easy solution as Comrade Browder 
seems to imply. 
The second basic error in Comrade 
Browder' s report is the idea that the 
main body of American finance capital 
is now or can be incorporated into the 
national unity necessary to carry out 
the decisions of the Teheran Confer-
ence in a democratic and progressive 
spirit. It is true that Comrade Browder 
sometimes makes modest estimates of 
the extent of the sections of monopoly 
capital that he hopes will go along in 
the democratic camp in fulfilling the 
decisions of Teheran in their interna-
tional and national implications. He 
says, for example, that "Such an ap-
proach is correct even if it should turn 
out that we find no allies there." But 
obviously he is making policy calling 
for new relations between two whole 
classes, the working class and the capi· 
talist class. That he is calculating upon 
the bulk of finance capital being won 
for the proposals he outlined is clear 
from many indications, including the 
great stress he lays upon the symbol of 
Browder shaking hands with Morgan 
and by the fact that he forsees no 
serious opposition by big capital in "the 
long term of years" of peaceful col-
laboration which he sees ahead. 
This great optimism as to the pro-
gressi ve stand of big business in back-
ing the war and in working out the 
reconstruction problems is quite un-
founded. The enforcement of the Te-
heran decisions, both in their national 
and international aspects, demands the 
broadest possible national unity, and 
in this national unity there must be 
workers, farmers, professionals, small 
businessmen and all of the capitalist 
elements who will loyally support the 
program. But to assume that such 
capitalists, even if we should include 
the Willkie supporters, constitute the 
decisive sections of finance capital, or 
can be extended to include them, is to 
harbor a dangerous illusion. The fact 
is, as I shall develop at length later, 
the great body of American finance cap-
ital is following a line contrary to a 
democratic and progressive interpreta-
tion of Teheran, and in all probability 
will continue to do so. 
The only way a national unity could 
be made with the main forces of 
American finance capital, and this is 
most emph:itically true of the postwar 
period, would b~ upon a basis incom-
patible with a democratic realization 
of Teheran. Such a national unity 
would be necessarily one under the 
hegemony of big capital, and in the 
long run it would fail in realizing the 
line laid down at the Teheran Con-
ference. The plain fact, and we must 
never lose sight of it, is that American 
big capital cannot be depended upon 
to cooperate with the workers and 
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other classes in carrying out the deci-
sions of Teheran, much less lead the 
nation in doing so. 
The error of· Comrade Browder is 
precisely the false assumption that they 
can be so depended upon. He thinks 
(Bridg~port speech) that the big capi-
talists fall within the scope of "the 
intelligent people of the world, the 
united moral forces of Britain, America 
and the Soviet Union," who are fight-
ing for a new and better world. Con-
tradicting his own correct starement in 
his report that the working people are 
the main base of the Teheran sup-
porters, he makes various proposals that 
appear to go in the direction of ex-
pecting a progressive lead from the 
monopolists. This is indicated, for ex-
ample, by his praise of the postwar 
program of the National Association 
of Manufacturers, and by his looking 
hopefully to the big capitalists to bring 
forward plans for doubling the work.: 
ers' wages in the postwar period. It is 
also shown by his agreement with the 
N.A.M. that in the question of foreign 
trade "the government should go no 
further in this direction than the export-
ca pitalists themselves demand," which 
would put the monopolists in full con-
trol of this vital matter. He says further 
that he would put no more curbs on 
the monopolists than they themselves 
see the need for, which would indeed 
b~ an ideal situation for the monopo-
lists. 
Comrade Browder' s misconception 
as to the progressive role of monopoly 
~apital in the postwar period is further 
indicated by his playing down the 
initiative of the workers in formulating 
proposed governmental economic poli-
cies and his looking for programs 
rather to the big employers, "who must 
find the solution in order to keep their 
plants in operation." There are also 
his flat acceptance of the two-party 
system, his indefiniteness as to what 
forces constitute reaction in the United 
State.s, his understress on the national 
election struggle, and his curt dismissal 
of the whole question of Socialism. 
Characteristic of Comrade Browder' s 
new conception of the progressive char-
acter, if not the actual leading role of 
monopoly capital, is the way he states 
the method of arriving at a national 
economic program, putting the capi-
talists first and the workers second. 
He says such a program must "rouse a 
minimum of opposition, from at least 
the two most decisive groups: first, the 
business men, industrial and finance 
capitalists and their managers, who 
have effective direction of the nation's 
economy; and second, the working 
class, organized labor and the farmers." 
This is putting the cart before the 
horse. 
The danger in this whole point of 
view is that, in our eagerness to secure 
support for Teheran, we may walk 
into the trap of trying to cooperate 
with the enemies of Teheran, or even 
of falling under their influence. Trail-
ing after the big bourgeoisie is the 
historic error of Social-Democracy, and 
we must be vigilantly on guard against 
it. Our task, instead of pursuing illusory 
plans of creating a national unity to 
include the body of monopoly capital, 
is, therefore, to understand that in 
order to realize the plans and hopes of 
Teheran, we have to rally the great 
popular masses of the peoples and to 
resist the forces of big capital now, 
during the war, and that, also, we will 
have to curb their power drastically in 
the postwar period. This policy is a 
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fundamental condition for success of 
Teheran and all it means to the world. 
When Roosevelt and Wallace single 
out the monopolists for attack, as they 
often do, they are sounding not only 
a popular, but also a correct note. 
MONOPOLY CAPITAL AND 
THE TEHERAN DECISIONS 
Among the major obj·ectives estab-
lished by the Teheran decisions are 
(a) the development of all-out coali-
tion warfare for complete victory over 
the enemy; (b) an orientation toward 
an eventual democratic world organi-
zation of peoples to maintain inter-
national peace and order; ( c) an im-
plied unfoldment of an elementary 
economic program with which to meet 
the terrific problems of postwar recon-
struction. In carrying out these objec-
tives, ample experience and plain real-
ism teach · us that American finance 
capital is a very reluctant cooperator, 
indeed, with the bulk of the American 
people, not to speak of its being their 
progressive leader. 
Take first the matter of an all-out 
military policy. In this respect Ameri-
can monopoly capital has indeed given 
anything but a patriotic lead thus far 
or a convincing promise for the future. 
The patriotic lead, on the contrary, 
has come, and will continue to come 
from the national unity elements 
grouped mainly around the Roosevelt 
forces. So far as the bulk of finance 
capital is concerned, starting out with 
a pre-war record of appeasement, it 
has, all through the war, followed a 
course of rank profiteering and often 
outright sabotage of both the domestic 
and foreign phases of the nation's war 
program, especially the former. While 
these elements obviously do not want 
the United States to lose the war, they 
are certainly very poor defenders of 
the po_licy of unconditional_ surrender. 
In the main, their idea of a satisfactory 
outcome of the war would be some 
sort of a negotiated peace with German 
reactionary forces, and generally to 
achieve a situation that would put a 
wet blanket on all democratic develop-
ments in Europe. All this still remains 
a serious obstacle to full victory. A 
real victory policy, as laid down at 
Teheran, can be achieved only in oppo-
sition to these elements, certainly not 
in easy collaboration with them, and 
above all, not under their leadership-. 
As to the creation of a world organi-
zation to maintain the postwar peace, 
as outlined at the Moscow and Teheran 
meetings, American finance capitalists, 
in the ·main, are equally unreliable. 
All through the war they have been 
saturated with ·anti-British and anti-
Soviet tendencies. -T4ey were litcrall y 
shoved into their dubioµs endorsement 
of Teheran by heavy mass pressure. 
They probably would accept some sort 
of an after-war world organization to 
maintain peace, but certainly not one 
as contemplated by the signers of the 
Teheran and Moscow pacts. At best 
it would be a kind of a touch-and-go 
proposition calculated not to interfere 
with the active imperialist maneuver-
ings they have in mind. So far, the 
real pressure and leadership in the 
United States for a democratic world 
organization of states has come, not 
from the main forces of finance capital, 
but from the broad masses of the 
. people, and there is no reason to · sup-
pose that this situation will alter in 
the foreseeable future. 
Regarding the development of a co-
operative world economic program of 
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reconstruction after the war, as Teheran 
obviously foresees, American finance 
capital acrain ·would indeed be a shaky 
reed to lean upon. While the great 
capitalists of this country would prob-
ably accept some elementary program 
to encourage world trade and also 
would provide a niggardly program of 
emergency relief, their guiding prin-
ciple would be to grab off whatever 
they could of the world market. That 
is about all the significance they would 
attach to epoch-making Teheran. It 
is idle to think that they would come 
forward with a broad economic plan 
based · upon the true interest of our 
nation and the world. The United 
States is not Czechoslovakia or Greece. 
It is not even Great Britain. Despite 
its war injuries, which are much more 
serious than a pp ears at first glance, 
it will nevertheless emerge from this 
war by far the most powerful capitalist 
nation in the world. And its great in-
dustrial rulers will not be inclined to 
make such concessions to the peoples' 
interests as is now being d~~me by the 
capitalists of some occupied countries, 
who are even accepting Communists 
in the Cabinets. American finance capi-
tal has not been seriously chastened by 
the war. It does not consider this war 
as a world defeat for monopoly capital 
(which it doubtless is) after which its 
job will be to assume a respo_nsible 
attitude toward the world capitalist 
sy'stem and to work out a progressive 
domestic program with democratic 
f?rces~ k is strong, greedy and aggres-
sive. 
When American capitalism looks out 
upon the postwar world it will see 
mostly that its great capitalist rivals 
have been badly disabled by the war, 
and ·its· imperialistic appetite will be 
whetted. Germany, Japan, Italy,. France 
and many other capitalist countries will 
be. prostrate by the war's end, and 
Great Britain also will be much weak-
ened. While American big capitalism 
acutely fears Socialism, it nevertheless 
considers that the U.S.S.R., facing a 
gigantic problem of internal reconstruc-
tion, will not be· an insuperable obstacle 
to its plans of imperialistic expansion. 
Altogether, it seems principally an al-
luring opportunity to conquer markets 
and strategic positions, and we may 
trust the Wall Street moguls not to 
overlook this chance. The Teheran 
Conference by no means liquidated 
American imperialism. A postwar 
Roosevelt Administration would con-
tinue to be, at it is now, an imperialist 
government, but one with a certain 
amount of liberal checks upon it. An 
election victory of the Republican Party, -
the chosen party of monopoly capital, 
would mean, however, imperialism of 
a far more aggressive type. Comrade 
Browder goes too far when he says 
that world capitalism and world So-
cialism have learned to live peacefully 
together and (in his Bridgeport speech) 
that "Britain and the United States 
have closed the books finally and for-
ever upon their old expectation that 
the oviet Union as a Socialist country 
is going to disappear some day." The 
fruition of such an attitude on the part 
of these capitalist countries is depen-
dent upon the extent to which demo-· 
cratic support is built up for Teheran 
and its perspective. 
In my article in the New Masses, 
December 14, 1943, I gave a brief 
summary picture of about what we 
could expect from American finance 
capital in the postwar period, given 
the strong control that a Republican 
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victory would bring it. It would en-
danger the whole setup and program 
of Teheran: 
A Republican Adm in i st r a ti on 
would encourage reaction all over the 
world. Rampant American imperial-
ism again in the saddle would weak-
en the foundations of the United 
Nations and sow seeds for a w ·orld 
vVar III. Such an Administration 
would not insist upon unconditional 
surrender; it would not extinguish 
fascism in Europe or establish de-
mocracy; it would not collaborate 
loyally with the U.S.S.R. or Great 
Britain; it would degenerate our 
Good Neighbor policy in Latin 
America .... Nor could Willkie 
as President, even if he wanted to, 
substantially alter this basically re-
actionary course of the Republican 
Party. 
The important sections of the capi-
talists who support \Yendell Willkie 
incline somewhat more to a liberal 
application internationally of the Te-
heran policies, although Willkie's stand 
on Poland was not very promising. 
Their basic kinship with the bulk of 
finance capital and their willingness to 
follow its main international and do-
mestic policies, however, are indicated 
by their common, all-out hatred of 
Roosevelt and by the practical certainty 
that they will, in the event that Willkie 
does not get the Republican nomina-
tion, support any other Republican 
candidate, unless possibly it should be 
some outright fascist or isolationist, 
such as Colonel McCormick. The weak-
ness in our own attitude toward the 
Willkie forces has been to stress too 
much their more superficial liberal ten-
dencies and not enough the more basic 
fact that they are part of the camp of 
reaction and that they constantly tend 
to lure the workers away from the 
Roosevelt progressive line into the trap 
of the Republican Party. The Willkie-
i tes will accept the reactionary line of 
the Hoovers, Tafts and Deweys, rather 
than join with the masses of the peo-
ple to fight these reactionaries. 
All of which means that the bulk 
of monopoly capital cannot be relied 
upon either to cooperate loyally, or 
to lead in a progressive application of 
the Teheran decisions. It will yield 
in this direction only under democratic 
mass pressure. Instead, our reliance 
must be upon 'the great democratic 
people, the real backbone of national 
unity, now organized in the ma:n in 
and around the Roosevelt camp. The 
basic flaw in Comrade Browder's re-
port was that he failed to make clear 
this elementary situation, but instead 
tended to create illusions to the effect 
that these antagonistic forces, the bulk 
of big capital and the democratic sec-
tions of the nation, now locked to-
gether in one of the sharpest class 
battles in American history, can and 
should work harmoniously together 
both now and during the postwar 
period. 
NATIONAL UNITY 
IN THE ELECTIONS 
Following logically his argumenta-
tion to the effect that the decisive sec-
tions of monopoly capital are, or can 
be drawn, not only in "the democratic-
progressive camp" for the realization 
of the Teheran decisions, but may also 
be the leaders of that camp, Comrade 
Browder gave little emphasis indeed 
to the bitter Presidential election strug-
gle now developing. For, certainly, if 
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the decisive sections of American mo- the Democratic South). The big mo-
nopoly capital are behind the Teheran nopolists, after the first few emergency 
decisions loyally, and indeed may lead months of 1933, have in overwhelming 
the national unity, there would be little majority come to hate the Roosevelt 
to worry about regarding the outcome Administration bitterly. They espe-
of the elections. It would make little cially attack the domestic angles of his 
difference which side won. Comrade policies. What backing Roosevelt had 
Browder did not sou d any note of from fi!lance capital at the start has 
alarm about the elections. He did not mostly leaked away from him. This is 
warn the American people militantly because of certain restrictions his Ad-
o£ the grave danger that would be in- ministration has placed upon big capi-
volved in a Republican victory. Instead, tal's drive for unlimited power. The 
in his National Committee report, he monopolists hate the Roosevelt Gov-
handled the two major parties almost ernment because it is not an instru-
in a tweedle-dee, tweedle-dum manner, ment that will do their bidding fully 
and in his Madison Square Garden and immediately; they hate it because 
speech, where he presented the Party of the social legislation it has written 
line to the public, he devoted only on the books and also for what it 
twelve lines to the vital subject of the threatens to adopt during a fourth 
elections. Logically following out his term; they hate it because it has facili-
general position, he seemed rather to tated the organization of ten million 
be more interested in bridging the gap workers into trade unions, which weak-
between the two warring parties in ened their great open shop fortress in 
the name of an all-inclusive national the basic industries; they hate it because 
unity, than in stirring into victory ac- they think there is altogether too great 
tion the great democratic forces of the a democratic content in ·its war and 
country, the only ones who can 'be foreign policies. 
relied upon to make the hope of Te- The substance of the present elec-
heran real. tion struggle, therefore, is an attempt 
Let us consider the elections a little of monopoly capital to break up the 
more in detail. Briefly, the situation is ~oosevelt liberal-labor combination. It 
this: during the eleven years of the is an effort of the big financial tycoon' 
Roosevelt Administration, monopoly to get rid of the governmental and 
capital has, of course, remained domi- trade union hindrances that have irked 
nant; its profits have gone right on, them so much under the New Deal, 
and it has also very great! y increased so they can branch out into the active 
its concentration and strength, particu- imperialistic regime they have in mind. 
larly during the war period. Neverthe- They are fighting Roosevelt vic.iously, 
less, monopoly capital has found an trying to defeat him in his own party 
obstacle in the Roosevelt Administra- with their Parleys and Southern poll-
tion. This Administration is, in fact, if taxers, and, if they fail in this, to beat 
not formally, a coalition among the him with a Republican candidate if 
workers, middle class elements, and he is nominated for a fourth term. 
the more liberal sections of the hour- The big capitalists are fighting Roose-
geoisie (with the special situation in velt with striking unity Even though 
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i~ey are having trouble to decide upon 
a candidate of their own, they are 
nevertheless united in opposing Roose-
velt. The fact that 90 per cent of the 
daily press and all the leading em play-
ers' associations and conservative farm-
ers' organizations are definitely opposed 
to Roosevelt, ~ells graphically where 
finance capital is standing in this cru-
cial election struggle. I ts victory would 
be understood all over the world as 
a victory for reaction. The fascists and 
every other enemy of Teheran in the 
United States and abroad would hail 
it as their triumph. 
In this most crucial election since 
1864 our duty as a Communist Party 
is plain. We must go all-out for a con-
tinuation of the Roosevelt policies, as 
the only way to support effectively the 
Teheran decisions, both in their na-
tion al and international implications. 
We must tell the people precisely who 
the enemy is that they are fighting-
organized big capital-and mobilize 
our every resource to help make their 
fight succeed. We must awaken them 
to the grave danger of a reactionary 
victory, pointing out the heavy mobili-
zation of the capitalist elements, the 
systematic propaganda-poisoning of the 
armed forces against labor, and the 
serious inroads that have been made 
into Roosevelt's labor and working 
farmer support. 
The mobilization of labor's forces 
politically and combining them with 
all other democratic, win-the-war forces 
supporting Teheran for an election 
victory over reaction, whose main fort 
is the Republican Party, should have 
been the all-pervading business of our 
National Committee. But it most em-
phatically was not. Instead, with Com-
rade Browder's new conceptions of na-
tional unity, there w~s a tendency for 
us to bridge the gap in the elections. 
This would, ·indeed, be a .serious mis-
take for us to make, to try to_ convince 
the American people in the heat of this 
great and significant struggle, that there 
is a possibility for progressive unity 
with the very forces that they are-fight-
ing against and must . defeat in this 
election, the monopolists. 
Let us not make the serious error of 
slipping in between these fighting 
forces in the name of an all~inclusive 
but illusory national unity with big 
capital. We must understand clearly 
and definitely that the basic forces of 
a progressive national unity are those 
grouped, in the main, around Roose-
velt's banners and we must fight to 
help them extend and solidify their 
ranks. Perhaps we can learn a lesson 
from the recent hotly-contested elec-
tions foF the Auto Workers' conven-
tions when we, in the name of trade 
union unity, took a neutral position 
and the dangerous Social-Democrat, 
Walter Reuther, almost won control 
of the convention out of the hands of 
the win-the-war forces. The influence 
of our Party in the national elections 
can be very great, especially in solidify-
ing the, at present, confused ranks of 
labor, and it must not be frittered 
away in any middle, half-middle, or 
above-the-battle position. 
NATIONAL UNITY IN THE 
POSTWAR PERIOD 
What kind of a postwar perspective 
may we look forward to in this coun-
try? In my judgment, it will be quite 
different from the long period of 
peaceful class collaboration and social 
advance, in which the monopolists arc 
progressively collaborating, that Com-
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rade Browder seems to en visage. The 
gravity of the world's postwar con-
struction problems, which our country 
also will feel, and the sharp contradic-
tions in dass interests involved, will 
not permit such a harmonious progress. 
. It . is true that at the present time 
many big capitalist leaders and or-
ganizations are talking glibly in gen""'. 
eralizations about the fine economic 
conditions they will create after the 
war. But bearing in mind the glowing 
promises, all unfulfilled, that were 
made toward the conclusion of World 
War I, we can safely discount much 
of their rosy prophecies and look 
sharply at their real policies. After all, 
these men of big promises have a great 
prize at stake, the full control of the 
United States "Government, and if they 
can fool the people with tricky dema-
gogy it will be a well-paying invest-
ment. 
Actually, the great capitalists in this 
country are orientating in the main 
upon a long-time postwar industrial 
boom, based upon reconstruction work 
and the spontaneous development of 
new industries, as well as the capture 
of new international markets. Al-
though in case of a crisis these ele-
ments would be quick to appeal to the 
state for aid, they are quite generally 
pooh-poohing and opposing any at-
tempts to prepare in advance a Fed-
eral Governmental program to keep 
the industries operating and the masses 
employed. To them this is still all 
pretty much "boondoggling" and in-
terference with the mystical operation 
of "free enterprise." That their true 
perspective is almost complete reliance 
upon privately owned industry along 
the accustomed paths of the past, is 
evidenced by the fact that they have 
i~ot introduced a single postwar eco-
nomic measure into Congress or popu-
~arized it before the country. Every 
progressive proposal made so far, from 
the general -slogan of the Four Free-
~oms, to the economic reconstruction 
program of the National Resources 
Planning Board, the Wagner-Murray 
social insurance bill, and the legisla-
tion to rehabilitate members of the 
armed forces, and n-0w the President's 
recently announced 34,000 mile high-
way plan and his new Bill of Rights, 
have all originated in the camp of the 
Administration forces and are opposed 
by the main forces of monopoly capital. 
And so it will continue to be. In 
the . domestic, as in the international 
, sphere, the progressive lead will not 
come from monopoly capital. The far-
reaching economic programs, involv-
ing government intervention in . indus-
try on an unprecedented scale that will 
be necessary to guard our country from 
an economic collapse. worse than that 
of 1929, will originate in a .truly pro-
gressive camp, consisting of the masses 
of workers, farmers, middle classes and 
liberal sections of capitalists. And they 
will be brought to realization, not in 
easy agreement with the monopolists, 
as Comrade Brmvder would appear to 
believe, but in .active pressure against 
them. 
Let us consider, therefore, what is 
likely to confront us as a result of the 
elections? First, if President Roose-
velt should be elected again and should 
~ry vigorously to put into effect a 
progressive program, including the in-
ternational decisions of Teheran and 
the econo~ic ·and political aims he 
enunciated in his recent "Report to the 
Nation," concretely, his new Bill of 
Rights, then he will certainly collide 
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heavily with the powerful forces of the 
bulk of American finance capital. 
Their present bitter opposition to all 
such measures would not suddenly 
melt away in sweetness and collabora-
tion. Inasmuch as we now fall far 
short of national unity even under the 
severe pressure of war, may we expect 
more unity when this unifying pressure 
is released? The American big bour-
geoisie show no signs of interpreting 
the Teheran Agreement in the sense 
that henceforth they must voluntarily 
adopt progressive programs in the 
United States. They still respond only 
to pressure of one kind or another, 
exerted nationally or internationally. 
The progressive democratic forces of 
national unity under a postwar Roose-
velt Administration should, and no 
doubt would, seek to widen as far as 
possible the area of agreement around 
their necessary economic programs and 
also generally to work on an orderly 
development of our national progress, 
but this desire will not save them from 
coming into serious collisions with the 
forces of finance capital. 
On the other hand, should a Dewey, 
Taft or Bricker, or even the liberal-
speaking Mr. Willkie be elected, then 
we could expect definite attempts of 
the new Administration to give mo-
nopoly capital a much freer hand at 
the expense of the people. If success-
ful, this could only result in strength-
ening reaction and imperilling our 
economic future. At best, the domestic 
economic program of such an Admin-
istration would be one based on boom 
expectation and upon extending gov-
ernment aid to the workers only in the 
most niggardly measure and under 
heavy pressure. American finance capi-
tal would soon demonstrate that it 
had learned very little of a progressive 
economic nature through the war and 
the period of the New Deal. The big 
capitalists, if they did not make an 
open attack upon the unions, would 
probably try to paralyze organized la-
bor by ensnaring it into a program of 
intensified class collaboration, designed 
in their own interests and not in those 
of labor and the nation. The capitalists 
have not forgotten the way they did 
this so disastrously to the labor move-
ment and the people after World War 
I. \Vi th the added consideration that 
big business today, bitterly remember-
ing the liberal-labor coalition that has 
backed the government for the past 
dozen years, would adopt any means 
to prevent a repetition of this hated 
experience. It could therefore be ex-
pected, what with the growing fascist 
spirit in its ranks and the tricks it 
has learned from Hitler, that the mo-
nopolists would adopt, if necessary, the 
most drastic means to clip the strength 
of labor and to prevent the return to 
power of any popular, progressive gov-
ernment. 
At our National Committee meet-
ing there were delegates who inter-
preted Comrade Browder' s report, not 
illogically, as implying a no.strike 
policy for the trade unions in the post-
war period. One, who went uncor-
rected, said: "We have the perspective 
of continued cooperation, a no.strike 
policy and no class clashes for a long 
time after the war." This is nonsense, 
of course. It would disarm the trade 
unions in the face of their enemies. 
The Teheran Conference did not abol-
ish the class struggle in the United 
States. The workers would indeed be 
foolish if they were to orientate upon 
any such illusory perspective. The cue 
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to the trade unions, in facing the post-
war period, is to unify their ranks, na-
tionally and internationally, to organ-
ize the millions of still unorganized 
workers, to develop their united po-
litical action movement so that they 
may be a real force in the democratic 
coalition, to establish the broadest pos-
sible alliance with all other democratic 
groups and classes, to defeat reaction 
in the coming national elections, to 
prepare constructive economic pro-
posals for the postwar period and work 
diligently for them, and generally to 
strengthen their ranks and be in readi-
ness to defend their organizations and 
their living standards from any and all 
attacks by their powerful and inveter-
ate enemy, monopoly capital. It would 
be disastrous if our Party were in any 
way to weaken labor's alertness to 
these necessities. 
THE SLOGAN OF 
"FREE ENTERPRISE" 
Comrade Browder was correct in 
saying that we should not take issue 
with the reactionaries' slogan of "free 
enterprise" in the sense that in the 
Presidential election the issue is for 
privately-owned industry or against it. 
But he is incorrect when he says, "The 
issue · of 'free enterprise' is thus not in 
any way, shape or form the issue of 
the coming struggle for control of 
United States policy in the Congres-
si-0nal and Presidential elections." On 
the contrary, "free enterprise" is the 
main slogan of the monopolists and be-
hind it stands the whole conception of 
their program. It cannot be dismissed 
by saying that "If anyone wishes to 
describe the existing system of capital-
ism in the United States as 'free enter-
prise,' that's all right with us." 
In stressing their main slogan of 
"free enterprise" the monopolists are 
of course trying to make plausible their 
unfounded allegation of Socialism 
against the Roosevelt Administration. 
But they are also seeking to do much 
more than this. Within the purview 
of this slogan is comprised their whole 
determination · to regain unrestricted 
control of the government, to weaken 
the power of organized labor, and gen-
erally to free the hands of monopoly. 
The economic essence of this slogan 
is a main dependence upon a long-
term industrial boom to solve our na-
tional economic problems, with im-
provised government work programs 
and aid for the workers and farmers 
considered merely as emergency pro-
grams. Thus, Senator Taft says in the 
Saturday Evening Post, December 11: 
''Substantially full employment must 
be restored and maintained through 
free enterprise, with only such assist-
ance from government as is proved to 
be absolutely necessary." That is to 
say, only after the economic crisis 
bursts upon us we may look for frag-
mentary, skinflint programs of govern-
ment work and relief. The "free en-
terprise" slogan represents a concrete 
progr-am just as definitely as did that 
of the "New Deal." Hence, to accept 
or ignore this slogan means to imply, 
in the popular mind, to accept or 
ignore the program behind it. 
It is obvious, therefore, that we can-
not simply brush aside big business' 
main slogan of "free enterprise" as 
being merely demagogic and let it go 
at that. On the contrary, while thor-
oughly exposing the demagoguery- of 
the slogan, we must also expose its 
reactionary economic and political con-
tent. This can only be done on the 
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basis of bringing forward the program 
of the progressive forces. In doing this, 
the question of social insurance and 
government stimulation of industry 
cannot be put forth merely as emer-
gency stop-gap measures to apply in 
times of crises. They must be pre-
sented as essential steps if we are to 
cushion ourselves against plunging 
headlong into overwhelming economic 
crises; if we are to make even an 
approach to the full production and 
jobs for all that everybody is now talk-
ing about so glibly. The counter-pro-
gram of the progressive, win-the-war, 
win-the-peace forces to the reactionary 
"free enterprise," or unrestrained mo-
nopoly program of the reactionaries, 
does not now contain demands for the 
nationalization of banks, railroads, or 
other industries, and it will not in the 
immediate postwar situation. But the 
grave difficulties that will confront 
capitalism all over the world after this 
war, not excluding American capital-
ism, will surely eventually raise the 
need and popularity of such demands. 
• 
On the question of the two-party · 
system, it is my opinion that Com-
rade Browder also dismisses that matter 
too easily, by speaking of "the stone 
wall of the two-party system." He 
subscribes to "the general national 
opinion that this 'two-party system' 
provides adequate channels for the 
basic preservation of democratic 
rights," and thus leaves the impression 
that the Communists no longer look 
beyond the present two-party line-up, 
even in the most eventual sense. 
In such a presentation, it seems to 
me, there is contained an underesti-
mation of the political initiative of the 
democratic masses of the people and an 
overestimation of their acceptance of 
the bourgeois leadership of the two 
main parties. While the situation is 
very much not ripe for a new political 
party line-up in the United States, 
nevertheless this can by no means be 
excluded permanently. I prefer, in-
. stead, the formulation of . Philip Mur-
ray in the current issue of the Ameri-
can Magazine, where he states that the 
political situation at this time in the 
United States does not jusify the forma-
tion of a third party. 
THE QUESTION OF SOCIALISM 
In presenting such a basic change 
in line to our Party as he did, it seems 
to me that Comrade Browder should 
have made a more complete statement 
regarding our Party attitude to the 
question of Socialism. While it is cor-
rect to say, as Gomrade Browder does, 
that Socialism is not the issue in the 
war, nor will it be the issue in the im-
mediate postwar period in the United 
States, and that, therefore, to raise the 
issue now could only result in narrow-
ing down the national unity necessary 
to win the war and to carry out gen-
erally the decisions of Teheran, never., 
theless, merely to take this negative at-
titude toward Socialism is not enough. 
We must also develop our positive 
position. 
We have to bear in mind that al-
though Socialism will not be the po-
litical issue in the United States in the 
early postwar period, it will neverthe-
less be a question of great and growing 
mass interest and influence. This is 
true for a couple of major reasons, 
aside from the possibility that some 
countries of Europe may adopt Social-
ism at the close of the war: first, the 
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Soviet Union in this war has given a 
world-shaking demonstration of the 
power and success of Socialism. The 
democratic peoples of the world, who 
have been saved by the Red Army from 
Hitler tyranny, are looking upon this 
great demonstration with amazement, 
gratitude and a lively curiosity. For 
the first time they are beginning to 
see through the wall of prejudice that 
was so carefully built up against the 
U.S.S.R. over so many years. They 
are extreme! y interested, and in a more 
and more objective sense, to learn 
further about the great, new, socialist 
world power. The present new crop of 
books friendly to the U.S.S.R. is an 
early sign of the new mass interest in 
the Soviet Union and its Socialism. 
With the development of the postwar 
reconstruction period, we can expect 
the . U.S.S.R. to perform as great 
"miracles" as it is now doing in a 
military way, hence this mass interest 
is bound to increase. The second basic 
reason for ~ great postwar mass in-
terest in Socialism is , that with the 
world capitalist system badly injured, 
there will be definite tendencies for 
the peoples in all countries to learn 
from the Soviet regime and to adapt 
tc- their own problems such features 
as they can from the obviously success-
ful and flourishing Socialist Soviet 
Union. _The whole question of the ad-
vance to Socialism will be in for a 
fresh discussion in the new world 
conditions. 
In view of all this, obviously the 
Communist Party, as the party of 
Socialism, cannot take merely a nega-
tive attitude toward Socialism. We 
must teach the workers the signifi-
cance of the socialist developments 
of our time and their relation to the 
United States. While we point out that 
Socialism is not now the issue in our 
country, we must also show that it is 
nevertheless the only final solution for 
our nation's troubles. If we do not do 
this, then the Social-Democrats will be 
left a free hand to pose as the party of 
Socialism, with consequent detriment 
to our Party and to the whole struggle 
of the win-the-war, win-the-peace 
forces. 
Obviously, the questions raised by 
Comrade Browder in his report are of 
far-reaching significance and represent 
a radical departure from our past con-
ceptions of national unity. They de-
serve the most profound consideration 
in the pre-convention discussion that 
is now beginning. In .these days of 
world-shaking war and with postwar 
problems of enormous size and com-
plexity looming before us, our Party 
must be doubly careful in the develop-
ment of its political line. I for one am 
convinced that if we give this close 
attention to Comrade Browder' s re-
port, adopted by the National Com-
mittee, we will find it necessary to alter 
it in the general sense of the several 
points raised in this letter. 
Comradely yours~ 
WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. 
NOTE BY WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 
The above letter to the National 
Committee was rejected at an enlarged 
meeting of the . Political Bureau, held 
on February 8, 1944, with about 40 
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leading Party members in attendance 
and voting. Comrade Browder put as 
the main issue of the meeting, not a 
re-survey of the pol_itical policies, in the 
light of my letter, but the preservation 
of the unity of the Party. After a day's 
discussion, all present voted against my 
letter, except Darcy and myself. 
As a result of this serious rebuff and 
in view of Comrade Browder' s ex-
pressed determination to stamp out all 
open opposition, an attitude on his part 
which was strengthened by the heavy 
vote of the enlarged Political Bureau 
against my letter, I concluded that it 
would be folly for me to try to take 
the question to the Party membership 
at that time. For to _do so would have 
weakened our general work in sup-
port of the war; ruined our current big 
recruiting drive, interfered seriously 
with the development of our vital na-
tional election campaign, and perhaps 
resulted in splitting our Party. 
So I decided to confine my opposi-
tion to the ranks of the National 
Committee, a course which I followed 
during the next year and a half by 
means of innumerable criticisms, pol-
icy proposals, articles, etc., all going 
in the direction of eliminating Com-
rade Browder' s opportuni~tic errors. 
I was convinced that the course of po-
litical events and the Communist train-
ing of our leadership would eventually 
cause our Party to return to a sound 
line of policy. 
It will be noted that my letter to the 
National Committee does not discuss 
the matter of dissolution, or reorgan-
ization, of the Communist Party into 
the Communist Poltical Association. 
When Comrade Browder proposed 
this liquidatory , step several members 
of the National Board raised objections 
to it, and, · of course, I opposed and 
voted against it. Nevertheless Comrade 
Browder was able to push it through 
in spite of this opposition. At the time 
of my sending the letter to the National 
Committee, things had proceeded so 
far that I considered the reorganization 
of the Party into the C.P.A. as virtually 
an accomplished fact. It had already 
been public! y an.u<:>unced and endorsed 
at the January meeting of the National 
Committee, and, in fact, the Party was 
already in the preliminary stages of 
reorganization. Consequently, I felt that 
further agitation of the matter was 
hopeless for the time being and could 
only cause useless strife and confusion 
in our ranks. So I left the whole ques-
tion out of my letter to the National 
Committee. The immediate task, as I 
saw it, was for me to help to keep the 
C.P .A., in fact, if not in name, the 
Communist Party. 
ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U.S.A. 
By JACQUES DUCLOS 
Reprinted from the April, 1945, issue of CAHIERS ou CoMMUNISME, 
theoretical organ of the Communist Party of France. 
Many readers of Cahiers du Com-
munisme have asked us for clarification 
on the dissolution of the Communist 
Party of the U.S.A. and the creation of 
the Communist Political Association. 
We have received some information 
on this very important political event, 
and th us we can in full freedom give 
our opinion on the political considera-
tions which were advanced to justify 
the dissolution of the Communist Party. 
The reasons for dissolution of the 
Communist Party in the U.S.A. and for 
the "new course" in the activity of 
American Communists are set forth in 
official documents of the Party and in 
a certain number of speeches of its 
former secretary, Earl Browder. 
In his speech devoted to the resl}lts 
of the Teheran Conference and the poli-
tical situation in the United States, 
delivered December 12, 1943, in Bridge-
port and published in the Communist 
magazine in January, r 944, Earl Brow-
der for the first time discussed the neces-
sity of changing the course of the 
C.P.U.S.A. 
The Teheran Conference served as 
Browder' s point of departure from 
which to develop his conceptions fa-
vorable to a change of course of the 
American C.P. However, while justly 
stressing the importance of the Teheran 
Conference for victory in the war 
against fascist Germany, Earl Browder 
drew from the Conference decisions er-
roneous conclusions in no wise flowing 
from a Marxist analysis of the situation. 
Earl Browder made himself the pro-
tagonist of a false concept of the ways 
of social evolution in general, and in 
the first place, the social evolution of the 
United States. 
Earl Browder declared, in effect, that 
at Teheran capitalism and socialism had 
begun to find the means of peaceful 
co-existence and collaboration in the 
framework of one and the same world; 
he added that the Teheran accords re-
garding common policy similarly pre-
supposed common efforts with a view 
to reducing to a minimum or com-
pletely suppressing methods of strug-
gle and opposition of force to force in 
the solution of internal problems of 
each country. 
That (the Teheran Declaration) 
is the only hope of a continuance of 
civilization in our time. That is why 
I can accept and support and believe 
in the Declaration at Teheran and 
make it the starting point for all my 
thinking about the problems of our 
country and the world. (Address at 
Bridgeport, Conn., Dec. 12, 1943.) 
Starting from the decisions of the 
Teheran Conference, Earl Browder 
drew political conclusions regarding 
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the problems of the World, and above 
. all the internal situation in the United 
States. Some of these conclusions claim 
that the principal problems of internal 
politics of the United States must in 
the future be solved exclusively by 
means of reforms, for the "expectation 
of unlimited inner conflict threatens 
also the perspective of international 
unity held forth at Teheran." (Teheran 
and Amer~·ca, pp. 16-17.) 
The Teheran agreements mean to 
Earl Browder that the greatest part 
of Europe, west of the Soviet Union, 
will probably be reconstituted on a 
bourgeois-democratic basis and not on 
a fascist-capitalist or Soviet basis. 
But it will be a capitalist basis 
which is conditioned by the principle 
of complete democratic self-determi-
nation for each nation, allowing full 
expression within each nation of all 
progressive and constructive forces 
and setting up no obstacles to the 
development of democracy and social 
progress in accordance with the 
varying desires of the peoples. It 
means a perspective for Europe mini-
mizing, and to a great extent elimi-
nating altogether, the threat of civil 
war after the international war. 
(Bridgeport speech, The Communist, 
January, 1944, p. 7.) 
And Earl Browder adds: 
Whatever may be the situation in 
other lands, in the United States 
this means a perspective in the im-
mediate postwar period of expanded 
production and employment and the 
strengthening of democracy within 
the framework of the present system 
-and not a perspective of the transi-
tion to socialism. _ 
We can set our goal as the realiza-
ti on of the Teheran policy, or we 
can set ourselves the task of pushing 
the United States immediately into 
socialism. Clearly, however, we can-
not choose both. 
The first policy, with all its dif-
ficulties, is definitely within the realm 
of possible achievement. The second 
would be dubious, · indeed, especially 
when we remember that even the 
most progressive section of t~e labor 
movement is committed to capital-
ism, is not even as vaguely socialistic 
as the British Labor Party. 
Therefore, the policy for Marxists 
in the United States is to face with 
all its consequences the perspective 
of a capitalist postwar reconstruction 
in the United States, to evaluate all 
plans on that basis, and to collaborate 
actively with the most democratic 
and progressive majority in the coun-
try in a national un£ty sufficiently 
broad and effective to realize the 
policies of Teheran. (Teheran 
and America, p. 20.) 
To put the Teheran policy into prac-
tice, Earl Browder considers that it is 
necessary to reconstruct the entire po-
litical and social life of the United 
States. 
Every class, every group, every in-
dividual, every political party in 
America will have to readjust itself 
to this great issue embodied in the 
policy given to us by Roosevelt, Stalin 
and Churchill. The country is only 
beginning to face it so far. Everyone 
must begin to draw the conclusion 
from it and adjust himself to the 
new world that is created by it. Old 
formulas and old prejudices are go-
ing to be of no use whatever to us 
as guides to find our way in this 
new world. We are going to have 
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to draw together all men and all 
groups with the intelligence enough 
to see the overwhelming importance 
of this issue, to understand that upon 
its correct solution depends the fate 
of our country and the fate of civili-
zation throughout the world. 
We shall have to be prepared to 
break with anyone that refuses to 
~ support and fight for the realization 
of the Teheran Agreement and the 
Anglo - Soviet - American Coalition. 
We must be prepared to give the 
hand of cooperation and fellowship 
to everyone who fights for the real-
iza-tion of this coalition. If J. P. 
Morgan supports this coalition and 
goes down the line for it, I as a 
Communist am prepared to clasp his 
hand on that and join with him to 
realize it. Class divisions or political 
groupings have no significance now 
except as they reflect one side or the 
other of this issue. (Bridgeport 
speech, January, 1944, The . Com-
mun£st, p. 8.) 
Browder' s remark regarding Morgan 
provoked quite violent objections from 
members of the American C. P. Ex-
plaining this idea to the plenary session 
of the central committee, Browder said: 
. . . I was not making a verbal 
abolition of class differences, but that 
I was rejecting the political slogan of 
class against class" as our guide to 
political alignments in the next 
period. I spoke of Mr. Morgan sym-
bolically as the representative of a 
class, and not as an individual-in 
which capacity I know him not at 
all. (Teheran and Amer£ca, p. 24.) 
As Browder indicates, creation of 
a vast national unity in the U. S. pre-
supposes that the Communists would 
be a part of this. Thus, the Communist 
organization must conclude a long-
term alliance with far more important 
forces. From these considerations, Brow-
der drew the conclusion that the Com-
munist organization in the U. S. should 
change its name, reject the word 
" " d k h party an ta e anot er name more 
exactly reflecting its role, a name more 
in conformity, according to him, with 
the political traditions of America. 
Earl Browder proposed to name the 
new organization "Communist Political 
Association," which, in the traditional 
American two-party system, will not 
intervene as a "party," that is, it will 
not propose candidates in the elections, 
will neither enter the Democratic or 
Republican Party, but will work to as-
semble a broad progressive and demo-
cratic movement within all parties. 
In his report to the plenary session 
of the central committee of the C.P., 
U.S.A., Browder spoke in detail of the 
economic problems of U. S. postwar 
national economy, and their solution 
on the basis of collaboration and unity 
of different classes. Browder indi-
cated that American business men, in-
dustrialists, financiers and even reaction-
ary organizations do not admit the 
possibility of a new economic crisis in 
the U. S. after the war. On the con-
trary, all think that U. S. national 
economy after the war can preserve 
and maintain the same level of produc-
tion as during the war. 
However, the problem is in the diffi-
culties of transition from wartime eco-
nomic activity to peacetime production, 
and in the absorption by home and for-
eign markets of $90 billions in supple-
mentary merchandise which the Amer-
ican government is now buying for 
war needs. In this regard, Earl Brow-
der daims that the Teheran Conference 
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decisions make possible the overcom-
ing of Anglo-American rivalry in the 
struggle for foreign outlets, and that 
the government of the United States, 
in agreement with its great Allies, 
and with the participation of govern-
ments of interested states, can create 
a series of giant economic associa-
tions for development of backward 
regions and war-devastated regions in 
~urope, Africa, Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. 
As to extension of the home market, 
to permit absorption of a part of the 
$90,000,000,000 worth of merchandise, 
Browder suggests doubling the purchas-
ing power of the average consumer, 
notably by wage increases. 
Marxists will not help the reaction-
aries, by opposing the slogan of "Free 
Enterprise" with any form of counter-
slogan. If anyone wishes to describe 
the existing system of capitalism in 
the United States as "free enterprise,'' 
that is all right with us, and we frank-
ly declare that we are ready to co-
operate in making this capitalism 
work effectively in the postwar period 
with the least possible burdens upon 
the people. (lbz'd., p. 2I.) 
Further, Browder claims that national 
unity could no more be obtained by fol-
lowing a policy based on slogans aimed 
at the monopolies and big capital. 
Today, to speak seriously of drastic 
curbs on monopoly capital, leading 
toward the breaking of its power, 
and imposed upon monopoly capi-
tal against its will, is merely another 
form of proposing the immediate 
transition to socialism. (Ibid., p. 23.) 
In his closing speech to the plen-
ary session of the C.P. Central Com-
mittee in January, 1944, Browder tried 
to base himself on "theoretical" argu-
ments to justify the change of course 
of the American C.P. Also he ex-
pressed his concept of Marxism and 
its application under present conditions. 
Browder thinks that by pronounc-
ing the dissolution of the C. P. and 
creating the C.P .A., the American Com-
munists are following a correct path, 
resolving problems which have no par-
allel in history and demonstrating how 
Marxist theory should be applied in 
practice. 
Marxism never was a series of dog-
mas and formulas; it never was a 
catalogue of prohibitions listing the 
things we must not do irrespective 
of new developments and new situa-
tions; it does not tell us that things 
ca.quot be done; it tells us how to do 
the things that have to be done, the 
things that history has posed as 
necessary and indispensable tasks. 
Marxism is a theory of deeds, not of 
dont' s. Marxism is therefore a posi-
tive, dynamic, creative force, and it 
is such a great social power precise! y 
because, as a scientific outlook and 
method, it takes living realities as 
its starting point. It has always re-
garded the scientific knowledge of 
the past as a basis for meeting the 
new and unprecedented problems of 
the present and the future. And the 
largest problems today are new in a 
very basic sense. 
We have more than ever the task 
to refresh oursel vcs in the great tra-
dition of Marxism, completely free-
ing ourselves from the last remnants 
of the dogmatic and schematic ap-
proach .... 
True, according to-all of the text-
books of the past, we are departing 
from orthodoxy, because none of our 
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textbooks foresaw or predicted a long 
period of peaceful relations in the 
world before the general advent of 
socialism. (Ibid., PP· 43-45.) 
The new political course outlined by 
Browder found but few adversaries 
among the leading militants of the 
C.P. U.S.A. At the enlarged session of 
the political bureau of the Party, those 
who spoke up violently agains.t Brow-
der were William Foster, president of 
the C.P.U.S.A., and Darcy, member of 
the central committee and secretary of 
the Eastern Pennsylvania district. 
Foster expounded his differences with 
Browder in two documents-in a letter 
to the national committee of the 
C.P.U.S.A. and in his introductory 
speech to the extraordinary session of 
the National Committee, Feb. 8, 1944. 
In these two documents, Foster criti-
cizes Browder' s theoretical theses re-
garding the change in the character of 
monopoly capital in the U.S.A., the 
perspectives of postwar economic de-
velopment as well as Browder' s position 
on the question of the Presidential elec-
tions. 
In his Feb. 8 speech Foster also at-
tacks those who, on the basis of Brow-
der' s theses, suggested that strikes be 
renounced in the postwar period. 
But in neither one of these docu-
ments did Foster openly take a stand 
against the dissolution of the Com-
munist Party. 
In his report Comrade Browder, 
in attempting to apply the Teheran 
decisions to the United States, drew 
a perspective of a smoothly working 
national unity, including the decisive 
sections of American finance capital, 
not only during the war but also in 
the postwar; a unity which (with 
him quoting approvingly from Vic-
tory and After), would lead to "a 
rapid healing of the terrible wounds 
of the war" and would extend on 
indefinitely, in an all-class peaceful 
collaboration, for a "long term of 
years." In this picture, American im-
perialism virtually disappears, there 
remains hardly a trace of the class 
struggle, and Socialism plays practi-
cally no role whatever. (Foster Letter 
to Members of N. C.) 
Foster violently criticized Browder 
because the latter, while outlining a 
new course in the activity of the Ameri-
can C.P ., had lost sight of several of 
the most fundamental principles of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
. It seems to me that Comrade 
Browder' s rather rosy outlook for 
capitalism is baseq upon two errors. 
The first of these is an underestima-
tion of the deepening of the crisis of 
world capitalism caused by the war. 
When questioned directly, in Political 
Bureau discussion, Comrade Brow-
der agreed that capitalism has been 
seriously weakened by the war, but 
his report would tend to give the 
opposite implication. The impression 
is left that capitalism has somehow 
been rejuvenated and is now enter-
ing into a new period of expansion 
and growth. (I bid.) 
According to Foster, world capitalism 
can surely count on a certain postwar 
boom, but it would be wrong to think 
that capitalism, even American capital-
ism, could maintain itself at the pro-
duction level attained in wartime, and 
resolve, in a measure more or less satis-
factory to the_ working class, the com-
plex problems arising after the war. 
Without diminishing the importance 
of the Teheran conference, Foster con-
sidered, nevertheless, that it would be 
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an extreme! y dangerous illusion to 
think that Teheran had in any way 
changed the class nature of capitalism, 
that the T eheran conference had liqui-
dated the class struggle, as it appears 
from Browder' s speech. The fact that 
capitalism has learned to live in peace 
and in alliance with socialism is far 
from meaning that American monopoly 
capitalism has become progressive and 
that it can henceforth be unreservedly 
included in national unity in the strug-
gle for the realization of the Teheran 
conference dec;isions. 
The class nature of imperialistic 
capitalism, Foster asserted, ·is reac-
tionary. That is why national unity 
with it is impossible. The furious 
attack of these circles against the 
democratic Roosevelt government-
does this not supply a convincing 
proof? Can one doubt, after that, 
that the monopolist sections in the 
U. S. are enemies and not friends 
of the Teheran decisions as Earl 
Browder thinks? · 
The danger in this whole point of 
view is that, in our eagerness to 
secure support for Teheran, we may 
walk into the trap of ti;ying to co-
operate with the enemies of Teheran, 
or even of falling under their influ-
ence. Trailing after the big bour-
geoisie is the historic error of social-
democracy, and we must be vigilantly 
on guard against it. (I bid.) 
Foster also criticized Browder for 
his attitude toward the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, which is, in 
his opinion, one of the most reactionary 
organizations of monopoly capital in 
the U. S. However, Browder thought 
he had to approve a certain number of 
the economic measures of this associa-
tion. He accepts its central slogan, that 
of "free private enterprise," which is 
in reality basically reactionary . and con-
trary to the Roosevelt policy. What is 
more, Browder, counting on seeing 
workers' wages increased 1 oo per cent 
after the war, invites U. S. monopolists 
to share his good intentions and says 
to them: "(You] must find the solution 
in order to keep their plants in opera-
tion." 
Citing these words of Browder' s, 
Foster declared: 
. In my opinion, it would be a 
catastrophe for the labor movement 
if it accepted such a plan or such an 
idea, even if only provisionally. Start-
ing from a notoriously erroneous 
conception, that U.S. monopoly capi-
talism can play a progressive role 
Comrade Browder looks askance at 
all suggestions tending to subdue the 
monopolies, whereas the C.P. can 
accept only one policy, that of tend-
ing to master these big capitalists 
now and after the war. In calling 
for the collaboration of classes, Brow-
der sows wrong illusions of tailism 
in the minds of trade union mem-
bers. Whereas the job of the trade 
unions is to elaborate their policy and 
dictate it to the big employers. 
As to the problems of postwar or-
ganizations, Foster repudiated all illu-
sions regarding the self-styled progres-
sive role of monopoly capital. America, 
Foster declared, will emerge from the 
war as a powerful state in the world, 
the industrial magnates will be rather 
inclined to dictatorial acts than to com-
promises, and it is hardly likely, he 
added, that we can expect a progressive 
program from them. 
So far as the bulk of finance capi-
tal is concerned, starting out with a 
prewar record of appeasement, it has, 
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all through the war, followed a course 
of rank profiteering and often out-
right sabotage of both the domestic 
and foreign phases of the nation's 
war program, especially the former. 
While these elements obvious! y do 
not want the United States to lose 
the war, they are ·certainly very poor 
defenders of the policy of uncondi-
. tional surrender. In the main, their 
idea of a satisfactory outcome of the 
war would be some sort of a nego-
tiated peace with German reaction(lry 
forces, and generally to achieve a 
situation that would put a wet 
blanket on ~II democratic govern-
ments in Europe. (Ibid.) 
·Foster thinks that Browder is right 
when he says that the question of 
socialism is not the issue of the present 
war and that to pose this question 
would only result in restricting the 
framework of national unity. But con-
sidering the fact that the successes of 
the U.S.S.R. will increase the interest 
of the masses in socialism, the Com-
munists must explain to the workers 
the importance of the socialist develop-
ment of our epoch and the way in 
which it concerns the U. S., for other-
wise the Social _Democrats could repre-
sent themselves as a part of socialism. 
The enforcement of the Teheran 
decisions, both in their national and 
international aspects, demands the 
broadest possible national unity, and 
in this national unity there must be 
workers, farmers, professionals, small 
businessmen and all of the capitalist 
elements who will loyally support 
the program. (I bid.) 
Foster's letter to the National Com-
mittee and his speech at the extra-
ordinary session of the National Com-
mittee on Feb. 8, 1944, against Brow-
der' s line, provoked violent criticism 
from those in attendance. Most speak-
ers rejected. Foster's arguments and 
supported the "new course" of the 
C.P.U.S.A. outlined by Browder. 
Speaking during the meeting against 
Browder, Darcy said that in his opinion 
Foster's · speech was not aimed at di-
minishing Browder' s authority. Like 
Forster, Darcy violently criticized the 
interpretation given by Browder of the 
Teheran decisions and asserted that the 
political agreement of the big three 
powers who constitute the Teheran 
conference should not be considered 
as an agreement on the principal post-
war economic problems. 
Afterwards Darcy was expelled from 
the Party by the Congress on the 
proposal of a commission named by 
the Central Committee and headed by 
Foster, because, as the decision says, 
by sending to Party members a letter 
contai~ing slanderous declarations on 
Party leaders, he attempted to create 
a fraction within the Party, and be-
cause he submitted the lette.r in ques-
tion to the bourgeois press. 
After the extraordinary session of 
the National Committee, a discussion 
on Browder' s report to the plenary 
assembly of the Central Committee was 
opened in the basic organizations of 
the Party, in regional congresses and 
the Party press. 
According to information published 
in the Daily Worker, after the discus-
sion the organizations and regional 
·congresses of the Party unanimously 
accepted Browder' s proposals. As to 
Foster, he declared at the extraordinary 
session of the National Committee that 
he did not intend to make known his . 
differences with Browder outside the 
Party Central Committee. 
The Congress of the C.P.U.S.A. 
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(held May 20, 1944) heard Browder's 
report in which he expressed his opin-
ions regarding the political situation 
in the U. S. and he proposed adoption 
of a new course in the policy of Com-
munists of the U. S. 
Proposing a resolution on the dis-
solution of the C.P.U.S.A., Browder 
declared: 
On Jan. II the National Commit-
tee of the Communist Party in the 
interest of national unity and to en-
able the Communists to function 
most effectively in the changed po-
litical conditions and to make still 
greater contributions toward win-
ning the war and securing a durable 
peace, recommended that the Ameri-
can Communists should renounce the 
aim of partisan advantage and_ the 
party form of organization .... 
With that purpose, I propose in 
the name of the National Committee 
and in consultation with the most 
important delegations in this Con-
vention, the adoption of the follow-
ing motion: 
I hereby move that the Communist 
Party of America be and hereby is 
dissolved ..•. (Proceedings, p-. n.) 
After having accepted the resolution , 
on dissolution of the C.P., the Congress 
of the C.P.U.S.A. proclaimed itself the 
Constituent Congress of the Commu-
nist Political Association of the United 
States and adopted a programmatic 
introduction to the Association's stat-
utes. In this introduction it is said: 
The Communist Political Associa-
tion is a non-party organization of 
Americans which, basing itself upon 
the working class, carries forward the 
traditions of Washington, Jefferson, 
Paine, Jackson and Lincoln, under 
the changed conditions of modern 
industrial society. 
It seeks effective application of 
democratic principles to the solution 
of the problems of today, as an ad-
vanced sector of the democratic ma-
jority of the American people. 
It upholds the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the United States Consti-
tution and its Bill of Rights, and the 
achievements of American democracy 
against all the enemies of popular 
liberties. 
It is shaped by the needs of the 
natio·n at war, being formed in the 
midst of the greatest struggle of all 
history; it recognizes that victory 
for the free peoples over fascism will 
open up new and more favorable 
conditions for progress; it looks to 
the family of free nations, led by the 
great coalition of democratic capital-
ist and socialist states, to inaugurate 
an era of world peace, expanding 
production and economic well-being, 
and the liberation and equality of all 
peoples regardless of race, creed or 
color. 
It adheres to the principles of sci-
entific socialism, Marxism, the herit-
age of the best thought of humanity 
and of a hundred years' experience 
of the labor movement, principles 
which have proved to be indispens-
able to the national existence and 
independence of every nation: it 
looks forward to a future in which, 
by democratic choice of the American 
people, our own country will solve 
the problems arising out of the con-
tradiction between the social char-
acter of production and its private 
ownership, incorporating the lessons 
of the most fruitful achievement$c!Of 
all mankind in a· form and manner 
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consistent with American traditions 
and character. ... (Preamble, Pro-
ceedings, pp. 47-48.) 
The C~nstituent Congress of the 
C.P .A. adopted a main political reso-
lution, "National Unity for Victory, 
Security and a Durable Peace." 
The resolution pain ts out the ex-
ceptional importance of the Teheran 
conference decisions for victory over 
the aggressor and establishment of a 
lasting peace. It calls for reinforcement 
oi national unity as the necessary con-
ditions for their application. 
By national unity is meant union 
of all patriotic forces from Comm u-
nists, Laborites to adherents of the 
Democratic and Republican parties. All 
ideological, religious and political dif-
ferences must be subordinated to this 
unity. The resolution stresses the ex-
ceptional importance of the r 944 elec-
tions on whose results depend the 
country's unity and destiny. It recog-
nizes the increasingly important role 
of the working class in national unity, 
its growing activity and its political 
influence. 
The resolution flays the reactionary 
policy of groups led by Du Pont, 
Hearst, McCormick, characterizing this 
policy as pro-fascist and treason, and 
calling on the American people to 
struggle against these groups. 
The resolution then says that the 
majority of the American people are 
not yet convinced of the need for 
a more radical solution to social and 
economic problems with the aid of 
nationalization of big industry or by 
means of establishing socialism. 
That is why, the immediate task con-
sists in obtaining a higher · level 
of product.ion in the framework of 
the existing capitalist regime. With 
this, priv'ate employers must receive all 
possibilities to solve the problem of 
production and employment · of labor. 
Solution of these problems is likewise, 
in the first place, linked to the maxi-
m um increase in the American people's 
purchasing power and extension of 
foreign commerce. If private industry 
cannot solve these tasks, the govern-
ment must assume the responsibility. 
The resolution expresses itself against 
anti-Semitism, anti-Negro discrimina-
tion, calls for the outlawing of the 
"fifth column" and for the banning of 
calls by the latter for a negotiated 
peace with the aggressor. 
The resolution concludes: 
For the camp of national unity,· 
which is composed of the patriotic 
forces of all classes, from the work-
ing people to the capitalists, rests 
and depends upon the working class, 
the backbone and driving force of 
the nation and its win-the-war coali-
6on .... It requires the extension 
of labor's united action of the A. F. 
of L., the C.I.O. and Railroad Broth-
erhoods. It requires the most resolute 
development of labor's political ini-
tiative and influence, with labor's 
full and adequate participation in 
the government. . . . 
... we Communists, as patriotic 
Americans, renew our sacred pledge 
to the nation to subordinate every-
thing to win the war and to destroy 
fascism .... (Resolutions, p. 7.) 
In addition to the resolution on 
"National Unity," the C.P.A. Congress 
passed a series of other decisions: on 
transition from war to peacetime pro-
duction; on international trade union 
unity; on the C.P.A.'s wage policy; 
on political life as it regards demo-
bilized veterans; on work among wo-
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me111; on farmers; on the situation in 
the southern states; on suppressing the 
poll tax; on the fight against anti-Semit-
ism; on unity among countries of the 
western hemisphere and on the 25th an-
niversary of the Communist move-
ment in the U. S. 
The congress unanimously elected 
Browder president of the C.P .A. 
The C.P .A. Congress addressed a 
message to Comrade Stalin and the 
Red Army saying especially: 
In every American city and village, 
every factory and farm of our great 
land, men and women and children 
of all classes speak with wonder and 
deep graditude of the heroic achieve-
ments of the Soviet Union and its 
valiant Red Army. Every day since 
the brutal and treacherous common 
Fascist enemy violated your borders 
on June 22, 1941, more of the Ameri-
can people have come to know and 
love your leaders and your people. 
The political and military leader-
ship of the U .S.S.R. and its mighty 
Red Army is applauded not only by 
our great political and military lead-
ers, but by our workers, farmers, 
businessmen, professional people, art-
ists, scientists and youth. The ap-
peasers of the Hitlerites and the ene-
mies of our common victory, who 
have been trying to frighten us with 
Hitler's "Soviet bogey," have not 
succeeded in blinding our people to 
the realities. Your deeds daily speak 
with an authority· that drowns their 
poisonous words. 
As the relentless offensives of your 
mighty forces drive the Nazis from 
your soil, bringing nearer the day of 
your common and final victory over 
the Fascist enemy, we grow ever 
more conscious of our enormous debt 
to you, the leaders and fighters and 
peoples of the great Soviet land. The 
names of your liberated towns and 
villages are daily on our lips, the 
name of Stalin and the names of 
your countless heroes enshrined in 
our hearts. 
Daily more and more of our peo-
ple understand why it is that yours, 
the world's first Socialist state, has 
given the world such an unparalleled 
example of unity, heroism, individual 
initiative and a new discipline in the 
art and science of warfare. ' 
All patriotic Americans are deter-
mined to strengthen -still further the 
concerted action of the United Na-
tions, and its leading coalition of our 
country, the Soviet Union and Eng-
land on which our assurance .of vic-
tory rests. They are determined to 
continue and deepen this coalition 
in the peace to come and to extend 
the friendship among our peoples 
which will cement the alliance of 
our two powerful nations as the 
mainstay of victory, national freedom 
and an enduring peace." (Message to 
Stalin, Proceedings, pp. 13-14.) 
After the Constituent Congress, the 
leadership of the C.P .A. waged a 
campaign of explanation on the aims _ 
and tasks of the Association. 
In one of his speeches Browder said: 
... That is why we dissolved the 
Communist Party, renounced all aims 
of partisan advancement, and re-
grouped ourselves into the non-parti-
san Communist Political Association. 
That is why we are ready and willing 
to work with any and all Americans 
who place victory in the war as the 
first law, and who move toward such 
a minimum program as we have out-
lined for the solution of our postwar 
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problems. This is _why we do not as~~· 
. ciate ourselves with any other polltl· 
cal party, but rather ':ith the m.ost 
forward.looking men m all parties. 
("The War and the Elections," 
Daz"ly Worker, June 18, 1944·) 
Explaining the . fm;ictions of the 
C.P.A., its orgamzauonal secretary, 
Williamson, declared: 
As regards the functioning of the 
Association, we emphasize that this 
means manifold increase and im· 
provement in every aspect of pa. 
litical·educational activity, on a na· 
tional, state and local cl uh basis. We 
must become known as an organi· 
zation whose grasp of Marxism pro. 
vides us with correct answers to the 
complex political problems confront-
ing the people. While the members 
belong to, and are active in, every 
type of mass organization-political, 
economic, cultural, fraternal, etc.-
the Association in its own name will 
speak out boldly and with initiative 
on all issues and policies." (William-
son, Proceedings, pp. 55.56.) 
The practical' activity of the C.P.A. 
since the Congress was subordinated 
to the principal task of the hour: active 
participation of the C.P.A. in the 1944 
election campaign. 
The national C.P .A. Congress unani-
mously backed Mr. Roosevelt's Presi. 
dential candidacy. In their speeches, 
Browder and the other leaders of the 
C.P .A. in the name of the C.P .A. 
supported Mr. Roosevelt's election to a 
fourth term. The regional-state or-
ganizations of the C.P .A. and local 
clubs carried on an active propaganda 
campaign in favor of Mr. Roosevelt 
and congressional candidates favorable 
to Mr. Roosevelt. 
On Sept. 25, 1944, during a meeting 
called by the New York C.P.A. on the 
25th aniversary of the Communist 
movement in the U. S., Browder said: 
. . . every group, however small, 
just as every individual has the same 
supreme duty to make its complete 
and unconditional contribution to 
victory. We must give not only our 
lives, but we must be ready also to 
sacrifice · our prejudices, our ideolo· 
gies, and our special interests. We 
American Communists have applied 
this rule first of all to ourselves. 
We know that Hitl~r and the Mi. 
kado calculated to split the United 
Nations on the issue of Communism 
and anti.Communism; we know that 
the enemy calculated to split America 
on this issue in the current elections, 
and thus prepare our country for 
withdrawal from the· war and a com· 
promise peace. We therefore set our. 
selves, as our special supreme task, 
. to remove the Communists and Com· 
munism from this election campaign 
as in any way an issue, directly or 
indirect! y. 
To this end we unhesitatingly sac. 
rificed our electoral rights in this 
campaign, by refraining from putting 
forward our own candidates; we 
went to the length of dissolving the 
Communist Party itself for an indefi-
nite period in the future; we declared 
our readiness to loyally support the 
, existing system of private enterprise 
which is accepted by the overwhelm· 
ing majority of Americans, and to 
raise no propo~als for any funda· 
mental changes which could in any 
way endanger the national unity; 
we went out into the trade unions 
and the masses of the people, straight· 
forward! y and frankly using all our 
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influence to firmly establish this pol-
icy of national unity; we helped 
with all our strength to restrain all 
impulses toward strike movements 
among the workers, and to prepare 
the workers for a continuation of na-
tional unity after the war. . . . 
As spokesman for American Com-
munists I can say for our small group 
that we completely identify ourselves 
with our nation, its interests and the 
majority of its people, in this support 
for Roosevelt and Truman for Presi-
dent and Vice-President. 
We know quite well that the Amer-
ica that Roosevelt leads is a capitalist 
America, and that it is the mission of 
Roosevelt, among other things, to 
keep it so. We know that only great 
disasters for our country could change 
this perspective of our country from 
that of capitalism to that of socialism, 
in the foreseeable future. Only failure 
to carry through the war to victory 
or a botching of the peace and failure 
to organize it, or the plunging of our 
country into another economic catas-
trophe like that of the Hoover era, 
could turn the American people to 
socialism. 
We do not want disaster for Amer-
ica, even though it results in social-
ism. If we did, we would support 
Dewey and Hoover and Bricker and 
their company. We want victory in 
the war, with the Axis powers and 
all their friends eliminated from the 
world. We want a world organized 
for generations of peace. 
We want our country's economy 
fully at work, supplying a greatly 
multiplied world market to heal the 
wounds of the world, a greatly ex-
panded home market reflecting rising 
standards of living here, and an or-
derly, cooperative and democratic 
working out of our domestic and class 
relationships, within a continuing na-
tional unity that will reduce and 
eventually eliminate large domestic 
struggles .... 
That is why American Commu-
nists, even as our great Communist 
forebears in 1860 and 1864 supported 
Abraham Lincoln, will in 1944 sup-
port Franklin Delano Roosevelt for 
President of the United States .... 
As to Browder's attitude toward the 
Soviet Union, he highly appreciates 
the U.S.S.R.'s role in the United Na-
tions system and in the work of finally 
crushing Hitlerite Germany and es-
tablishing a lasting peace after the war. 
Browder !:tressed more than once that 
the Soviet state built by Lenin and 
Stalin constitutes the irreplaceable force 
which saved the world from fascist 
slavery and he called for it to be made 
known to all Americans all the wisdom 
of Leninist-Stalinist theory that made 
the Soviet Union great and powerful. 
From an organizational point of 
view, the C.P .A. structure is as fol-
lows: . the basic organizational cell is 
the territorial club whose general meet-
ing is calied once a month. Between 
general membership meetings all the 
work pla1:rned by the club is carried out 
by its committee, made up of the most 
active members. The clubs are sub-
ordinated to regional C.P .A. councils. 
The leading organization of the C.P .A. 
is the National Committee elected for 
two years at the Association Congress. 
The Association's president and II vice-
presidents elected by the Congress 
comprise the permanent leading organ-
ization of the Association. 
The C.P.A. Congress set forth main-
tenance of the principle of democratic 
centralism as the structural basis of the 
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Association. Williamson, C.P.A. or-
ganizational secretary, explained to the 
Congress in these terms the applica-
tion of the democratic centralism prin-
ciple of the C.P.A.: 
... While maintaining a structure 
and minimum organizational re-
quirements compatible with the char-
acter of a Marxist political educa-
tional association, we must grant 
greater autonomy to the lower organi-
zations, emphasize that democracy is 
a two-way street from top to bottom 
and bottom to top, and eliminate all 
rigidity of organization. (William-
son, Proceedings I p. 58.) 
The National Congress of the Politi-
cal Association adopted the C.P .A. 
constitution in which it said that every-
one who wishes to belong to the .C.P ~A. 
accepts its program and its line. 
Explaining who can belong to the 
Association, the Daily Worker wrote: 
We can ask of new applicants to 
membership in the Party only loyalty 
to the principles that are already com-
prehensive to all workers, devotion to 
the most basic duties of action today; 
plus a willingness and eagerpess to 
study the program and history and 
the theory which will make them 
thorough Communists. And above all 
a willingness to fight, to sacrifice in 
the war of mankind against Nazi en-
slavement is the first requirement 
for entering the Communist Party. 
(Minor, Daily Worker1 Feb., 1944.) 
At the time of its dissolution the 
Communist Party of the United States, 
according to Browder's declaration, had 
80,000 members without counting the 
10,000 Party members in the army. 
According to the Congress decisions all 
members of the C.P.U.S.A. are mem-
bers of the C.P .A. and must register 
before July 4, 1944· As the Daily Work-
er announced up to July 16, 1944, hard-
ly 45,000 persons had been registered. 
Without analyzing in detail Brow-
der's full position on the dissolution 
of the C.P.U.S.A. and creation of the 
Communist Political Association, and 
without making a developed critique 
of this position, one can nevertheless de-
duce from it the following conclusions: 
l. The course applied under Brow-
der' s leadership ended in practice in 
liquidation of the independent political 
party of the working class in the U. S. 
2. Despite declarations regarding 
recognition of the principles of Marx-
ism, one is witnessing a notorious revi-
sion of Marxism on the part of Brow-
der and his supporters, a revision which 
is expressed in the concept of a long-
term class peace in the United States, 
of the possibility of the suppression of 
the class struggle in the postwar period 
and of establishment of harmony be-
tween labor and capital. 
3. By transforming the Teheran 
declaration of the Allied governments, 
which is a document of a diplomatic 
character, into a political platform of 
class peace in the United States in the 
postwar period, the American Commu-
nists are deforming in a radical way the 
meaning of the Teheran declaration 
and are sowing dangerous opportunist 
illusions which will exercise a negative 
influence on the American labor move-
ment if they are not met with the nec-
essary reply. 
4. According to what is known up to 
now, the Communist Parties of most 
countries have not approved Browder's 
position and several Communist Parties · 
(for example that of the Union of South 
Africa and that of Australia) have come 
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out openly against this position, while 
the Comm uni st Parties of several South 
American countries (Cuba, Colombia) 
regarded the position of the American 
Communists as correct and in general 
followed the same path. 
Such are the facts. Such are the ele-
ments of understanding which permit 
passing judgment on the dissolution of 
the American Communist Party. 
French Communists will not fail to ex-
amine in the light of Marxist-Leninist 
critique the arguments developed to 
justify the dissolution of the American 
Communist Party. One can be sure 
that, like the Communists of the Union 
of South Africa and of Australia, the 
French Communists will not approve 
the policy followed by Browder for it 
has swerved dangerously from the vic-
torious Marxist-Leninist doctrine whose 
rigorously scientific application could 
lead to but one conclusion, not to dis-
solve the American Communist Party 
but to work to strengthen it under the 
banner of stubborn struggle to defeat 
Hitler Germany and destroy everywhere 
the extensions of fascism. 
The fact that all the members of the 
Communist Party of the United States 
did not sign up automatically in the 
Co.mmunist Political Association shows 
that the dissolution of the Party pro-
voked anxieties, perfectly legitimate. 
In the United States the omnipotent 
trusts have been the object .of violent 
criticism. It is known, for instance, 
that the former Vice-President of the 
United States, Henry Wallace, has de-
nounced their evil doings and their anti-
national policy. 
We too, in France, are resolute parti-
sans of national unity, and we show 
that in our daily activity, but our 
anxiety for unity does not make us lose 
sight for a single moment of the neces-
sity of arraying ourselves against the 
men of the trusts. 
Furthermore, one can observe a cer-
tain confusion in Browder' s declara-
tions regarding the problem of national-
ization of monopolies and what he calls 
the transition from capitalism to so-
cialism. 
Nationalization of monopolies actu-
ally in no sense constitutes a socialist 
achievement, contrary to- what certain 
people would be inclined to believe. 
No, in nationalization it is simply · a 
matter of reforms of a democratic char-
acter, achievement of socialism being 
impossible to imagine without prelim-
inary conquest of power. 
Everyone understands that the Com-
munists of the United States want to 
work to achieve unity in their country. 
But it is less understandable that they 
envisage the solution of the problem 
of national unity with the good will 
of the men of the trusts, and under 
quasi-idyllic conditions, as if the capi-
talist regime ,had been able to change 
its nature by some unknown miracle. 
In truth, nothing justifies the disso-
lution of the American Communist 
Party, in our opinion. Browder's analy-
sis of capitalism in the United States 
is not distinguished by a judicious ap-
plication of Marxism-Leninism. The pre-
dictions regarding a sort of disappear-
ance of class contradictions in the U. S. 
correspond in no wise to a ·Marxist-Len-
inist understanding of the situation. 
As to the argument consisting of 
a justification of the Party's dissolution 
by the necessity of not taking direct 
part in the presidential elections, this 
does not withstand a serious examina-
tion. Nothir:ig prevents a Communist 
Party from adapting its electoral tactics 
to the requirements ot a given political 
situation. It is clear that American 
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Communists were right in supporting 
the candidacy of President Roosevelt 
in the last elections, but it was not at 
all necessary for this to dissolve the 
Communist Party. 
It is beyond doubt that if, instead 
of dissolving the Communist Party of 
the United States all had been done to 
intensify its activity in the sense of de-
veloping an ardent national and anti-
fascist policy, it could very greatly have 
consolidated its position and consider-
ably extended its political influence. On 
the contrary, formation of the Commu-
nist Political Association could not but 
trouble the minds and obscure the 
erspectives in the eyes of the working 
asses. 
In France, under cover of Resistance 
nity, certain suggestions for the liquid-
tion of the party have been circulated, 
ith more or less discretion, during the 
ast months, but none among us has 
ver thought of taking such suggestions 
eriously. It is not by liquidating the 
arty that we would have served na-
ional unity. On the contrary we are 
erving it by strengthening our Party. 
nd as far as the American Commu-
ists are concerned, it is clear that their 
esire to serve the unity of their country 
nd the cause of human progress places 
efore. them tasks which pre-suppose 
e existence of a powerful Communist 
arty. 
After the Teheran decisions came 
h~ Yalta decisions which expressed the 
.111 o_f the Big Three to liquidate fas-
1sm m Germany and to help the lib-
rated peoples to liquidate the remnants 
f fascism in the different countries. 
It is scarcely necessary to recall that 
he material bases for fascism reside in 
h~ trusts, and the great objective of 
ts war, the annihilation of fascism, 
an only be obtained to the extent in 
which the forces of democracy ancl 
progress do not shut their eyes to the 
economic and . political circumstances 
which engender fascism. 
The American Communists have an 
especially important role to play in the 
struggle taking place between the pro-
gressive forces of the earth and fascist 
barbarism. 
Without any doubt they would have 
been in a better position to play this 
role in the interests of their country 
and human progress if, instead of pro-
ceeding to dissolve their Party, they had 
done everything to strengthen it and 
make of it one of the elements of the 
assembling of the broad democratic 
masses of the United States for the final 
crushing of fascism, that shame of the 
20th century. It would be useless to 
hide the fact that fascism has more or 
less concealed sympathizers in the U.S., 
as it has in France and other countries. 
The former Vice-President of the 
U . . S., Henry Wallace, present Secretary 
of Commerce, said rightly that one can-
not fight fascism abroad and tolerate 
at home the activity of powerful groups 
which intend to make peace "with a 
simple breathing spell between the 
death of an old tyranny and the birth 
of a new." 
The Yalta decisions thwart these 
plans, but the enemies of liberty will 
not disarm of their free will. They 
will only retreat before the acting coali-
tion of all the forces of democracy and 
progress. 
And it is clear that if Comrade Earl 
Browder had seen, as a Marxist-Lenin-
ist, this important aspect of the prob-
lems facing liberty-loving peoples in 
this moment in their history, he would 
have arrived at a conclusion quite other 
than the dissolution of the Communist 
Party of the United States. 
ON THE QUESTION OF REVISI NISM 
By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 
Report to the National Commi'ttee meeting of the 
C.P.A., June 18-20, 1945· 
Comrade Browder's "notorious revi-
sionism" (to use the words of Duclos) 
stems directly from the present aggres-
sive .program of American imperialism. 
In order to understand this, it is help-
ful to review briefly the Communist 
Party's struggle against right cppor~u­
nism in its ranks during the l92o's. 
For the revisionism of that time was 
also a definite reflection .in our party 
of American imperialism. 
Following World War I, American 
imperialism experienced a big up-
swing. The United States became the 
most powerful capitalist country in the 
world. It passed from the status of 
debtor to a creditor nation, exporting 
capital from 1920 to 1929 to the then 
unheard-of total of 20 billion dollars. 
All over the world it conducted an ac-
tive campaign to capture markets, as 
against other big countries which were 
weakened by the war. With its 
"Y " d "D " 1 . oung an awes pans, 1t prac-
tically dictated the economic terms to 
defeated Germany. Toward Latin 
America its attitude was one of arrogant 
domination and military oppression. 
Meanwhile, at hom·e the capitalists, in 
an orgy of profit-making, went ahead 
developing their new methods of mass 
production, to the admiration and envy 
of the whole capitalist world. 
As usual, in the optimistic atmos-
phere of the upward phase of the eco-
nomic cycle, super-heated soothsayers 
appeared to sing the glories of the 
American capitalist system. And this 
time to an extent never known before. 
The United States, they said, had finally . 
overcome the contradictions of capital-
ism. There would be no more eco-
nomic crises or mass unemployment. 
Mass production and high wages was 
the magic formula. Not Marx, but 
Ford, was their slogan. The "New 
Capitalism" was here, and engineers 
and economists came from all over Eu-
rope to study the American miracle. 
Not strangely, this intoxicating capi-
talist propaganda had profound reper-
cussions in the ranks of the workers, 
especially the trade unions. Labor 
officialdom, ·including the progressives, 
listened open-mouthed when Professor 
Carver explained how the workers 
through their savings were buying con-
trol of the great industries. And the 
labor "theoreticians" did a little utopia-
building of their own. They declared 
that the path of progress for labor lay 
through cooperation with the employers 
to increase production. The class strug-
gle was ended, strikes were a thing 
of the past, Socialism was an outworn 
dogma. The big thing was the "High-
er Strategy of Labor" (no-strike, speed-
up, policy), labor banks, and class col-
laboration on every front. 
This capitalist nonsense became the 
official policy of the A. F. of L. and 
railroad unions, begit?-ning in 1923. The 
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result was that these labor organiza-
tions, already weakened by serious strike 
defeats during the big postwar anti-
union drive, became little better than 
speed-up agencies for the employers, 
grievous! y neglecting the interests of the 
workers. Consequently trade union 
morale sank to zero and for the first 
time in history the labor movement 
failed to increase its membership dur-
ing a period of "'prosperity." 
It is one of the brightest pages in 
the history of our Party that we fought 
militantly (even though often on a too 
narrow basis) against this whole drunk-
en orgy of class collaboration, many 
of our best fighters being expelled from 
the unions, deprived of their jobs, ar-
rested, and otherwise persecuted for 
doing so. In spite of this policy of 
struggle, however, the poison of Amer-
ican imperialist propaganda _ managed 
to seep into our Party's ranks. 
Its chief voice was Jay Lovestone, 
who later became a renegade. Reflect-
ing the propaganda of the great trusts, 
Lovestone added his voice to the chorus 
of praise of American capitalists. In 
our Party he developed his theory of 
"American exceptionalism," the sub-
stance of which was that capitalism in 
this country had become so strong and 
progressive that it was no longer sub-
ject to the- general economic laws gov-
erning the recurring capitalist crises. 
The practical effects of Lovestone' s re-
visionism were to tend to disarm our 
Party's militancy, to sow false prosper-
ity illusions among the masses, and to 
subordinate the workers to the capital-
ists' profit-making orgy in this country 
and their imperialist program abroad. 
After. a bitter struggle Lovestone' s re-
visionism was exposed and he was ex-
pelled from the Party, · whereupon he 
proceeded to develop into a Soviet-hater 
and a tool of the notorious Matthew 
Woll. 
As for the An1erican "New Capital-
ism," which was to regenerate the capi-
talist svstem of the world, it blew up 
with a" loud report in October, I 929. 
And the United States, which was sup-
posed to · have overcome the economic 
contradictions of capitalism, according 
to Carver, Chase, Tugwell, Lovestone 
and many . other bourgeois theorists, 
actually suffered more devastatingly 
from the unprecedented economic crisis 
during 1929-1934 than any other coun-
try in the world. 
· AMERICAN IMPERIALIST 
DRIVE FOR DOMINATION 
Comrade Browder' s revisionism has, 
like Lovestone's, also devdoped in a 
period of American imperialist iilusions 
and upswing. Even before Vvorld War 
II began there were powerful vo · ces 
among · the big capitalists clamoring or 
American world domination, a notori-
ous case in point being Henry Luce, 
with his "American Century" theories. 
And since the war has been under 
-way, this striving for American im-
perialistic dominance has grown, until 
now it is manifestly the basic deter-
mination of American big capital. 
In the main the great capitalists of 
this country have supported the war-
in their own way. But it would be silly 
to think that in doing so they have had 
the same democratic aspirations as 
the American people, or even of the 
Roosevelt government. For the most 
part they have seen a good chance to 
knock out a couple of very dangerous 
imperialist rivals and thereby to lay the 
basis for American imnerialist advance~ 
ment. All through th~ war they would 
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have been happy to make a negotiated 
peace with Hitler to their own advan-
tage and at the expense of the Soviet 
Union and the democratic forces of the 
world. And now that Hitler is smashed, 
their imperialist designs become all the 
more apparent, as witness their behavior 
at the San Francisco conference of the 
United Nations. Such elements see the 
weakened position of other capitalist 
states, as contrasted with the great 
strength of the United States, and they 
want to realize on this situation in such 
wise that they can dictate to the rest 
of the world, including the U.S.S.R. 
As the National Committee's resolu-
tion points out, American finance capi-
tal, fearful of democratic developments 
in Europe and desirous of world control 
for itself, is now embarking upon a pol-
icy of imperialistic aggrandizement 
which, if it is not checked by the demo-
cratic forces of the world, can have the 
most disastrous consequences, not only 
·to big capital itself, but also to the 
great objectives laid down in the con-
ferences of Moscow, Teheran,. and Yal-
ta. 
Although American finance capital 
strives to conceal its imperialistic am-
bitions under pretenses of the United 
States using its world power for altru-
istic ends, nevertheless these ambitions 
are clear, not only from big capital's 
practical policies, but also from the 
writings of many of its spokesmen-
conservative, liberal and labor. Thus, 
Thomas E. Dewey's spectacular de-
mand of the Mackinac Republican con-
ference for a United States-Great Brit-
ain alliance was obviously an attempt to 
set up a domination over the U.S.S.R., 
and with it the rest of the world. 
Eric Johnston's book, America Unlim-
ited, is an essay on how to capture the 
trade of the world and to paral yzc 
ideologically the American people in 
the face of the power drive of finance 
capital. Walter Lippmann's volume, 
United States War A£ms, with .its con-
ception of a great "Atlantic Commu-
nity," consisting of the allied American 
and British empires, plus all the coun· 
tries of ce.qtral and western Europe is 
manifestly a program for American 
world domination. The Soviet trade 
union journal, The War and the Work-
ing Class, March r, 1945, correctly 
designates the imperialist character not 
only of Senator Vandenberg, but also 
of his associates, the Hoovers, Tafts, 
Deweys, Landons, McCormicks, Pat-
tersons, Hearsts, and other spokesmen 
of big capital when it says: 
The whole content of Vanden-
berg's speech . . . is a mask to con-
ceal hii pretentious claims for the es-
. tablishment of the dictatorship of one 
Great Power over all the other pow-
ers, great, medium and small. 
As in the 1920' s but under different 
forms, the present actively expansionist 
policies of American imperialism evoke 
a response in the labor movement, as is 
evidenced by the attitude of such fig-
ures as Matthew Woll and by many 
policies of the A. F. of L. Executive 
Council. Also, the wild attacks of 
Norman Thomas, David Dubinsky and 
other Social-Democrats against the So-
viet Union have their roots in the ex-




Our Party does not live in a politi-
cal vacuum. It is exposed to all the 
illusions and pressures of capitalism; 
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hence it should surprise no Marxist that 
the present drive of American imperial-
ism for world power should find cer-
tain echoes within the ranks of the 
Party. The tragedy of the situation is 
that it is precisely. Comrade Browder 
who is giving voice to these imperialist 
illusions in our Party, especially with 
regard to the postwar situation. And 
he is doing this under elaborate pre-
tenses of a discerning and flexible 
Marxism-Leninism. 
In the postwar world, which will face 
gigantic problems of industrial recon-
struction and development, the United 
States, with its tremendous economic 
resources, is bound to play a very im-
portant role. \Vhat Comrade Browder 
does not see, however, is that if the 
role of the United States is to help in 
the realization of the programs of Mos-
cow, Teheran and Yalta, this can only 
be accomplished if the broad masses 
of this country, especially the trade 
union movement, are very much on the 
alert to see to it that imperialist trends 
upon the part of our Government and 
the great capitalists are curbed and 
democratic policies imposed. The great 
goals of victory over fascism and the 
achi~vement of a lasting peace, laid 
down at Moscow, Teheran and Yalta, 
can be realized, but only upon the basis 
of eternal vigilance by the combined 
democratic forces of the world. Brow-
der, contrary to this, is quite willing 
to leave the whole matter to the "in-
telligence" and "enlightened" self-in-
terest of the big capitalists. 
The imperialists could hardly ask 
for anything better than the free hand 
that Browder would so readily grant 
them. It is hard to conceive of a situa-
tion more favorable to American im-
perialism than the belief, such as Brow-
der has expressed many times that we 
can rely upon these capitalists' "en-
lightenment" to follow a constructive 
and democratic world policy. The gen-
eral result of such a reliance would be 
that American imperialism, without aay 
popular checks upon it, would run hog-
wild and would soon have the whole 
world in a worse mess than it now is. 
Of course, Comrade Browder does not 
want any such situation, but Lenin 
has long since taught us that the ob-
jective results of political policies bear 
no necessary rdation to the subjective 
desires of their initiators. 
That the practical effects of Comrade 
Browder' s · revisionist ideas are to fa-
cilitate the policies of American impe-
rialism is beyond question. Let me 
show this by indicating briefly a few 
of his major proposals and their impe-
rialistic implications: 
r. When Comrade Browder proposes 
that the United States in the postwar 
period should set out to build up a 
$40,000,000,000 yead y export trade, ... as 
he did in his book Teheran: Our Path 
z'n War and Peace, he is in fact calling 
upon American imperialism to make 
a drive virtually to monopolize the mar-
kets of the world. 
2. When Browder says (page· 79 of 
his book Teheran: Our Path in War 
and Peace), "I am entirely willing to 
help the free enterprisers realize. the 
$40,000,000,000 foreign market that is 
required entirely and completely by 
their own chosen methods," he is tail-
ing the workers after the bourgeoisie 
and surrendering the American people 
into the hands of the imperialists. 
3. When Browder proposes that the 
great capitalists of the United States 
have a free hand to carry through a 
postwar program ,of "industrialization 
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of all the devastated and undeveloped 
areas of the world," he is in fact pro-
posing American economic and politi-
cal world hegemony. 
4. When Browde .. · says that "Britain 
and the United States have closed the 
books finally and forever upon their old 
expectation that the Soviet Union is 
going to disappear some day," he is 
blinding the people of this and other 
countries to the dangerous machina-
tions of American and British impe-
rialists against the U.S.S.R.-"a con-
summation devoutly to be wished" by 
these sharks. 
5. When Browder fails to signalize 
the danger of American imperialism 
(and he denies, incredible though it 
may seem, that there is any such im-
perialist menace), he is hiding from 
the American people the greatest dan-
ger to future world peace and progress. 
The imperialists could hardly ask for 
anything more convenient to their 
schemes of exploitation and domina-
tion. 
6. When Browder fights against the 
American people curbing the monopo-
lies, as he does, ·actually he is freeing 
from restraint the worst enemies of 
democracy, the generators of economic 
chaos, imperialist aggression, fascism 
and war. 
7. When Browder spreads illusions 
among the workers to the effect that 
there will be a long period of class 
peace after the war during which they 
can safely bind themselves with a no-
strike pledge, and that the employers 
will voluntarily radically improve the 
workers' real wages, he is tending to 
paralyze the working class in the face 
of the provocative attacks of big capi-
talists upon the trade unions and the 
workers' living standards. 
8. When Browder (Daily Worker, 
April 8, 1944) hails the Labor-Manage-
ment Gharter without a word of criti-
cism and deplores only that it is "un-
fortunate" the NAM is not a partner 
to the Charter, and when (Daily Work-
er, April 14, 1944 ), he proposes that 
the incentive wage be adopted generaliy 
in American ind us try in the postwar 
period, he is opening wide the doors for 
the speeding up and more intensified 
exploitation of the workers of this coun-
try. 
9. When Browder dissolves the C.P. 
into the C.P .A., he is weakening the 
most dynamic force that the workers 
possess to counteract the reactionary 
activities of the great trusts at home and 
abroad. 
One would have to be blind politi-
cally not to recognize that all these 
revisionist theories and proposals of 
Browder's dovetail with the interests of 
the great capitalists and that they are, 
in fact, a reflection of the aggressive pro-
gram of American imperialism. Con-
trary to Browder's faith in the big bour-
geoisie, the democratic forces of the 
country and the world will have to use 
all their united political strength to 
achieve complete victory, to establish a 
democratic peace, to win full employ-
ment and a better life generally. 
BROWDER'S REVISIONISM 
IN THEORY 
· Bedazzled by the United States' great 
power in this war, by its enormous in-
dustrial expansion and output, by its 
gigantic political prestige, by the many 
concessions the capitalists made (under 
compulsion) to the workers during the 
Roosevelt regime-Comrade Browder 
in his present writings and policies leaps 
to the revisionist conclusion, especially 
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' after the Teheran agreement, that 
American capitalism and its capitalist 
class, including reactionary finance 
capital, has in .some mysterious way be-
come progressive. 
Upon this false basis, Comrade Brow-
der proceeds to build up a capitalist 
utopia in his book, Teheran: Our Path 
in War and Peace, in which he sees 
the "enlightened" great capitalists of 
this country, acting in "their true class 
interest," leading our country and the 
world into an era of unprecedented 
democracy, industrial expansion and 
mass well-being. With this rosy picture 
in mind, he calls upon the workers 
to join hands harmoniously with the 
capitalist class in realizing it. He tries 
to stretch postwar national unity to in-
clude reactionary finance capital. All 
of which fantasy, of course, would boil 
down in reality to the workers in this 
country subordinating themselves to a 
more intensified exploitation at home, 
to the world being soon dragged into 
a fresh growth Gf fascism and a new 
world war. 
Comrade Browder's revisionist ideas 
violate the most fundamental principle 
of Marxism-Leninism. They are more 
akin to the bourgeois notions of Eric 
Johnston than to the scientific prin-
ciples of Marx and Lenin. As I said 
in my letter of January 20, 1944, to the 
National Commitee, "In this (Brow-
dcr's) picture, American imperialism 
virtually disappears, there remains harcl-
ly a trace of the class struggle, and So-
cialism plays practically no role what-
ever." Browder's revisionism, while it 
goes in the general Social-Democratic 
direction of subordinating the workers 
to capitalist domination, is actually not 
Social-Democratic, but bourgeois lib-
eral. 
Browder attempts to liquidate the 
class struggle by preaching an illu-
sory harmony . of interest between the 
workers and their class enemies, the big 
capitalists, in the postwar period. For, 
if what Browder says were true, that 
the capitalists would, of their own voli-
tion, radically improve the workers' 
real wages, there would remain little 
or no basis for the class struggle. Brow-
der's idea, too, that the American big 
capitalists, in their "true class interests" 
virtually must make them not only 
raise the workers' living standards but 
live in friendly harmony with the 
U.S.S.R., has nothing in common with 
the Marxist conception of classes and 
their roles. There is no Marxian prin-
ciple which holds that social classes 
"must'' follow "their true class inter-
ests." Indeed, hi_story is replete with 
examples of classes which, under imme-
diate economic, political or ideologi-
cal pressures, have violated their "true 
class interests," with disastrous conse-
quences to themselves. A striking case 
in point was the way in which the 
British ruling class tended to follow the 
policy of appeasing Hitler to the point 
where its world position would have 
been irretrievably shattered had not the 
U.S.S.R. become involved in the war. 
To appease the big capitalists and thus 
to make sure that they would follow 
their "true class interests," Comrade 
Browder not only dissolved the Com-
munist Party, but he was also prepared, 
if he coulO do so, to liquidate the Com-
munist Political Association and to give 
up even our Communist ideology. 
Browder also tries to by-pass Ameri-
can imperialism theoretically. In fact, 
his book, Teheran: Our Path in War 
and Peace, is an attempt to prove that 
the epoch of imperialism has passed and 
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that we are now in a period of inevit-
able friendly collaboration between the 
capitalist and socialist sectors of the 
world; a collaboration, which Browder 
would not base upon the strength of the 
U .S.S.R., the colonial countries, the new 
war-born democracies, and the labor 
movement of the world (as it must be 
if it is to exist), but upon the good 
will of the great capitalists, particularly 
the Americans, whose "enlightenment," 
"high moral sense" and "true class in-
terests" will dictate to them this col-
laborationist course. Browder, indeed, 
undertakes to wipe out American impe-
rialism regarding its relations with the 
U.S.S.R., and he also draws idyllic pic-
tures of how American big capital will, 
under our Goverment' s auspices, in-
augurate great campaigns of industriali-
zation and democratiization through-
out the world. According to him, our 
capitalists would make the rest of the 
world free and prosperous whether it 
wanted to be so or not. For, says Brow-
der (on page 79): 
There is not a government in the 
capitalist or colonial world that 
would dare refuse or withdraw from 
such a partnership, once the United 
States made clear the benefits that 
would accrue to all concerned. 
Browder also seeks to do away with 
Lenin's theory of the decay of capital-
ism in the imperialist stage, and there-
with, he would even shelve the whole 
Marxian concept of the necessity for 
socialism. There can be no other con-
clusions from his argumentation; for if 
it is possible for world capitalism under 
the leadership of the United States and 
especially under the ·tutelage of "en-
lightened" American finance capital 
to overcome its general crisis and to 
embark upon a new period of exuberant 
and long continued economic expan-
sion, then there would be no possibility 
to establish socialism in any thinkable 
perspective. Thus, Marx and Lenin 
would be wrong and Browder right. 
There is serious reason to conclude that 
when Comrade Browder cast aside ilie 
slogan of socialism (as an educational 
issue) in January, 1944, he did not mere-
ly put it in mothballs, to be taken out 
again when its advocacy would be 
more convenient; but very probably he 
.thought he was done with it for good. 
In his theory of a capitalist system 
capable of overcoming its basic contra-
dictions there is no room for socialism, 
even in the most remote sense. 
That Comrade Browder was attempt-
ing to have our Party discard basic 
principles of Marxism-Leninism and 
to adopt a bourgeois-liberal program is 
incontestable. In his Bridgeport speech 
eighteen months ago, he gave a clear 
indication of this when he said: "Old 
formulas and old prejudices are going 
to be of no use whatever to us as guides 
to find our way in the new world." 
What are the "old formulas and old 
prejudices" that Browder warns us are 
useless? These are none other than 
our Marxist-Leninist analysis of the 
class struggle, of imperialism, of social-
ism. All these Browder himself had 
already abandoned, and he was trying 
to get our Party to do likewise. 
BROWDER'S REVISIONISM 
IN PRACTICE 
Comrade Browder especially began 
to develop his opportunistic ideas 
shortly after his return from Atlanta 
(although roots of them can be found 
earlier). At that time the Party had 
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a sound war policy, worked out during 
his incarceration; including all-out sup-
port of the war, support of the Roosevelt 
Administration with criticism, national 
unity of all pro-war elements, includ-
ing pro-Roosevelt capitalists, the 
achievements. of maximum war produc-
- tion, the labor no-strike pledge, and an 
active defense of the masses' economic 
and political rights as a war necessity. 
Browder almost immediately started to 
project h1s opportunism into this essen-
tially correct wartime policy. One of 
the first signs of this was his utopian 
handling of the question of a central-
ized war economy. He developed his 
opportunistic position further in his 
book, Victory and After. A~d his re-
visionist point of view finally came to 
full expression in his volume, Teheran: 
Our Path £n War and Peace. 
The revisionistic ideas contained in 
these works and in Comrade Browder's 
other writings and policies, not only 
introduced confusion into our political 
thinking, but also hindered our practi-
cal work in support of the war. In my 
article in the Daily Worker of June 10, 
I listed a number of the more important 
of our shortcomings and mistakes dur-
ing the war, bred of Browder's oppor-
tunism, a list which, besides those noted 
above, included inadequate criticism of 
the Roosevelt Administration; failure 
to demand a coalition government with 
labor as a full partner; rejection of the 
demand that international labor should 
be represented in all wartime confer-
ences of the great powers; proposals 
for a joint Republican-Democratic tick-
et in the nati<mal elections, which, if 
adopted, would have eliminated Roose-
velt as a candidate, etc. To this list 
could be added many others, in almost 
all branches of our Party work. Such, 
for example, as the tendency, in the 
earlier stages of the war, to neglect to 
press militantly for Negro rights; the 
underestimation, for a time, of the nec-
essity for increased wage rates for the 
workers in our eagerness to have the in-
centive wage established; and the fail-
ure to make a major issue in the ranks 
of labor and among the public gener-
ally of the vital matter of the Govern-
ment and the trade union movement 
giving our a·rmed forces a thoroughly 
democratic education regarding the 
. causes and purposes of the war. 
Through all of Comrade Browder' s 
theoretical and practical errors runs 
the ever-present thread of a tendency 
to rely upon the big bourgeoisie for 
national leadership, to appease reaction-
ary finance capital, to underestimate the 
independent, democratic role of labor 
and other democratic forces, and esptl-
ciall y of our Party, in the national anti-
fascist front. It is true that the Com-
munists stood second to none in their 
war effort and made a record of which 
the Party may well be proud. But we 
must admit that in the light of the ex- · 
itsing opportunities and the responsi-
bilities we fell short in many respects 
precisely because of these opportunist 
errors. 
Harmful during the war, Comrade 
Browder' s false policies would have 
been disastrous if they had been car-
ried over into the postwar period. Once 
their German and Japanese imperialist 
rivals are both disposed of, the Ameri-
can finance capitalists will feel freer to 
maneuver, in all probability within the 
framework of the United Nations, 
against the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and 
the new democracies being born out of 
the war; they will also intensify their 
attacks upon the trade unions in this 
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country. This is obvious from the 
course of events since the end of the 
European phase of the war. In such a 
situation the democratic forces will have 
to unite fi.rml y in order to put into 
reality the objectives of Teheran and 
Yalta. Browder's illusions about a long-
term of class peace in the United States 
and of a smoeth working together of 
American big capital with our wartime 
allies would be a brake upon this need-
ful struggle of the democratic masses 
and peoples and would play right into 
the hands of American imperialism. 
Very probably, even if Duclos' letter 
had never arrived, our Party, under 
the pressure of postwar tensions, would 
of itself have thrown off Browder's 
revisionism and found its way to a cor-
rect policy. Indeed, there were already 
many tendencies in this direction. This 
correction of our Party's policy, how-
ever, could have come only in a strug-
gle against Browder, as is quite evident 
from his present resistance to such a 
change. One of the basic reasons why 
the Duclos letter was so quickly en-
dorsed by our Party is precisely because 
the end of the European stage of the 
war threw into the spotlight the bank~ 
r~ptcy of Browder's opportunistic poli-
cies. 
HOW DID WE DEVELOP 
OUR REVISIONISM? 
How did it happen that Comrade 
Browder could have our Party adopt 
as policy his crude revisionism, his 
apology for American imperialism, 
which has confused our Party's think-
ing, weakened its practical work, 
checked its growth, and injured its pres-
tige among the broad masses? 
First, I should say, it was because 
of an inadequate Marxist-Leninist 
training on the part of our leadership. 
Although in the Party many comrades 
opposed Browder' s line and there was 
much uncertainty and uneasiness gen-
erally, the leadership was not able to 
penetrate his bourgeois sophistries and 
to expose their anti-Marxist character. 
The fact that our Party, throughout 
the war and even for some years earlier, 
had been in collaboration with the pro-
Roosevelt minority section of the bour-
geoisie, gave Comrade Browder a con-
venient jumping-off place for his at-
tempt to have us cooperate with the 
whole bourgeoisie, including its de-
cisive, reactionary sections. That our 
Party was not able to see through this 
opportunistic maneuver is proof posi-
tive that we are badly in need of 
strengthening our basic theoretical train-
ing, of refreshing our understanding 
from those "old (Marxist-Leninist) 
books" and "old formulas" that Brow-
der wants us to discard as obsolete. 
A second, and very decisive reason for 
our Party's falling victim to Comrade 
Browder' s revisionism was the lack of 
political discussion and democracy in 
the Party. During the past several 
years we have allowed ourselves to de-
part widely from the principles of dem-
ocratic centralism. Browder has been 
conceded altogether excessive authority 
-to such an extent, in fact, that his 
word virtually became law in the Party. 
He was in the habit of simply laying 
down the policy, and few ventured to 
dispute his arbitrary pronouncements. 
Under such conditions, democratic dis-
cussion, self-criticism and collective lead-
ership became almost extinct in the top 
committees of our Party. Besides this, 
the Party leaders and members poured 
out upon Browder an impermissable 
deluge of adulation and super-praise 
ON THE QUESTION OF REVISIO~TJSM 
which placed him almost beyond the 
realm of our criticism. 
In this situation there was no real 
pelitical discussion of Comrade Brow-
der' s report on Teheran when he un-
expectedly produced his whole opportu-
nist line at the January, 1944, meeting 
of the National Committee. The fact 
that my letter at the time protesting 
to the National Committee against 
Browder' s revisionism never reached the 
membership was due to the lack of 
democrae::y in the Party. If I had at-
tempted to take my letter to the Party 
after it was rejected at the enlarged 
meeting of the Political Bureau on 
February 8, 1944, it would have resulted 
in my immediate expulsion and prob-
ably a split in the Party. Comrade 
Browder made this perfectly clear at the 
meeting in question. Hence, for the 
sake of Party unity, I had to confine 
by opposition to Browder's revisionism 
to the National Committee. 
In assessing the blame for the seri-
ous error our Party has made, the 
whole top leadership, especially the 
National Board, bears a heavy responsi-
bility. For despite Browder's excessive 
authority, if the members of the Board, 
or even a substantial minority of them, 
had taken a stand against Browder' s 
opportunism he could have been de-
feated. Unfortunately, however, no 
such development took place. Hence 
the responsibility of the Board is great. 
But the overwhelming share of the 
responsibility of the error rests with 
Comrade Browder himself. He origi-
nated the opportunistic policies, he 
theoretically developed them, he used 
all his power and authority in the Par-
tv as a long-time international Commu-
nist leader to have them adopted. And 
now, refusing to admit his error, he has 
voted and written against the National 
Committee's resolution which corrects 
his errors. It is not too much to say 
that had any other leader in the Party 
than Comrade Browder presented such 
a distortion ·of the Teheran Conference 
to our Party it would have been re-
jected as rank opportuni~m. But Brow-
der was able to put it across because of 
his great prestige and his over-central-
ized authority. 
All this goes to emphasize the basic 
need for the development of true dem-
ocratic centralism in our Party. In the 
new leadership that will grow out of 
this situation there must be not one-man 
control, but a genuine collectivity of ef-
fort. There must also be a re-estab-
lishment of self-critcism and free politi-
cal discussion. Only upon the basis 
of these correct Leninist principles can 
the all-important Communist clarity, 
unity and discipline be developed. 
THE DANGER OF 
OVER-CORRECTION 
When a Communist Party makes a 
drastic change of policy, either because 
of previous errors or a profound alter-
ation in the objective situation, there is 
always the danger of an over-correction 
of policy-that is of flying from one 
extreme to another. Such over-correc-
tions have occurred more than once in 
the life of our Party, as well as in 
those of other countries. This is the 
main danger thaf we confront now, and 
it must be most carefully avoided. 
That our party will overwhelmingly 
endorse the National Committee's 
Resolution, in the branches and in the 
coming National Convention, is a prac-
tical certainty. The vote of the Na-
tional Committee-53 to 1-is a clear 
signal as to how the Party as a whole 
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is reacting to the Resolution. Comrade 
Browder -stands quite alone, defending 
his opportunism, in the National Board 
and the National Committee. And in 
the Party at large it is almost exclusively 
the newer and less developed members 
who are still giving him some small 
measure of support. As for the trained 
Marxist-Leninist members and leaders 
in our Party, they are almost unani-
mously backing the National Commit-
tee's Resolution. 
However, there are serious ideological 
scars still in the party from our ex-
perience with Comrade Browder' s re-
visionism. These must be eliminated 
by a process of Leninist education. But 
in liquidating such remnants of revi-
sionism, we must be doubly on guard 
against falling into the pit of sectarian 
practices. We must not make the deadly 
error of trying to cure Browder's oppor-
tunism with sectarian-leftism. 
This means that our Party has to 
make the closest study and widest 
use of the National Committee's Reso-
lution. This Resolution, if correctly un-
derstood and systematically applied, will 
provide us with the basis for the broad-
est mass contacts we have ever known 
in the history of our Party. Therefore, 
it will be the great task of our coming 
convention, after it has further strength-
ened our line and rebuilt our national 
leadership, to proceed to mobilize_ the 
entire Party for carrying out the broad 
mass tasks outlined by the National 
Committee's Resolution, in defeating 
fascist Japan and in building a free and 
prosperous postwar world. 
SOME ASPECTS OF OUR 
POLICIES AND TASKS 
By EUGENE DENNIS 
Report to the National Committee, C.P.A., June 18-20, 1945. 
It is with deep humility that I sub-
mit this report on behalf of the National 
Board. For, despite the positive esti-
mation of my position made by Com-
rade Foster, I realize that I bear a full 
share of the responsibility for the main 
errors and mistakes which the National 
Board of our Communist Politic;al As-
sociation has made. 
Generally speaking, I have not been 
among those who considered that the 
objectives of Teheran and Crimea 
would be fulfilled automatically and 
without the most active intervention of 
the masses. I have not been one of 
those who mini~ized the resolute strug-
gle which must be waged against pro-
fascist reaction, or who underestimated 
the independent role and activity of la-
bor and the people. 
Yet it is a fact that I have held and 
fostered certain opportunist illusions re-
garding the postwar role of the anti-
Axis sections of monopoly capital. And 
in so doing I participated in, and con-
tributed toward, the main errors which 
our national leadership has committed. 
Besides, on such specific questions as 
liquidating the C.P .A. in the South, as 
well as in incorrectly estimating the 
significance of. the Labor-Management 
Charter, I bear a particular responsibil-
ity. 
Moreover, while I have taken issue 
with and opposed a number of individ-
ual and separate mistakes which the col-
lective leadership of our Association 
committed, it should be recognized that 
I did not draw the full conclusions 
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from these, nor did I fight as effectively 
and consistent! y as was required. Like 
most other comrades in our leadership 
I have always endeavored to preserve 
the unity of our Communist movement 
as the apple of our eye. But in this 
connection I have sometimes tended 
to overlook the essential fact that Com-
munist unity must be forged without 
making any concessions on questions of 
principle, even "minor" or "temporary." 
In view of this, I wish to re-em-
phasize that I submit this report with 
a profound sense of humility and with 
a deep realization of my own responsi-
bility for the errors which our National 
Board has made. 
With these introductory remarks, I 
shall now proceed with my report. And 
I am sure all comrades will appreciate 
the fact that this report embodies, not 
only my personal views and deep con-
victions, but likewise the general view-
point of the majority of the National 
Board. 
The main reports and documents 
upon which our discussions are based 
are already before you. These are the 
draft resolution of the National Board 
adopted on June 2, the article of Com-
rade Duclos, Comrade Faster' s report 
to this plenum, as well as the highly 
important political letter which Com-
rade Foster submitted to our National 
Convention in February, 1944. 
From these the following facts are 
self-evident: 
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First, during the course of the anti-
Hitler war, in which we Communists 
made sterling contributions, our Asso-
ciation made a number of basic oppor-
tunist errors and mistakes. We started 
to depart from and revise certain Marx-
ist theories and principles. We tended 
to weaken and liquidate the vanguard 
role of our Communist movement as 
the independent Marxist political party 
of the working class. 
The responsibility for this oppor-
tunism rests not only upon Comrade 
Browder, who bears the heaviest re-
sponsibility for our notorious revision-
ism. The responsibility for our errors 
and mistakes likewise rests u pan our 
entire national leadership, and in the 
first place upon our National Board. 
Those revisionist departures from 
Marxism which we were making up to 
recently, adversely affected the applica-
tion of our correct policies for win-
ning the war, and were disorienting our 
Communist organization and other anti-
fascists as regards coping with the new 
and complex problems which now aris~ 
as we enter the postwar period. 
Secondly, the reports and material 
before you indicate that the majority 
of the National Board. now understands 
and is attempting to rectify its former 
errors and deviations. Aided by the 
wise and invaluable counsel of Com-
rade Duclos, le~rning from our own 
experiences and the latest international 
developments, and helped greatly by 
the essentiallly sound position of Com-
rade Foster, who warned us some I7 
months ago of the dangerous opportu-
nist path we were embarking upon, 
we have begun to overcome our mis-
takes and correctly to reorient ourselves 
and the Association. Already, most of 
the National Committee and the over-
_whelming majority of our membership 
have expressed themselves decisively 
and enthusiastically in favor of the 
main viewpoint of Duclos' article and 
the main line of the resolution of the 
Board. 
However, the fact also remains that 
Comrade Browder, as well as those 
relatively few comrades who continue 
to support his erroneous non-Marxist 
theories and policies, are resisting the 
rectification of our past mistakes. Com-
rade Browder stubbornly clings to a 
false postwar orientation. He is actively 
opposing the sound political line which 
is now being hammered out by our Na-
tional Board in conjunction with our 
membership. In so doing, Comrade 
Browder is compounding his previous 
errors and embarking on an even more 
dangerous course-a peculiar kind of 
non-Marxian "isolationism" and Ameri-
can exceptionalism. 
Before analyzing the nature and 
basic source of Comrade Browder's 
errors and th us also the errors of our 
entire National leadership, as well as 
why these errors happened, it is worth 
while and enlightening to examine the 
present position of Comrade Browder 
in respect to a series of key questions. 
Take the cardinal question of Ameri-
can-Soviet relations and cooperation, 
which every anti-fascist and most 
patriotic Americans understand is the 
cornerstone of national and world se-
curity: Together with the National 
Board, Comrade Browder recognizes 
the paramount need and the great possi-
bilities for maintaining and extending 
American-Soviet friendship and peace-
ful collaboration after the war, as part 
of and as the heart of the anti-Hitlerite 
coalition. Browder also agrees with the 
Board that the position of the State De-
SOME ASPECTS OF OUR POLICIES AND TASKS 49 
partment and the American delegation 
at San Francisco on a host of vital 
questions, as well as the slowness and 
inconsistency with which Washington 
and London move to realize the con-
cords of Yalta, create strains and fis-
sures in the coalition, endanger the 
unity of the Big Three. 
But Comrade Browder differs funda-
mentally from the position of the Na-
tional Board on how to prevent Amer-
ica from vacillating and departing from 
the agreement of Yalta in the future, 
on how to prevent divisions within 
the coalition, on how to consolidate 
and strengthen American-Soviet unity. 
Browder considers that the "coinci-
dence of interests" of capitalist America 
and the Soviet Union-the joint inter-
ests of our nations arising from the 
common need of establishing a durable 
peace and prosperous and mutually 
beneficial trade-predetermines the fu-
ture role and position of the decisive 
sections of American monopoly capi-
tal in respect to future American-So-
viet relations. Browder counts first of 
all on the "intelligence" -of the most 
"far-sighted" sections of the bourgeoisie 
as the main "guarantee" that the cru-
cial necessity of American-Soviet amity 
and cooperation will more or less auto-
maticall y overcome and surmount ex-
isting difficulties and differences and 
will suffice to curb the aggressive im-
perialist aims and policies, including 
the anti-Soviet hostility, of powerful 
sections of American finance capital. 
The National Board believes that the 
common interests of the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. are real, and are strong 
and compelling factors, without which 
there could be no basis for long-term 
and friendly cooperation and peace. At 
the same time, the Board also believes 
that these interests in themselves, that 
these favorable objective conditions, 
neither can nor will automatically 
determine America's policies. We can-
not overlook the contradictions between 
the capitalist and socialist system. We 
cannot forget the lessons of the League 
of Nations, Munich, or World War II. 
This is why we consider that Ameri-
can-Soviet friendship and cooperation, 
and the task of completing the destruc-
tion of fascism in Europe and every-
where, will not and cannot depend 
upon the "intelligence" of this or that 
section of monopoly capital. It will de-
pend above all and to a large extent 
upon the welding of a firmer and more 
solid national democratic coalition 
within our country-a coalition resting 
upon the power and unity of labor and 
all other democratic forces especially 
upon the working farmer, the Negro 
people, small businessmen, professionals 
and intellectuals. 
In this connection, we also take into 
account the fact that there still are 
certain influential capitalist groupings 
which, for one or another reason, sup-
port the Crimean decisions, and we con-
sider that it is possible and necessary 
for labor and the popular forces to 
fight for these objectives together with 
such capitalists. But equally, we believe 
that labor and the people cannot rely 
on any capitalist group or elsements to 
maintain a steadfast position or to 
struggle against fascism to the end. We 
believe, now more than ever, that 
within · the camp of national unity, 
within the national democratic coali-
tion, labor, together with other progres-
sive forces, must not only be the back-
bone and the main driving force, but 
must play the leading role. 
Further, in respect to the decisive 
question of American-Soviet relations,. 
the National Board likewise differs.. 
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from Comrade Browder in two other 
important respects. Unlike Browder, 
we do not believe that the U.S.A. fol-
lows at the tailend or is the naive pawn 
of British imperialism. We consider, 
while world capitalism has emerged 
from this war weakened by the defeat 
of Hitler Germany and will be further 
weakened by the defeat of imperialist 
Japan, that the U.S.A. is emerging from 
the war as the strongest imperialist 
power-economically, militarily and 
politically. 
The U.S. is not the servile and junior 
partner of the British Lion. Quite the 
contrary. Furthermore, in the postwar 
period, U.S. and British economic and 
political rivalries are bound to sharpen 
and become more acute. In fact, after 
the war, Anglo-American rivalry and 
contradictions will constitute a main 
source of conflicts endangering world 
peace and stability. And in the struggle 
against its chief imperialist rival, the 
U.S. will play an increasingly aggres-
sive role. 
However, we do noc conclude from 
this that all is hopeless, that America 
inevitably and irrevocably will come 
forward only in a reactionary and pro-
fascist role in the world of tomorrow. 
The relationships of international 
forces, and the strong progressive cur-
rents within our country are such that 
it is possible for labor and all democratic 
forces-if they are united on an anti-
fascist program and~ wage a resolute 
struggle-to influence effectively the 
course of America, at home and abroad. 
The point is, that neither American 
nor British imperialism will be weak-
ened, nor their reactionary conflicts and 
aims thwarted, by Browder's appeal to 
their "intelligence" and "true~' class in-
terests; nor by his fantastic blueprints 
designed to soften their antagonisms, 
to divide up peacefully the world 
market, or to arrive at arrangements 
whereby Downing Street would volun-
tarily liberate the British Empire. Amer-
ican, just as British imperialism, will be 
weakened and curbed, particular! y 
when the American working class and 
people, by their unity and struggle, 
weaken and undermine the position of 
the most reactionary and aggressive 
forces of finance capital, and establish 
closer and firmer unity of action with 
the freedom-loving peoples of all lands. 
Moreover, we of the N aiional 
Board cannot agree with Browder' s 
fatalistic position and his arbitrarily 
chosen alternatives of the future course 
of world development. For instance, 
we do believe that if the imperialist 
bourgeoisie of the U.S. and Britain 
reneged on Crimea and were to force 
a rupture in American-Soviet-British 
relations-that this would engender new 
aggressions, great suffering, .damage 
and untold hardship for the world, and 
not least of all for the American peo-
ple. This is why everything must be 
done to preserve and strengthen the 
unity of the Big Three. 
Yet we cannot agree that the only 
alternative to Browder's concept of the 
Grand Alliance is chaos, anarchy and 
the end of civilization. Browder has not 
yet drawn all the necessary conclusions 
from this war of national liberation in 
which there has emerged a stronger and 
a more influential Soviet Union, a new 
and democratic Europe and a stronger 
world labor movement. These historic 
developments certainly are an indispens-
able part of the world of reality; they 
are an ~ essential basis and an organic 
part of the anti-Hitlerite coalition-a 
part and basis whi_ch has already created 
an entirely new relationship of world 
forces, irrevocably strengthening the 
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cause of world democrac\" and nat10nal 
freedom. ~ 
In this connection, it should not 
he forgotten that out of this war there 
has also emerged a stronger and more 
influential American labor movement. 
The supreme task now is to forge la-
bor's unity of action, locally and na-
tionally, and to make American labor 
fully conscious of its vanguard role and 
its immediate historic task to complete 
the destruction of fascism, and toward 
this end to affect decisively, in alliance 
with all democratic forces, America's 
policies, both foreign and domestic. 
This, admittedly, is no easy task. For 
the labor movement is sharply divided, 
.and the Greens, W olls, Dubinskys, 
Hutchesons and Lewises still retain 
positions of great power. However, the 
conditions are ripe, and the need is so 
,great, that it is now possible to make 
new advances in welding labor's anti-
fascist unity. This can and must be 
.done. 
* * * 
Next, take the question of the slogans 
-0f action set forth in Part I of the Draft 
Resolution of the Board. With Certain 
reservations and one basic difference, 
Browder alleges that he could agree 
with this immediate program of action. 
Leaving aside the "reservations," 
what is Comrade Browder's stated and 
most basic disagreement with the slo-
gans of action? Browder claims that the 
National Board has omitted what he 
terms, the decisive question of any na-
tional unity program for the post-
war period, namely, the question of 
"'markets." Browder still contends that 
the solution of postwar markets, espe-
cially of foreign markets, on a scale 
capable of absorbing the entire produc-
tive output of U.S. wartime industry 
and production levels, remains the key 
and heart of any sound re·conversion 
and postwar plan for securing economic 
prosperity. 
Obviously, the question of markets, 
both foreign and domestic, is not un-
important, especially as these will have 
a pronounced effect upon the postwar 
levels of production and employment 
in the U.S.A. 
What then, let us ask, are the pro-
spects for expanding American postwar 
trade in the immediate postwar period? 
For one thing, the def eat of German, 
and subsequently of Japanese imperial-
ism, as well as the vast destruction of 
property, plant capacity and capital 
goods during the war, will enable both 
the U.S. and Great Britain to increase 
their share of the world market, in com- · 
parison with pre-war levels, particularly 
during the first period of rehabilitation 
and reconstruction-though it must be 
emphasized this will take place under 
conditions of sharpened Anglo-Amer-
ican rivalry, and sooner or later under 
circumstances of a "depression" and a 
cyclical crisis. 
However, to realize the great possi-
bilities which are now open for con-
siderably extending American foreign 
trade-possibly from $7,000,000,000 to 
$10,000,000,000 annually-during the 
early postwar years, as well as to achieve 
a level of exports for a longer period 
of time considerably above the prewar 
level of 1939--it is necessary, as the Re-
solution of the Board proposes, to 
achieve the following conditions: 
(a) To ensure a stable and longterm 
peace. 
(b) . To guarantee that liberated 
Europe develops further along demo-
cratic, anti-fascist lines. 
( c) To promote a free and demo-
cratic Asia. 
( d) To extend American long-term 
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and low-interest credits and loans to all 
democratic nations for purposes t>f 
economic reconstruction and ind ustriali-
zation-and on the basis of non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of these 
nations. 
Undoubtedly, the various proposals 
in the Resolution which are designed to 
promote international economic co-
operation and world trade, can and 
should be implemented. Equally, it may 
be necessary to augment that section of 
the resolution dealing with reconversion 
and how to promote the fight for 
60,000,000 jobs. 
But, it is the firm opinion of the 
Board that on the question of markets 
we cannot adopt the "amendments" and 
alternative economic proposals and 
concepts which Comrade Browder now 
advances and which are essentially the 
cause Browder's postwar economic 
same as those he set forth in his book 
Teheran. 
This is our considered opinion be-
views contain, among other things, two 
basic flaws: 
Firstly, Browder remains obsessed 
with the idea that the way to improve 
the wage and living standards of the 
American people. is to try and solve all 
the market and profit problems of 
monopoly capitalism, that is, to try and 
make capitalism work. This is why 
Browder puts forward an economic pro-
gram for monopoly capital, for trying 
to overcome the anarchy and contradic-
tions of capitalist production, for trying 
to bring about a super-organized cap-
italism "free" from crises. 
Browder is also obsessed with the 
iaea that in the postwar period the 
workers will not have to depend, first 
of all, upon their own organized 
strength and struggles; rather, he be-
lieves that they can advance their in-
terests by making one concession after 
another to the monopolists. 
However, the National Board be-
lieves that the way to promote jobs an<Sl 
social security_ and to raise the purchas-
ing power of the working people-
which we consider vital for the ex-
pansion of the domestic market-de-
pends, among other things, upon how 
we rally and unify labor and all anti-
fascists to struggle vigorously against 
the efforts of most employers to utilize 
the reconversion period to lower wages 
and living standards, and to undermine 
the trade union movement. This is why 
we stress the need for mobilizing the 
masses today to fight for improved 
federal and state emergency unemploy-
ment insurance; to enact the Murray 
Full Employment Bill and the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell Bill; to start a gigantic 
federal and state public works and hous-
ing program, etc. 
This, too, is why we place such great 
emphasis upon the urgent need of pro-
tecting the trade unions, organizing the 
unorganized, and developing labor's 
unity and independent political action. 
But these key questions, which are or-
ganically connected with the problem 
of markets, are seldom mentioned or 
stressed by Browder. 
Secondly, on the question of postwar 
markets and economic perspectives, 
Browder refuses to entertain any notion 
of the embryonic or forthcoming econ-
omic crises in the U.S., whose clouds are 
beginning even now to loom on the 
horizon. Browder is still hypnotized by 
his original opportunist illusions re-
garding the postwar possibility of a 
long-term period of expanding produc-
tion and full employment taking place 
under present social conditions without 
conflicts, crises or mass unemployment. 
But what are the facts? 
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Present internal conditions in the 
U.S.A. are now featured, in part, by 
the present transition and shift from 
wartime to a peacetime economy. This 
process, which is taking place in the 
midst of prosecuting the war against 
Japan and under circumstances of a 
greater concentration and centralization 
of big capital, is accompanied by vast 
dislocations in the economy and a 
marked increase of unemployment. 
This difficult period of reconversion 
may last one to two years. It probably 
will merge with, or be followed by a 
postwar economic "boom." 
But this "boom," too, will be a boom 
of a special kind. Whatever its length, 
2, 3 or 5 years, it will develop unevenly, 
advantageous primarily to the most 
powerful trusts, under conditions in 
which there will be large-scale and 
chronic unemployment and serious in-
ternal struggles. Further, this postwar 
economic "boom," due to the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism, will inevit-
ably give rise to a cyclical crisis, to a 
severe economic crisis-and this will 
take place despite the prospective ex-
pansion of America's foreign trade in 
the immediate postwar period. And if 
we do not see this, and do not map out 
a program of action to protect the in-
terests of the people along the lines set 
forth in the Board's Resolution, then 
the monopolies, headed by their most 
reactionary groups, may succeed in 
utilizing that crisis for their own reac-
tionary ends, and along fascist lines. 
There is also another aspect of the 
slogans of action embodied in Part I of 
the Resolution that Comrade Browder 
objects to. He considers that our pro-
posals to curb the powers of the mo-
nopolies are sectarian, if not utopian. 
But the contrary is true. Only by re-
sol utel y mobolizing the people to curb 
the powers of the trusts and cartels will 
it be possible greatly to expand both 
the foreign and domestic markets un-
der conditions more favorable to the 
peoples. Only by curbing the mo-
nopolies can we seriously check and 
defeat those American imperialists who 
advocate a soft or compromise peace 
with feudal-fascist Japan. Only by such 
measures can we best promote today the 
fullest rallying and unification of the 
national liberation forces in China, In-
donesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere, 
thereby hastening victory over Japan 
and the free and democratic advance of 
the peoples and nations of Asia. Only 
by curbing the economic royalists ~ow 
can we most effectively prevent the 
restoration or unbridled predatory 
activity of the Anglo-American-German 
cartels, the scuttling of the Crimean 
decisions and the coming peace settle-
ment, and help put a halt to those who 
want to plunder, rob and oppress the 
liberated peoples. 
There is also, and not least of all, 
the question of . the dissolution of the 
Communist Party. Browder still be-
lieves that there is nothing to worry 
about in regard to this action. He even 
has the audacity to state now-which 
he didn't do some 14 months ago-that 
he realized when the decision to 
establish the C.P .A. was taken that this 
might cause difficulties for a number 
of Communist Parties in other lands in 
the trying days C?f their national libera-
tion struggle. At the same time, Brow-
der insists that the dissolution of the 
C.P. was an indispensable act necessary 
to ensure victory in the 1944 elections 
and advisable from the viewpoint of the 
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future role of the American Com-
munists. 
However, what are the facts? The 
dissolution of the C.P. in May 1944, as 
Comrade Duclos indicates, caused 
serious difficulties for a number of Com-
munist Parties in Europe. This in itself 
makes clear that we had no right to 
dissolve the C.P. For the interests of the 
world working class, and therefore of 
its vanguard parties, are basically iden-
tical, so that an injury to one can never 
by anything but an injury to the others. 
Moreover, the dissolution of oui: 
Party, as we can see, accelerated 
previous and all tendencies to put an 
end to the independent role an~ posi-
tion of the American Communist or-
ganization as an independent Marxist 
political movement and entity. The dis-
solution of the C.P. accentuated the 
tendency to weaken our base among the 
workers in the decisive sections of in-
dustry. It promoted all opportunist 
views, including the tendencies to limit 
and negate the independent role of the 
Communists in the elections, as well 
as in other progressive and broad united 
front political-legislative movements. 
Insofar as the 1944 elections are con-
cerned, the facts are: the dissolution of 
the C.P. aided the enemies of the camp 
of national unity. We Communists, as 
well as those who we supported in the 
elections, were charged or castigated 
with dissolving our independent party 
organization in order to "capture" or 
"dominate" the A.L.P. and the Demo-
cratic Party. And it must be admitted 
that this line of Red-baiting attack was 
used by the Hoover-Dewey Republicans 
and the Social-Democrats with marked 
and harmful effect. Furthermore, while 
the C.P.A. did play a key role in the 
elections, the dissolution of the C.P. 
tended to reduce the power and activity 
of our Communist movement precisely 
during the course of the elections, and 
prevented us from exerting our full 
strength. 
Clearly, we cannot perpetuate this. 
state of affairs. Irrespective of what 
name or form we may now choose, we 
Communists now, from this day on,. 
must augment and expand our inde-
pendent, Communist vanguard role. 
Pending future changes in our name 
or formal electoral status, we can and 
must build our Communist Association 
among the basic industrial workers, ex-
pand our independent mass activities, 
including our own independent elec-
toral tickets and campaigns. We will do 
this, of course, in conjunction with or-
ganizing the broadest unity of action 
together with all other anti-fascist and 
democratic forces. But now and in the 
future, whether we retain the status of 
the C.P.A., as a non-party organization 
in the accepted electoral sense, or reor-
ganize into the C.P., we must develop 
our organization as the Marxist Party 
of the American working class. 
The final point I wish to mention 
regarding Browder's present position is 
his non-Marxist views concerning 
theory. When pressed to the wall, Brow-
der admits that "perhaps" some of his 
theories were and are untenable, or at 
least, that they don't square with real-
ities and with our practice. Further, 
Browder claims that even if we made 
mistakes on the theoretical front, these 
were not so serious because we Ameri~ 
can Communists performed virtual 
miracles in our mass work, such as 
during the 1944 elections. Also, Brow~ 
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der contends that it doesn't matter if we 
erred as regards theory because, accord-
ing to him, we have been reacting cor-
rectly, especially since V-E Day, to 
many of the current political develop-
ments, internationally and within the 
country. 
This distortion of and contempt for 
Marxian theory is dangerous and has 
nothing in common with Marxism. 
Insofar as our National Board and 
membership are concerned, it is our 
deep conviction and determined pur-
pose to insure that now, as !lever be-
fore, for us Communists; theory must 
ser·ve as a guide to action. Our Marxist-
Leninist theory and practice must be 
inseparable. They must confirm and 
reinforce each other. 
Precisely because under Browder's 
leadership we were, until recently, revis-
ing Marxism, our "new theory" took 
us into strange pastures; we were tend-
ing to slide into the swamp of Bern-
steinism and Kautskyism. And, natu-
rally, our "new theory" failed to equip 
our Association and our friends to 
foresee and to meet in time the new 
changes in world and national affairs. 
\Ve were not forearmed for the new 
tasks with which we are now con-
fronted. We were reacting to certain 
events, such as at the San Francisco con-
ference, etc., piecemeal, in an isolated 
and limited way, and without vision 
and all-round clarity, without display-
ing the required political initiative. 
Because of our erroneous theoretical 
conclusions, we did not adequately arm 
politically the American working class 
and all anti-fascists for the new tasks 
now ansmg. 
Some say, however, that despite our 
opportunist errors, possibly we could 
meet and correctly adjust ourselves to 
many aspects of the present changing 
situation, and that our practice would 
inevitably have led us to correct our 
theoretical mistakes. But, the fact 
remains, because of an incorrect theore-
t~cal position, we were lagging behind 
events, we were acting spontaneously 
and without that essentia1 Communist 
compass: Marxist foresight and insight. 
But to continue: What, we should 
ask, was the basis of the opportunist 
errors, not only of Comrade Browder 
but also of the entire national leader-
ship? 
The root of our revision of Marxism 
arose, essentially, from an erroneous 
estimate of and attitude towards mo-
nopol y capital, especially towards those 
sections of Big Business which sup-
ported the military defeat of Germany . . 
Did our mistakes consist in cooperat-
ing with the win-the-war sections of Big 
Capital to speed the military defeat of 
Nazi Germany and the Axis? Did they 
arise from collaborating in a broad na-
tional electoral coalition with those cap-
italists who wished to re-elect Roose-
velt? Did our errors flow from our ef-
forts to utilize and sharpen the divisions 
and contradictions within the ranks of 
c;:apital, so-as to try and isolate and de-
feat the pro-fascist cliques headed by 
duPont, Hearst and McCormick? Ob-
viously the answer is-no! 
Then, from what did our funda-
mental mistakes arise? Our errors arose, 
for one thing, because we tended to 
forget why the main sections of Ameri-
can finance capital entered the war. We 
forgot. that the monopolists did not 
participate in the war against Hitler 
completely to destroy fascism, to era-
dicate its social and economic roots. 
Rather, they came into the war against 
the Nazis in order to prevent German 
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world domination, and also to eliminate 
or W€aken an imperialist rival. Of 
course, their pro-war position coincided 
with the immediate interests of the 
American people, even though there 
was no reason to assume that these big 
capitalists would fight consistently 
against Hitler or to the end against 
Hitlerism. 
Our opportunist errors arose because 
we lost sight of the fact why the Roose-
velt and Churchill governments, and 
the bourgeoisie supporting them, en-
tered into the agreements of Teheran 
and Crimea. We forgot that the U.S.A. 
and Britain became partners of these ac-
cords primarily because of the military 
necessity, because of the given re-
lationship of world forces and be-
cause of the strong and powerful anti-
fascist sentiments, objectives and deter-
mination of the American and British 
peoples. 
Similarly, we did not take into ac-
count the fact that the concords of 
T eheran and Yalta were, as Comrade 
Duclos has pointed out, diplomatic 
agreements. Clearly, these diplomatic 
ae-reements were political events and 
acts of the first importance; they were 
of historic significance. Yet what we 
oYerlooked was the fact that while the 
U .S.S.R. would honor and fulfill its 
pledge to the letter, as well as in the 
spirit, the ruling circles of America and 
Britain would carry out these agree-
ments only to the extent that labor and 
the people-the true democratic and 
anti-fascist forces-spoke out and waged 
a resolute and an effective struggle; as 
well as to the extent that the relation-
ship of international forces compelled 
this. 
Our revisionist mistakes consisted 
further in the fact that, even during 
the wartime period, while correctly co.. 
operating for victory with the win-the. 
war sections of capital, we often tended 
to rely upon these sections of capital; we 
did not adequately criticize or counter-
act their vacillations; we did not syste-
matically and sharply enough oppose 
·their concessions to pro-fascist reaction; 
we did not maintain at all times our 
own independent position. We were in-
fluenced negatively, by illusions regard-
ing the "intelligence" and "far-sight-
edness" of the so-called pro-Roosevelt 
sections of capital. And, in retrospect 
we must admit that our recent op-
portunist mistakes have a long history 
and were influenced no little by the 
"Roosevelt decade," by the liberal-
bourgeois influence which the Roose-
velt "era" exerted upon the American 
labor and, progressive movements. 
Finally, and most important, because 
of illusions concerning the wartime and 
future role of the anti-Axis sections of 
monopoly capital, we tended to forget 
that American finance capital, Ameri. 
can imperialism, itself breeds and en-
genders fascism and wars; and that 
after the war, American capitalism 
would seek and foster imperialist ag-
grandizement-that it would strive, 
either by force or by using the "dry" 
method, to attain · world hegemony. 
Because of this we Communists inad· 
vertently tended to obscure and weaken 
the independent and leading role of the 
working class anci consequently the 
vanguard role of our Communist or-
ganization. Because of this we did not 
sufficiently forewarn and prepare labor 
and the people to mobilize all their 
strength and force for the new and 
complex postwar problems. And this 
we must do now, at great speed and 
despite all difficulties, so as-for one 
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thing-to prevent, in time, the growth 
-0£ fascism within our own country. 
• * * 
The question inevitably arises as to 
why this basic opportunist errors, as 
well as other rightist mistakes, was al-
lowed to penetrate into oµr wartime 
work and influenced our main political 
line and approach for the postwar 
period. 
Did this take place because the lead-
ing cadres of our Communist move-
ment are organically inclined towards 
revisionism, or are incurable opportun-
ists? Did this take place because our 
leadership is bankrupt and has made 
little or no contributions to the struggle 
against fascism and reaction, or becallse 
we are devoid of Bolshevik honesty, 
integrity and devotion? 
To ask these questions is to answer 
them. And the answer is, No! The 
membership and the vast majority of 
our leadership are adherents of Marx-
ism, are staunch proletarian anti-fas-
cists, who champion the immediate, as 
well as the ultimate interests of the 
werking class-socialism. We have 
made vital contributions to victory in 
the war, to advancing the cause of de-
mocracy, peace, freedom and social pro-
gress. We have proved ourselves cap-
able, albeit in varying degrees, of de-
fending and promoting the interests of 
the working class, of our people and 
nation. 
Then why and how can we account 
for the disorienting and paralyzing 
opportunist influences and errors which 
adversely influenced our policies and 
mass work in the recent period? These 
can be explained by the following 
reasons and factors: 
r. During and in the midst of mobil-
izing everything to defeat Hitler-Ger-
many and the Axis, we tended to be-
come careless and dizzy with success. 
We correctly devoted ourselves to 
achieving victory at all costs and in so 
doing we made signal contributions t0-
wards this end. Yet, in the process of 
doing this, we became one-sided. While 
correctly subordinating everything to 
the great objective of smashing Hitler-
ism, and working effectively to achieve 
this goal, we carried on a relentless 
struggle to root out all sectarianism in 
our work; but we completely neglected 
to combine this with an equally vigilant 
struggle against opportunism. We 
forgot the sound advice of Comrade 
George Dimitrov, who, in 1935, warned 
Communists of all lands that to apply 
successfully the policy of the united and 
people's anti-fascist front, we must 
" ... eradicate from our ranks all 
self-satz"sfied sectarianism, which above 
all blocks our road to the masses and 
impedes the carrying out of a truly 
Bolshevik mass policy. We want to 
intensify in every way the struggle 
against all concrete manifestations of 
Right opportunism, realizing that the 
danger from this side will increase 
precisely in the practice of carrying out 
our mass policy and struggle." 
2. In the course of our win-the-war 
and general anti-fascist activity, while 
participating in the broad camp of na-
tional unity, we adopted, in practice, 
a non-vigilant attitude towards our non-
labor allies. We unconsciously allowed 
ourselves to be influenced by the anti-
Axis sections of the bourgeoisie. This 
was particular! y true in respect to 
President Roosevelt and those sections 
of capital aligned with him. Thus, we 
frequently dragged at the tail-end of 
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Roosevelt, were slow in criticizing his 
mistakes, weakenesses and hesitations. 
Consequently, we did not develop a 
sufficiently independen.t position. We 
did not adequately maintain our own 
Communist identity and vanguard role. 
Moreover, because of this, we tended 
to gloss over many of the pressing 
grievances of the workers and the Ne-
gro people, and sometimes even put a 
damper on their struggles. 
3. Then, too, our opportunism was 
abetted by the fact that our national 
leadership has not yet fully mastered 
Marxism, that in the midst of ener-
getically supporting and waging this 
national liberation war, we often con-
fused the woods for the trees, and 
tended to evaluate or raise short-term 
tactics and transitory phenomena to the 
level of strategy or a "new theory." And 
in this connection we should ponder 
over the penetrating remarks of Lenin 
in his article "Marxism and Revision-
. " ism : 
To determine its conduct from case 
to case, to adapt itself to the events of 
the day and to the windings of po-
litical trivialities, to forget the basic 
interests of the proletariat and the 
main features of the entire capitalist 
system as well as the whole capitalist 
evolution, to sacrifice these basic in-
terests for the sake of reai or would-
be advantages of the moment-such 
is the policy of revisionism. And it 
obvious! y follows from the very es-
sence of such a policy that it may as-
sume an infinite variety of forms and 
will give rise to one or other variety 
of revisionism, each time when there 
is some "new" question, or when 
there is more or less unexpected and 
unforeseen turn of events, even 
though this turn changed to the basic 
line of development to but an insig-
nificant degree and for but the short-
est period of time. (V. I. Lenin: 
Marx, Engels, Marxism, International 
Publishers, p. 77.) 
4. Lastly, though not to exhaust the 
subject, our errors arose because in our 
leading committees and methods of 
work we have not yet established gen-
uine democracy and collective work. 
We have tended to fall into the trap of 
formal democracy and self-adulation. 
We have confused the forging of firm, 
unbreakable Communist unity with the 
creation of a synthetic unity which cur-
tailed criticism and self-criticism, which 
separated the leadership from the mem-
bership, and failed to draw most of our 
trade union cadres and the entire mem-
bership into the fullest form?lating and 
executing policies. This has played no 
small role in feeding and prolonging 
opportunism and bureaucratic methods 
of leadership and work. 
What must be done now to rectify 
our errors, most speedily, to help pre-
vent the recurrence of such a situation 
within the leadership of our Commu-
nist movement and to enable our organ-
ization to fulfill its new tasks and re-
sponsibilities with dispatch and suc-
cess? 
Obviously, there are a number of 
steps and measures which must be 
undertaken now and in preparation for 
convening at the earliest moment a spe-
cial national convention. Among these 
are the following: 
r. It is necessary to deepen and ex-
tend the democratic discussion now tak-
ing place within our Association, and 
to combine continuous, searching and 
constructive criticism with the maxi-
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mum self-criticism and correction. We 
must guard against excesses and distor-
tions, whether of a rightist or leftist 
tendency. And, in so doing, we must 
resolutely preserve and strengthen the 
basic unity of our Communist organi-
zation. 
2. It is essential to institute every-
where, full inner-party democracy, 
based upon the principle of democratic 
centralism. For one thing, it is nec-
essary to put an end to that practice 
where new and major policies are sud-
denly, and without consultation, thrust 
upon our membership and often upon 
, the National Committee and the Board, 
as the line and settled decisions of our 
Association. For another, it is neces-
sary to convert the National Committee, 
as well as each State Committee, into a 
functioning and responsible policy-mak-
ing and leading body. 
3. It is essential to refresh and 
strengthen our national and state leader-
ship with the most tested working-class 
cadres, with the most devoted and com-
petent Marxists. This will require a 
bold policy of promotion, as well as the 
amalgamation of the healthiest Marx-
ist core of the existing leadership with 
a new and large circle of loyal and 
able proletarian cadres. This will re-
quire the establishment of far closer 
ties between our entire leadership, the 
membership and the masses. This will 
also require that our entire member-
ship and all leading committees exercise 
the greatest political vigilance and 
judge each and every leader and mem-
ber not alone by his or her vote or 
political declaration, but by deeds, by 
performances. 
4. It is imperative that we build 
and strengthen our CPA as a Marxist 
organization, as an independent work-
ing class party. Whatever final judg-
ment our membership may render 
as to the name and form of our Com-
munist organization, we must imme-
diately fortify our organized working 
class base in the most decisive indus-
tries, and effect a new disposition of 
our leading cadres to help affect this; 
we must expand and improve our in-
dependent Communist mass work and 
political and organizational initiative on 
all fronts-on the industrial, electoral 
and legislative fronts, and particularly 
on the ideological and theoretical fronts. 
5. It is also especially urgent now 
that we shall organize the most sys-
tematic study and mastery of Marxism-
Leninism throughout our Association, 
from top to bottom. Starting with the 
planned study and application of the 
main line of the draft resolution of our 
Nati~nal Board, with the Duclos ar-
ticle, as well as with Comrade Foster s 
letter of Jan. 20, 1944, we must encour-
age and develop the widest and most 
profound study of the Marxist-Leninist 
classics, especially the reports and writ-
ings of Comrade Dimitrov; the History 
of the C.P.S.U.; Lenin's Imperialism 
and Left-Wing Commun£sm; Marx, 
Engels-A.farxism; The Proletarian 
Revolut£on and The Renegade Kaut-
s ky, and the Collapse of the Second 
International; and not least of all The 
Foundations of Leninism and Master-
ing Bolshevism, by Stalin. 
6. It is necessary that we immediate-
1 y commence to examine, in the light 
of our discussion and Resolution, all 
fields of work, all press, publications 
and institutions led or influenced by the 
C.P .A.; that is, it is essential to examine 
·our theory and practice, as well as our 
cadres, in all spheres of work and in all 
mass organizations, 
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7. It is urgently necessary that we 
raise the vigilance of our entire move-
ment, root out and prevent factionalism, 
as well as smoke out and expel all 
Trotskyite and other enemy agents. 
8. It is equally imperative, particu-
larly now during our inner-discussion 
period, that we reach and clarify the 
broadest sections of the masses regard-
ing our policy and tactics. We must 
react immediately to all slanders, dis-
tortions and misrepresentations of our 
position which appear in the press, such 
as have been recently expressed in the 
columns and editorials of the New York 
World-Telegram and the New York 
Ti'mes. We must utilize every avenue 
of public information to explain and 
popularize our position. 
9. And, finally, it is essential that our 
C.P.A. resolutely combine our present 
discussions and deliberations with the 
maximum mobilization of all our re-
sources and strength, with a broadening 
of our contacts and relations with all 
anti-fascists and progressives, rapidly 
to implement the program of action out-
lined in our Resolution. 
Every thing must be done without 
delay to rally and unify labor and all 
democratic forces to consistently sup-
port a . progressive foreign policy, a 
sound reconversion program, and in 
preparation for the current municipal 
and the fateful I 946 Congressional 
elections. Everything must be done 
now, in time, to weld the broadest anti-
fascist and democratic unity of the na-
tion and to reinforce the friendship and 
concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-
American coalition. 
Everything should be done to help 
determine the course of the Truman 
Administration, which despite its recent 
vacillations and inconsistencies in the 
sphere of foreign policy, is s.till subject 
to mass pressure and can be influenced 
in a progressive direction along the lines 
of Yalta, especially-if labor and the 
people are organized, united and active. 
* • • 
I am confident, as is the National 
Board, that our discussions and deliber-
ations will result in a great strengthen-
ing of our Communist movement, in 
the achievement of greater independent 
Marxist thinking, genuine democracy 
and collective work and a higher type 
of inner-Communist unity. This is al-
ready borne out by the first results 
of our discussions and by the fact that 
already, prior to any official decisions, 
we have, in a basic sense, begun to re-
constitute and convert our C.P .A. into 
the Marxist Party of the American 
working class. This is all to the good. 
This augurs well for the future. 
Insofar as the Resolution of the Na-
tional Board is concerned, I would like 
to venture the following opinion: the 
main line and approach of the Res0-
lution is correct. Yet there is much 
ground for additions, changes and im-
provement. Therefore, I should like to 
suggest that we approve the main line 
of the Resolution, accept it as a draft 
and elect a small committee to incor-
porate in the Resolution, all amend-
ments advanced by the National Com-
mittee and our membership. Then, on 
this basis, we should submit the im-
proved draft resolution for the consider-
ation of our membership and final ap-
proval of a special national conventi'on 
which should be convened at the earliest 
moment. 
FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR 
MARXIST VANGUARD 
By J~HN WILLIAMSON 
Extracts from Report to Meeting of C.P.A. National Committee, 
/une 18-20, 1945· 
In the main reports and discussion 
we established the approach-both po-
litically and organizationally-to all the 
problems to be raised here. My effort 
will be to draw certain lessons from 
our recent experiences, to indicate the 
direction of solving some of the prob-
lems connected with the functioning 
of the C.P.A. as a Marxist political par-
ty of the working class. We do not 
come with finalized or "last word" pro-
posals. It is up to this National Com-
mittee to discuss these problems seri-
ously. 
• 
Let us review briefly some expres-
sions of this liquidationism: 
Firstly, on the role of the C.P.A. 
in relation to the democratic coalition: 
While we conducted a struggle to 
achieve clarity and understanding as 
to the indispensability of the C.P .A., 
its role and effectiveness as an organ-
ized force in stimulating and leading 
mass movements, and strongly argued 
against those who wished to limit the 
organization only to educational activ-
ity, the fact remains that in both theory 
and practice we tended to minimize the 
independent Marxist vanguard role of 
our organization. 
Predicating our thinking , on the 
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premise of an identity of interests be-
tween ourselves and all class forces rep-
resented in the war coalition for a long 
time to come, we circumscribed the 
function of our organization to the lim-
its of this coalition. We negated a basic 
Marxist concept, fundamental to the ex-
istence of a working class Marxist par-
ty, that we must at all times maintain 
an independent position aimed at in-
fluencing in the first place the most de-
cisive force within the nation, the work-
ing class, while vigilantly criticizing 
and overcoming hesitations and vacilla-
tions within the camp of our allies . 
Too often our position was determined. 
by the concept that "we must not and 
cannot do anything to endanger the 
coalition." This was falsely interpreted 
to mean that criticism of errors and 
mistakes of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion and the sections of the bourgeoisie 
which supported the defeat of Hitler 
Germany, would "weaken the coali-
tion." We tended to submerge our iden-
tity in the general democratic move-
ment, instead of firmly maintaining the 
independent position of the Commu-
nists and labor as a pre-condition for 
strengthening, not weakening, national 
unity. Thus we could not resolve the 
contradiction that constantly found ex-
press10n in our organization-the con-
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tradiction between our collaboration 
with the democratic forces and the 
maintenance of our own political and 
organizational identity. 
During the election campaign we 
called off a series of mass meetings and 
radio talks, stopped issuing leaflets in 
our own name, reached a new low in 
literature distribution and in our press 
circulation, etc. In some districts and 
in numerous clubs, not a single piece of 
literature had been prepared and is-
sued, reacting to specific events and in-
dicating the C.P.A. thinking and pro-
posed line of action to the masses, for 
the past six to nine months. We could 
not effectively meet and eliminate a 
growing underestimation of our own 
. independent role, the absence of ade-
quate club initiative in organizing and 
developing independent activities while 
collaborating with the democratic forces 
in the community. We were unable to 
effectively combat the trend to trans-
form our clubs into "discussion centers" 
-instead of centers for organizing mass 
struggle around the key issues of the 
day. And we could not give a satis-
factory answer to the question raised 
persistent! y within our ranks and 
among many workers: "How does the 
C.P.A. differ from other win-the-war 
progressive organizations?" 
What we didn't see, namely the inti-
mate connection of these types of prob-
lems and their political roots, the work-
ers instinctively understood better than 
we. They demonstrated this by staying 
out of our organization in large num-
bers, by not giving us sustained support 
in local union elections, and on many 
other occasions. 
Secondly, we have seen a deteriora-
tion of the industrial and trade union 
composition of our membership since 
the C.P .A. was organized. We know 
by definition that a Communist or-
ganization, to fulfill its vanguard role 
"must absorb all the best elements of 
the working class, their experience, their 
revolutionary spirit and their unbound-
ed devotion to the cause of the work-
, ing class." Can we honestly say, de-
spite all our positive achievements (and 
we don't want to detract one iota from 
them) that our organization embraces 
all the advanced workers available and 
ready to join? I am not talking ideal-
istically. The fact remains that today 
we only have 316 coal miners although 
ten years ago we had several times that 
many; or that we only have r,427 steel 
workers and 840 marine workers. I 
could go on and on, with examples 
from other industries, states and towns. 
Equally decisive as these figures, is 
the fact that our ability to convince the 
trade union movement, including the 
C.I.O., of the correctness of our poli-
cies is far from fully established. We 
do not have so deep-rooted an influ-
ence or organized strength that we can 
influence and continue to lead decisive 
sections of ·the labor movement, irre-
spective of what any leader inside or 
outside the trade union movement may 
do at a critical moment. 
We know that workers, particularly 
workers in basic industries, should 
more readily understand our policies-
our Marxist thinking. Yet, we see a 
weakening of our working class base 
in a number of key industries. Dur-
ing the past year we had a decline in 
industrial and trade union composition 
for the first time in six years. It is 
clear, that we should have attracted cer-
. tain working class forces from key in-
dustries and industrial areas, but did 
not in this period. 
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Obviously, the C.P.A. did not have 
the recruiting capacity of the C.P. 
While we enrolled 63,000 C.P. members 
intp the C.P .A.-or 82 per cent of 
our membership (not counting those in 
the armed forces) and showed a growth 
of 25 per cent, that was due primarily 
to the big recruiting campaign prior to 
the change of name. We had an aver-
age monthly recruiting during the first 
half of 1943 of 3,615 members; during 
1944 of 4,275; but during the first half 
of 1945 it dropped to l,185. It is only 
fair to add that we ourselves, in line 
with our general policy, decided against 
any large-scale recruiting this year. 
Thirdly, another example was our 
attitude to the press. This is one mis-
take from which I must exclude myself 
and a few other members. For months 
we conducted a struggle to establish 
the editorial concept of the Dail-y Work-
er. To some the tabloid form was to 
be the cure-all answer. Then we were 
told we need a broad popular news-
paper-a sort of Communist PM. We 
had similar expressions in the field of 
press circulation. First, was the liquida-
tion of the Browder Brigades in New 
York. Then a folding up of the home 
delivery system. Then a theory that 
responsibility for the distribution of the 
Daily Worker and The Worker should 
not be placed on the membership and 
clubs. Let the newsstands and mail 
subs answer the problem. This sprang 
from the illusions we ourselves were 
creating. It resulted in negating the ac-
tive role of Communist members and 
clubs with reference to the press. It 
further resulted in practically wiping 
out our bundle sales. It made us ex-
dusi vel y dependent upon bourgeois 
forms of distribution, such as distribu-
tion agencies and the U.S. mail, to 
reach the masses with our message and 
leadership. 
Fourthly, the concept of membership 
in a Communist organization. We dev-
eloped concepts of Communist member-
ship which· said that attending club 
meetings was not important; that col-
lecting dues was a routine and thank-
less job, consequently let us have yearly 
dues; that monthly Club meetings were 
sufficient. Thus, during the past period 
the C.P.A. has not had organized con-
tact with at least 50 percent of its mem-
bership. Add to this, theories that we 
were harassing the members, that we 
were overburdening them and could 
not expect a new membership to come 
to meetings and fulfill so many activ-
ities. All these concepts were essentially 
incorrect. I do not want to infer here 
that there are no new methods of work 
that can and should be adopted, or that 
there are no new things we must all 
learn. Of course there are, but new 
methods of work must not weaken the 
Communist concept of membership in 
our organization, nor destroy that 
which distinguishes us from others. The 
central question is correct policy but, 
we need an organization with Com-
munist characterictics to carry out such 
policy. This demands that we combat 
all attempts to transform our Clubs into 
Democratic or Republican Party types 
of clubs, or merely into neighborhood 
ping pong and forum centers. We must 
quickly overcome all organizational 
lodseness-and reject all theories de-
veloped to justify it. 
Fifthly, is the serious decline in dues 
payments. Years ago dues payments 
averaged 85 per cent for the entire 
country with some districts reaching a 
higher level. However, during the last 
six months of 1944 dues in the C.P.A. 
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averaged 71 per cent and for the first 
five months of 1945 they have further 
declined to 58 per cent. Even more 
alarming is the status for the first 
quarter of this year in such key in-
dustrial districts as Ohio-44 per cent; 
Michigan-32 per cent; Illinois-45 per 
cent and Pittsburg-58 per cent. 
Sixthly, is the serious decline in the 
sale of theoretical literature by Marx, 
Engels, Lenin and Stalin. I only have 
6 gures for the country excluding New 
York. These show that for the six years 
between 1938 to 1943 we sold a yearly 
average of 34,000 copies of Marxist-
Leninist classics. However, for l 944 this 
had declined to 19,000 copies and this 
included 5,000 volumes of the Lenin 
Horne Library. I do not have the figures 
for the New York District, but I am 
told that the decline is proportionately 
the same. 
Given such conditions, a critical 
situation was inevitable. 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST . REVISIONISM 
By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 
Report to the Special Convention of the Communist Political. 
Association, held in Neu; York City, July 26-28, 1945, which 
reconstituted the Communist Party of the U.S.A. 
During the past several weeks we 
have been engaged in the frankest, 
deepest, and most self-critical theoreti-
cal analysis and practical political dis-
cussion in the history of our Party. 
Now, therefore, in its overwhelming 
majority, our Party has become con-
vinced that our policy for the past 
eighteen months was "a notorious re-
vision of Marxism." The complete dis-
solution of the Party in the South shows 
where Comrade Browder was leading 
with his policy. . . . 
I. 
OUR PARTY'S REVISIONIST 
MISTAKE: ITS ORIGIN 
AND COURSE 
Browder, with his revisionism, was 
trying to fasten a system of Right-
wing bourgeois liberalism upon our 
Party; a liberalism so conservative that 
on many questions it put us far to the 
Right of Roosevelt, of the liberal press, 
and of the main sections of the labor 
movement. This revisionism has noth-
ing in common with Marxism-Lenin-
ism, being a complete abandonment of 
its basic principles. 
A. Brotvder' s line is a rejection of 
the Marxian economic doctrines. Brow-
der has developed bourgeois theories of 
the liquidation of the capitalist cyclical 
and general crises; he rejects Marx' 
theory of surplus value and of the ex-
ploitation of the workers. Thus, for 
the past two years our Party has made 
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RO criticism whatever of capitalism as 
a system of human exploitation, nor has· 
it challenged the blood-wrung profits-
of the employers. Instead, we have 
heard many comrades, without rebuke 
from Browder, talking about our al-
leged obligation to guarantee the em-
ployers, already the richest in the world, 
a so-called fair profit. That such shame-
ful nonsense should be heard in a 
Communist organization! When Brow-
der adopted so glibly the slogan of 
"free enterprise," he accepted in prac-
tice most of bourgeois economics along 
with it. With his great faith iQ capital-
ism he outdoes even such enthusiastic 
bourgeois economists as Chase, Hanson 
and Johnston. 
B. Browder' s line is a rejection of the 
Matxian principles of the class strug-
gle. Comrade Browder denies the 
class struggle by sowing illusions among 
the workers of a long postwar period 
of harmonious class relations with gen-
erous-minded employers; by asserting 
that class relations no longer have any 
meaning except as they are expressed 
either for or against Teheran; by substi-
tuting for Marxian class principles such 
idealistic abstractions as the "moral 
sense," "enlightenment," "progressiv-
ism," and "true class interests" of the 
big monopolists, as determining factors 
in establishing their class relations with 
the workers. Browder's theories of 
class collaboration and the harmony of 
interest between capital and labor are 
cut from the same oppgrtunistic cleth 
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as those of Bernstein, Legien and Gom-
pers, except that his ideas are more 
shamelessly bourgeois than anything 
ever produced by these notorious revi-
sionists of the past. 
C. Browder' s line is a rejection of the 
Marxian concept of the progressive and 
revolutionary initiative of the working 
class, and with it, the vanguard role 
of the Communist Party. The very 
foundation of Marxism-Leninism is that 
the working class, with the Communist 
Party at its head, leads the democratic 
masses of the people in the ameliora-
tion of their conditions under capital-
ism and also in the eventual establish-
ment of Socialism. But Comrade 
Browder has thrown this whole concep-
tion overboard. His books Victory-
and After and especially Teheran: Our 
Path in War and Peace, present the 
thesis of a progressive capitalist class, 
particularly American finance capital, 
leading the peoples of this country and 
the world to the achievement of the 
great objectives of the Moscow, Tehe-
ran, Yalta and San Francisco Confer-
ences, and the building of a peaceful, 
democratic and prosperous society. 
Browder sees labor and the democratic 
forces, including the Communist Party, 
playing only a secondary, non-decisive 
role in the present-day world. 
D. Browder's line is a rejection of the 
Leninist theory of imperialism as the 
final stage of capitalism. Comrade 
Browder, in his books and speches, 
paints a utopian picture of a world 
capitalist system, not moribund, but 
vigorous and progressive, especially in 
its American section-a world capitalist 
system about to enter into a period of 
unprecedented expansion. It is a denial 
of the general crisis of the capitalist 
system. Browder believes that under 
the leadership of his "enlightened" 
American monopolists, the imperialist 
ruling classes in this and other capitalist 
countries will peacefully and spon-
taneously compose their differences with 
each other, with the U.S.S.R., with the 
liberated countries of Europe, and with 
the colonial and semi-colonial countries, 
without mass struggle. This is the 
bourgeois liberal notion that the epoch 
of imperialism is past. It conflicts funda-
mentally with the Leninist theory of 
imperialism as the last stage of a dec-
adent capitalist system. 
E. Browder' s line is a rejection of the 
Marxian-Leninist perspective of Social-
ism. Obviously, if world capitalism, 
under the leadership of Comrade Brow-
der's beneficient American monopolists, 
can overcome its inner contradictions 
and produce an era of well-being and 
capitalist progress such as Browder sees 
ahead, the whole question of Socialism 
is reduced to a mere abstraction. Brow-
der accepts this logic and has · aban-
doned the advocacy of Socialism, even 
in a purely educational sense. In his 
book on Teheran he casts aside our 
Party's ultimate goal of Socialism and 
expands our program of immediate 
demands into a fantastic caiptalist utop-
ia which leaves no room whatever for 
Socialism. 
From all of this, it should be clear 
that Browder is preaching anti-Marx-
ism, in fact "a notorious revision of 
Marxism," as Duclos said. He is fight-
ing our Party and with it, what he 
has designated as "the Marxists of Eu-
rope." But like all other revisionists, 
he presents his opportunism under the 
·false flag of a Marxism brought up to 
date. That he realizes he is making a 
head-on attack upon the whole body 
of Marxist-Leninist principles, however, 
is clear from his often-expressed scorn 
for the ''old books" and "old formulas,• 
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by which, of course, he means Marxist-
Leninist books and formulas. Browder 
would have us throw away the Marxist-
Leninist classics and adopt instead his 
Right-wing bourgeois liberalism, .which 
he misnames Marxism. His two latest 
books cannot be called Marxist works, 
they are more akin to the ideas of Eric 
Johnston than to those of Karl Marx. 
Browder' s amazing bourgeois revi-
sionism is a surrender to the pressure 
of American imperialism upon our 
Party. The class beneficiaries of his 
whole program are the big cai ptalists 
of this country. His line dovetails with 
their plans of imperialist expansion 
and world domination when he sows 
illusions about their alleged progres-
sivism, hides their imperialist aggres-
sions, spins capitalist utopias that shut 
out all perspectives of Socialism, de-
ludes the workers with prospects of 
their employers voluntarily doubling 
their wages in the postwar stage, and 
weakens the Communist Party by trans-
forming it into the Communist Politi-
cal Association, etc. Thus he plays 
into the hands of the most reactionary 
elements, American big capitalists, who 
in the postwar period will be the strong-
est world force making for economic 
chaos, fascist reaction, and a new world 
war. 
One of the most dengerous aspects 
of Browder's revisionism is that it was 
penetrating into the Communist parties 
of other lands through the spread of 
his writings. Thus, a number of our 
brother parties in this hemisphere, espe-
cially in Latin America, became infected 
with it, thereby weakening their guard 
against advancing American imperial-
ism. Various European and Asiatic 
parties also felt the liquidatory effects 
of Browderism. Indeed, Browder wrote 
a public letter to the Communist Party 
of Australia, virtually telling it what 
it should and should not do-advice 
which that Party indignant! y rejected. 
Before the Duclos article was published, 
Browder also contemplated sending 
a public letter to the British Commu-
nist Party urging it to oFientate itself 
in the then approaching Parliamentary 
elections on the perspective of an elec-
tion alliance between the British demo-
cratic forces and the Churchill group 
of Tories against the reactionaries (sic). 
How preposterous tP.is sounds now in 
view of the Labor Party's victory-over 
Churchill. Browder's plan, apparently, 
was to develop some sort of a loosely 
integrated cooperation between such 
Comm uni st parties as he could influ-
enc;e, with the C.P .A. as a new world 
center, with himself as its leader, and 
with his revisionist policies as its pro-
gram. The Duclos article smashed this 
whole plan. 
Browder's revisionism, although it 
burst into full expression following the 
Teheran conference~ has roots reaching 
back several years earlier in his Par!y 
leadership. An examination of this 
earlier period will reveal the major 
reasons why the Communist movement 
has not made greater progress in the 
United States during the past several 
years. Browder's policies have been a 
detriment to our Party for years. 
Our Party discussion has made it 
clear that Comrade Browder' s revision-
ism has exerted a weakening effect 
upon our wartime policy. Many of our 
comrades still believe that Browder' s 
policy was necessary during the war. 
It was not. It . was definitely a detri-
ment in our war work, as I have shown 
in detail in my article in The Worker 
of June 10. And not a few believe that 
Browder worked out our policy of all-
out support of the war, of strengthening 
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the United Nations coalition, of the 
fight for the Second Front, of maxi-
mum war production, of the no-strike 
pledge, etc. But this is not true. Brow-
der was in Atlanta when this correct 
general war policy was developed, and 
he had nothing whatever to do with 
its formulation. Almost as soon as he 
was released from prison, however, he 
began to undermine our correct pol-
icy with his enervating revisionism. 
He did not succeed, however, in com-
plete! y destroying our otherwise correct 
wartime policy. Despite his revision-
ism, our Party may well be proud of 
its record during the war, its whole-
hearted and devoted struggle on every 
front to win the war. The full de-
structive force of Browder's revisionism 
would have been felt, however, if we 
had attempted to extend his policies 
over into the postwar period. This 
would have proved disastrous to our 
mass work and to our Party itself. The 
corrective Duclos article arrived at a 
most opportune time for us. 
As it was, the corrosive effects of 
Browder' s revisionism were fast bring-
ing our Party into a major internal 
crisis. His pro-capitalist liberalism 
alienated our Party sympathizers and 
confused our Party members. So badly 
had he undermined our policy that it 
finally took an expert to explain to a 
member of a progressive trade union 
why he should join the C.P.A. or re-
main a member of it. Our members' 
morale fell rapidly. Fluctuation figures 
rose steeply and _our power to recruit 
members declined accordingly. The per-
centage of trade unionists dropped off 
sharply in our Party. Our contacts 
with the Negro people were weakened, 
especially by the disastrous liquidation 
of our Party in the South. Attendance 
at branch meetings declined alarmingly, 
and dues payment percentages fell to 
record low levels. This is what hap-
pens to a Communist Party when it 
gets poisoned with revisionism. It will 
take hard work upon our part to over-
come this developing crisis and to start 
our Party off again on a course of 
healthy growth and development. 
A peculiar! y harmful effect of our 
Party's disease of Browder' s revision-
ism was that by crippling the . Party; s 
militancy, it tended to throw the work-
ers into the grip of the pseudo-left dem-
agogy of the Trotskyites, Reutherites, 
Thomasites, Dubinskyites and Lewis-
ites. 
The Party membership is mystified 
as to how our Party leadership, almost 
unanimous! y, came to make the serio,us 
mistake of adopting Browder's crudely 
revisionist line, especially during the 
past 18 months. Let me try to explain 
this: 
First, for several years prior to the 
adoption of Browder' s distorted policy 
~m Teheran, our Party had, under 
Browder's leadership, slipped into the 
opportunist practice of supporting 
Roosevelt without serious self-criticism. 
It thereby began to adopt a wrong at-
titude toward the bourgeoisie. Our 
developing oportunistic attitude toward 
the capitalists was further strengthened 
by the failure to recognize clearly that 
the big capitalists of this country were 
supporting the war for their own im-
perialistic purposes and not to advance 
the democratic objectives of the Ameri-
can people. Browder's opportunistic line 
was to welcome the big capitalists more 
or less as loyal comrades in arms with 
the democratic forces. With all this 
opportunistic confusion as a background 
in Party policy, it was not difficult for 
Browder, after the Teheran conference, 
to take his final plunge into revisionis~ 
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by contending that our so-called war-
time cooperation with the big capitalists 
would be continued and intensified in 
the postwar period. This argumenta-
tion seemed reasonable to many; for if 
the Socialist sector of the world could 
arrive at an agreement on Teheran to 
cooperate in war and peace with the 
capitalist parts of the world, then why 
could not American workers and capi-
talists also work together in harmony 
in the war and in the postwar period? 
With this opportunistic reasoning as a 
basis, Browder then added his utopian 
theories of a progressive capitalist sys-
tem, the liquidation of imperialism, the 
harmony of interests between capital 
and labor, etc. Unfortunately, the rest 
of our Party leadership was not able 
to demolish this complex utopian struc-
ture by exposing its grossly opportunis-
tic core. 
Secondly, a vital reason why Com-
rade Browder was able to foist his op-
portunism upon our Party was because 
of the super-centralism prevailing in our 
organization. With his great personal 
prestige and his excessive degree of au-
thority, Browder' s word had become 
practically the law in our Party. Con-
sequently, he was able to suppress any 
analytical discussion whatever of his 
false thesis regarding Teheran~ It is 
my opinion that if Browder' s proposals 
could have been really discussed, they 
would hav.e been finally rejected by 
our Party, but such a discussion was out 
of the question. 
Now I come to another matter that 
is deeply troubling our Party and its 
friends; namely, how does it happen 
that a Party leadership that had been 
almost unanimously following Brow-
der' s opportunist line for eighteen 
months could suddenly switch over and 
take a stand flatly against Browder! 
In answer to this general question, 
I think that the basic cause of the sud-
den, almost spectacular change of not 
only the leadership's, but of Party, 
opinion was that Browder' s policy had 
been proved bankrupt by life itself as 
the war in Europe was coming to an 
end. Moreover, thousands of Party 
members had accepted the policy at its 
outset with grave doubts and hesitations 
and were ready for the change. 
There were, indeed, many signs of 
an impending change of Party policy. 
The end of the war against Germany, 
the death of Roosevelt, the imperialist 
raid upon the San Francisco conference 
of the United Nations, the obvious prep-
arations of the N.A.M. for a postwar 
drive against organized labor, the de-
velopment of many strikes, etc., were 
awakening concern among our leaders 
in the National Board. Comrades Den-
nis, Green, Thompson, Williamson and 
other leading members were either be-
ginning to express direct! y opposing 
views to Comrade Browder' s, or were 
raising questions that he found it in-
creasingly difficult, on the basis of his 
distortions of T eheran, to answer. Even 
Browder himself, under the pressure of 
events, had been forced to cast aside 
some of the cruder. forms of his revision-
ism and recently had felt compelled to 
write several "radical" articles which 
apparently contradicted his line. Al-
ready, Dennis and Green had made 
proposals for a meeting of the National 
Committee, to review our postwar per-
spectives and policies. Such a review 
could not have been avoided, and when 
it had eventually taken place I am sure 
it · would have produced important 
changes in the Party's line. As we can 
see from Comrade Browder' s present 
opposition to the National Committee's 
Resolution, however, such changes 
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could have occurred only in the face of 
his stubborn resistance. 
Had the Duclos article been pub-
lished a few months earlier, its recep-
tion in our Party would have been 
much less unanimous. As things 
turned out, however, it appeared at 
just the right time. The objective sit-
uation was ripe for it, and so, increas-
ingly, were our P<;irty leaders and mem-
bers. Hence, the stage was all set for 
the sudden switch in Party opinion that 
has perplexed so many people. Our 
Party has suddenly reverted to its basic 
Communist principles. 
II. 
THE NEXT TASKS IN THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST 
REVISIONISM 
A. An £deological campaign against 
Revisionism: From the Party's over-
whelming endorsement of the National 
Committee's Resolution, it is clear that 
this Convention will decisively reject 
Comrade Browder's bourgeois liberal-
ism. This is vitally important; but the 
worst mistake we could now make 
would be to conclude therefrom that 
the fight against Browder's revisionism 
has been fully won and that we can 
now proceed unconcernedly with our 
daily tasks. On the contrary, we must 
continue and intensify the ideological 
struggle. While at the conclusion of 
this convention our formal general 
Party discussion will end and we will 
close our ranks and proceed in unity 
and discipline to the application of the 
line we have adopted, we must, how-
ever, conduct the broadest and deepest 
campaign of enlightenment we have 
ever led in our Party. As never before, 
we must train our Party in the funda-
mentals of Marxism-Leninism. To this 
end we must check over the curicula, 
teaching personnel and textbooks of all 
our schools. We must re-examine all 
our recent literature. We must prepare 
new propaganda and agitation material 
in harmony with our new line. We 
must especially be alert to eliminate, not 
only Browder's wrong theories, but 
also all those opportunist ways of think-
ing and working that have developed 
during Browder's long regime as head 
of the Party. So prevalent are these op-
portunist moods and methods that 
many comrades in State and National 
leading posts are deeply affiicted with 
them, often without even realizing the 
fact. 
The eradication of these insidious 
open and concealed forms of opportu-
nism, the scars of Browderism, will 
need our close and earnest attention jn 
the coming period. At the same time, 
we will have to be vigilantly on guard 
against a sharp growth of "Left" -sec-
tarianism, which is a perennial danger 
in our Party and of which there are al-
ready manifestations. We must avoid 
doing what we have done several times 
before during sharp turns in Party 
policy; namely, to make the mistake 
of over-correction. We must avoid 
flying from the one extreme of open 
revisionism to the other extreme of a 
narrow sectarianism. One evil is as 
harmful as the other. 
B. Re-establish the Communist Party: 
It is the National Board's opinion that 
this Convention should reconstitute the 
Communist Party. It was a grave er-
ror to form the Communist Political 
Association in the first place, a long 
step toward dissolving the Communist 
movement in the United States, as we 
now see so dramatically in the South. 
And it will be compounding that deadly 
mistake if we do not here and now re-
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orgamze the C.P .A. into the C.P. 
Comrade Dennis, in his report to our 
National Committee, showed conclu-
sively that the formation of the C.P.A. 
did not help our election campaign, as 
Comrade Browder avers, but seriously 
hampered it. Likewise, Comrade Wil-
liamson, in reporting to the National 
Committee, demonstrated beyond ques-
tion that the continuation of the C.P .A. 
is having a liquidationist effect upon 
~very branch of our Party work and or-
ganization. The clear lesson from all 
this is that the convention should re-
establish the C.P. without delay, includ-
ing especially the organization in the 
South. 
There are no electoral complexities 
in this country that the C.P. cannot 
meet better than the C.P .A. To keep 
the present name is politically inde-
fensible. We will have more standing 
among the people operating frankly as 
the Communist Party. Besides, every 
advanced worker knows the meaning 
of a "party," but does anyone, even 
Comrade Browder himself, really know 
what a political association" is? Only 
with a party can we meet the great tasks 
confronting us. Failure to re-establish 
the Communist Party at this Conven-
tion would be a major political mistake. 
It would disappoint our membership; 
it would cripple our future work; it 
would stimulate the Browder opposi-
tion; it would be a sign that we are not 
clear-sighted and resolute enough to 
take the decisive steps necesary to eradi-
cate Browder' s revisionism. . . . 
C. Refresh and Strengthen the Party 
Leadership: During my various reports 
and articles in this situation, I have 
taken Comrade Browder sharply to task 
for our Party's revisionist mistake. I 
have done this because Browder was 
the chief author of the revisionism; he 
theorized it; he rammed it down our 
Party's throat without discussion; he 
now refuses to accept correction, and 
he has been busily trying to organize 
an opposition against the National 
Commitee's Resolution. Some comrades 
believe, however, that I have been un-
duly severe in polemizing against 
Browder. But this is sentimentalism, 
when it is not political uncertainty. 
Comrade Browder has done and is still 
doing severe injury to our Party. He 
subjected it to ridicule when he intro-
duced his absurd capitalist ideas into 
it a year and a half ago, and he is ex-
posing it to a severe Red-baiting attack 
now that we have to change back from 
his false policies. He has seriously 
weakened our Party's daily work and 
confused its membership. He has also 
profound! y lowered our Party's prestige 
among other Communist Parties. 
While it is necessary, therefore, to 
concentrate the main fire against Brow-
der as the ideological leader of our revi-
sionist error, this does not remove the 
heavy burden of responsibility borne 
by the rest of our national leadership, 
especially the members of the National 
Board. It was a great weakness that our 
leadership was not capable of theoreti-
cally unmasking Browder's opportun-
ism and thus saving the Party from the 
ensuing ravages in its work, its prestige, 
and its membership. 
Political mistakes are serious matters 
and cannot be lightly passed over. In 
these times of crucial struggle against 
fascism they involve the welfare, the 
liberties and possibly even the lives of 
large masses of people. Leaders who 
make such mistakes must, therefore, be 
held strictly responsible. Consequently, 
the proposal as stated in the National 
Committee's Resolution, to "refresh 
and strengthen the personnel of all re-
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sponsible leading committees in the 
Association," is a pertinent one. The 
Party must provide the best guarantees 
it can in its leadership that such a 
disastrous mistake shall not take place 
again. This does not signify, however, 
as some comrades assert, that "the 
whole national leadership must be 
leaned out." Such a Leftist course 
would be throwing the baby out with 
the bath water. 
Communist parties are not infallible, 
and even the best Marxists sometimes 
make mistakes. The distinction between 
Communist parties and other parties 
of the people in this respect is that, 
armed with the science of Marxism-
Leninism, the former make far fewer 
mistakes than any other group, and 
when they do commit errors, they 
frankly admit and correct them. Just a 
little while ago Stalin stated that many 
serious errors had been made in the 
U.S.S.R. during the prosecution of the 
war. And in his famous speech on 
Masterz'ng Bolshevism, delivered on 
March 3, 1937, when pointing out that 
the leadership of the Party made the 
serious error of failing to recognize 
the danger of Trotskyism, he said: 
How can it be explained that our 
leading comrades, who have a rich 
experience of struggle against every 
kind of anti-Party and anti-Soviet 
trend, proved to be so blind and naive 
in this case that they were unable 
to recognize the real face of the ene-
mies of the people, were unable to 
discern the wolves in sheep's cloth-
ing, were unable to tear the mask 
from them? 
They forgot Soviet power has con-
quered only one-sixth of the world, 
that five-sixths of the world is in 
possession of capitalist powers. They 
forgot that the Soviet Union is in 
conditions of capitalist encircle-
ment .... 
This was a very serious error, as all 
will agree, and in the most advanced 
Communist Party in the world. 
When errors are made by Commu-
nist leaders, and our error was a seri-
ous one, it calls for a check-over of the 
leading forces; but this must not be in-
terpreted as a signal for a reckless deci-
mation of the Party leadership. Such 
a decimation would be in order only 
if the Party should have fallen into 
the hands of a hard-boiled group of in-
curable revisionists, which is not the 
case in our Party. What is called for 
in our situation in order to refresh and 
strengthen the leadership, therefore, is 
to select our new National Committee 
and National Board on the basis of a 
careful review of the various members' 
qualifications, including their social 
background, their Marxist - Leninist 
training, their previous Party record, 
their degree of participation in the pres-
ent error, their connections with trade 
unions and mass organizations, their 
present attitude toward Browder's re-
visionism, and their general prospects of 
doing effective future Party work. Ob-
viously, there must be important 
changes in our leading committees, par-
ticularly the National Board. Trade 
unionists and war veterans especially 
must be brought into the leadership, 
both nationally and in the districts. T he 
present Party situation must result in a 
very substantial improvement in our 
whole Party leadership. 
D. Re-establish Democratic Central-
ism: A basic essential in our fight 
against Browder' s revisionism is to re-
introduce Leninist democratic central-
ism into the Party. During the tenure 
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of Comrade Browder's leadership the 
Party drifted far from these principles 
and allowed itself to become infected 
with a corroding bureaucratism in 
which Browder was the key figure and 
chief moving force. 
Centralism we had, a super-central-
ism in fact, but very little democracy. 
Comrade Browder during the course 
of the years had managed, with the ac-
quiescence of the leadership and of the 
Party in general, to develop among us a 
totally wrong conception of Communist 
leadership. He had grown almost into 
a dictator. His authority reached such 
a point that his word had become vir-
tually unchallengeable in our Party. 
His policies and writings finally were 
accepted almost uncritically by the lead-
ers and the general membership. Brow-
der created around himself an atmos-
phere of infallibility and unchallenge-
able authority. All this was accentu-
ated by the deluge of petty-bourgeois 
adulation, praise-mongering and hero-
worship that was constantly poured 
upon him by our leadership and our 
members. 
Comrade Browder was deeply intoxi-
cated by this unseemly adulation and 
by his arbitrary power. He quite lost 
his political balance from it. He aban-
doned Communist modesty and Lenin-
ist self-criticism and fell into the most 
extravagant boasting. This boasting at-
titude has done Browder great personal 
damage and it has brought havoc to 
our Party. 
Constantly grasping for more power, 
Comrade Browder had largely liqui-
dated the political functions of the 
Party's leading bodies. He habitually 
by-passed the National Board in policy 
making. Characteristically, his notori-
ous report on Teheran was never pre-
sented as a whole to the National Board. 
All the Board saw of it beforehand 
were a few fragments. It was sprung 
suddenly and sensationally, in the true 
Browder manner, at a National Com-
mittee meeting attended by several 
hundred people. The National Com-
mittee, also, had gradually lost all real 
political power. It assembled; it lis-
tened to Browder's proposals; it af-
firmed them; and it dispersed to the dis-
tricts to impress the policy upon the 
membership. Of genuine political dis-
cusison there was none whatever in the 
National Committee. Similarly, our re-
cent National Conventions were hardly 
better than the National Committee 
meetings-with their formal endorse-
ment of Browder' s reports, no political 
discussions and no self-critical exami-
nation of the leadership. 
In this stifling bureaucratic atmos-
phere, Leninist collective leadership 
could not and did not exist. Political 
thinking itself was hamstrung. Com-
rade Browder, basing himself upon 
the high prestige which he enjoyed 
among the Party membership, made 
policy pretty much as he saw fit, with 
the sad results that we now see. How 
far Browder was prepared to go to 
prevent political discussion was shown 
by the way he suppressed my letter of 
January, 1944, to the National Com-
mittee. The only way I could have 
gotten this letter to the membership 
was by facing expulsion and a sure split 
in the Party. Even then my letter 
would not have really come before the 
Party, for the issue would have been the 
unity of the Party, and anyone who at-
tempted to discuss my letter would 
have been denounced as a Trotskyite 
by Browder. 
The Party must insist that this whole 
bureaucratic system be swept away, 
in the districts and nationally, as a 
,... ' 
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basic condition for freeing itself from 
Browder's revisionism. There must be 
a genuine collective leadership built up. 
The Se~~etariat must report regularly to 
the Nat10nal Board, which must discuss 
its reports freely. The National Com-
mitt~e must establish its political power 
and It must have the £ullest freedom to 
discuss all reports coming from the Na-
tional Board or members of the Sec-
retariat. Important differences of opin-
ion in the National Board must be re-
ported to the National Committee. The 
National Convention must not be a 
mere rubber stamp, as it was under 
Browder's leadership, but must be, in 
fact as well as in name, the most 
authoritative body in our Party. 
The Party must insist that the Party 
leaders be self-critical, and it must learn 
to be on guard against leaders who 
cover up their mistakes, instead of 
' frankly admitting and analyzing them. 
Petty-bourgeois adulation of leaders 
must also be ended. We should respect 
our chosen leaders, but ·not make gods 
of them. We must insist that real 
political discussion take place at all 
levels of the Party, from the branches 
to the highest committees. However 
' ' our Party is not a debating society; 
we have to arrive at decisions and then 
resolutely carry them out. But we 
can neither formulate sound policies 
nor carry them out effectively without 
collective thinking, collective discus-
sion, and collective leadership. Only 
by applying the sound principles of 
Leninist democratic-centralism can our 
Party keep its mistakes . to a minimum 
and develop the clear: .. thinking unity 
of action and resolute discipline that 
are the great strength of Communist 
parties all over the world. 
E. Strengthen the Party's Indepen-
dent Role: Central to Comrade Brow-
der's revisionism was the · constant 
playing down of the independent role 
of the Communist Party. This blunt-
ing of the political initiative of our 
Party expressed itself in various form~ 
of tail-ending after the bourgeoisie. 
This deadly opportunism is to be found 
in Browder's leadership for at least 
the past ten years. It has had the ef-
fect of facilitating the demagogy of 
the Trotskyites and Dubinsky Social-
Democrats. 
Thus, under Browder's leadership, 
our Party habitually failed to criticize 
adequately the Roosevelt Administra-
tion for its shortcomings and . to come 
forward boldly with its own proposals. 
In the same spirit of tailism, Browder 
refused to criticize sharply the reac-
tionary policies of the A. F. of L. 
Executive Council, except in the most 
flagrant cases. But the worst instance 
of all was his attempt to set our Party 
to tail-ending shamelessly after Ameri-
can financ~ capital directly, by pictur-
ing the National Association of Man-
ufacturers, the U. S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the American Bankers Associa-
tion and other reactionary employers' 
associations as progressive bodies and 
as qualified therefore to lead the na-
tion in various branches of its economic 
and political policy. This example of 
tailism, which is the very core of the 
distortion of the Teheran decisions, 
was the most disgraceful piece of mis-
leadership in the history of our Party. 
Another exprnssion of Comrade 
Browder's settled policy of minimiz-
ing our Party's leading role was his 
systematic hiding of our light under 
a bushel. That is, instead of having 
our Party speaking out boldly under 
itf. own name on all political ques-
tions, Browder nearly always, in re-
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cent years, ought to shove the Party 
into the background and to surrender 
the initiative to other organizations. 
This harmful practice has done much 
to weaken our prestige among the 
masses, to surround our Party with a 
false conspiratorial air, and to hamper 
the full legalization of our movement. 
Still another, and a very deadly form 
of such playing down of the role of 
the Party, was Browder's long-contin-
ued practice of virtually limiting our 
Party's activities to mass agitation and 
of avoiding all mass organization and 
struggle. Browder has a magic rever-
ence for the spoken word. He is a 
talker, not a mass fighter. He has had 
very little experience in, or understand-
ing of, the need to back up the word 
with action. Especially of recent years 
has this trend become manifest, as 
Browder, poisoned by our sickly adula-
tion, developed more and more of an 
inflated idea of the importance of his 
speeches. He eventually got to the 
point where he seemed to believe that 
all that was necessary in the case of 
a given issue was for him to make a 
speech, for the Party to scatter huge 
quantities of it throughout the coun-
try, and all would be well. Browder 
grossly underestimates the importance 
of mass organization and political 
struggle, so that it is several years since 
our Party has organized any real mass 
movements on its own, or by mobiliz-
ing its forces to support other organiza-
tions that were campaigning for the 
people's rights. This long-developing 
tendency of liquidating the mass or-
ganization work of the Party finally 
reached its climax in the dissolution 
of the Party and the formation of the 
C.P.A. as almost exclusively a political 
educational society. 
The Party must br~ak $h~rply with 
Browder's chronic tailism, his hiding 
the Party's face, and his avoidance of 
mass struggle. The Party must recover 
its political initiative and Communist 
boldness-even though certain public 
officials, leaders of the A. F. of L. 
Executive Council and of the N.A.M. 
may not like it. 
It is good, of course, that many 
mass organizations now speak out pro-
gressively on various questions, and 
we must do all we can to develop this 
trend. But this must not be done 
by pushing the Communist Party into 
the background, into the shadows, 
where the workers cannot see it in ac_. 
tion. Our Party, if it is to be recog-
nized by the masses as their political 
leader, must speak out quickly and 
boldly on every important question. 
Of course, in this sharpening up of 
the Party's political role we must not 
fall into the sectarian errors of the 
past. And, above all, our Party must 
regain its skill of backing up its spoken 
word with the most complete possible 
mobilization of our membership and 
of the organizations with which we 
cooperate. , 
At the present time we are facing 
a big task in this respect in the wage 
movements of the workers, where 
there is the most urgent need of our 
helping to organize a broad and active 
political campaign within the frame-
work of the wartime no-strike pledge. 
We will face a still greater task in the 
Congressional elections of r 946, when 
the reactionaries will make a desperate 
attempt to capture control of Con-
gress. We must employ all our skill to 
awaken and mobilize the workers and 
all democratic forces to beat back the 
political offensive of reaction. 
F. Improve the Party's Social Com-
position: To eliminate Browder' s op-
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portunism and to build a strong dike 
against its future recurrenc.e, the Par-
ty must radically improve the social 
composition of its membership and of 
its leadership. We must enlist more 
and more workers from the basic in-
dustries. We must, above all, recruit 
trade unionists and war veterans and 
bring them into our leadership. The 
winning of such members will be fa-
cilitated by the Party's present change 
of line. 
The morale of our Party members 
and sympathizers is now being great-
1 y raised by the Party's new line. They 
are happy to get from underneath the 
suffocating cloud of Browder's oppor-
tunism and bourgeois revisionism. We 
should be alert, therefore, to translate 
this new enthusiasm into a big Party 
building campaign that will bring 
many thousands of new members into 
our Party, particular! y in our concen-
tration districts, and that will vastly ex-
tend the circulation of the Daily Work-
er and the rest of our press. The best 
answer we can make to Comrade 
Browder and his revisionism will be 
to enroll many thousands of new 
members into our Party-workers from 
the steel mills, coal miners, automo-
bile plants, railroads, and other key 




The supreme measure of our new 
policy is its application in practice to 
the immediate demands and interests 
of the people. Only if we have suc-
~ssful practical mass policies and ac-
tivities can we free ourselves from 
Browder' s rev1s1onism, on the one 
hand, and avoid the pitfalls of "Lefr>' 
sectarianism, on the other. . . . I want 
to direct my concluding remarks to 
the correction of some general mis-
conceptions regarding the new political 
line of our Party. 
The first of these misconceptions is 
voiced in the argument that Comrade 
Browder stands for a broad national 
unity, whereas the new line of the 
Party tends to narrow down our ac-
tivities. The reverse is the case. Ac-
tually, Comrade Browder's policy, 
measured in the light of our Party's 
experience, was definitely cutting down 
cur organization and its ~ass contacts. 
Proof of this is the fact that his 
liquidatory policy was fast taking the 
vitality out of our Party and throw-
ing it into a serious internal crisis. 
Thus it was undermining the very 
foundations of all our work. Besides, 
Browder's line, with its nonsense about 
the so-called progressive capitalists 
voluntarily protecting the workers' in-
terests, was destroying our Party's 
prestige among the workers and alien-
ating them from us, as was shown in 
the defeat of Communists in more 
than one important trade union elec-
tion in this period. 
Many of our Party members found 
Browder' s policy so absurd that they 
would not even try to apply it in the 
industries. But a comrade, Freda 
W erb, of Buffalo, in a discussion ar-
ticle showed what happened to com-
rades who did try to apply the policy 
in the shops. 
Being faced with fay-offs as we 
were, the discussion in the plant na-
turally was around what was going 
to happen to us after we were laid 
off, and what sort of postwar world 
we were going to live in. For 
months I stood there and told every-
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one who would listen that in the 
postwar world our purchasing pow-
er would _ be greatly increased, that 
the capitalists would voluntarily pay 
us more money because they wanted 
to have a prosperous postwar world. 
I may say in passing that many either 
wouldn't listen, or having listened, 
laughed. 
If we had persisted in advancing 
Browder' s no-strike pledge for the 
postwar period, it would have iso-
lated us in the labor movement. In 
addition to all this, Browder succeeded 
in alienating whole sections of pro-war 
liberal forces of the country and turn-
ing them into a vitriolic opposition to 
our Party. There is nothing "broad" 
in a policy that cuts the heart out of 
our Party, ruins our prestige among the 
workers, and violently antagonizes the 
democratic forces generally. 
In contrast to all this, the new Par-
ty line will build the Party and inspire 
its members with an incomparably bet-
ter morale; it will restore our waning 
standing among the workers, it will 
lay the basis for real cooperation with 
all democratic forces, it will lay the 
basis for the broadest possible demo-
cratic coalition. 
The second misconception that I 
want to deal with is now being spread 
by Browder. It is akin to the fore-
going one, and it runs to the effect that 
Comrade Browder speaks for the whole 
nation, whereas the Party, with its new 
line, speaks only for the working class. 
This, too, is a falsification of realities. 
Browder is speaking for a nation which 
he wants to be led by reactionary 
finance capital. In doing this he is 
speaking in the interest, not of the na-
tion, but of the big capitalists. Where-
as, our Party is speaking for a nation 
in which only the proletariat can and 
must be the decisively progressive 
force. It thereby indeed speaks for 
the whole nation. Thus, in the pres-
ent fight to maintain their wage rates, 
our Party holds that the workers are 
in fact fighting to advance the eco-
nomic prosperity of the nation by pre-
venting the collapse of their purchas-
ing power and with it a breakdown 
of the whole industrial machine. We 
maintain that in all their wage strug-
gles, therefore, the workers should place 
in the very forefront of their propa-
ganda the fact that by keeping up 
their wages they are def ending most 
vital economic interests of the entire 
people. The same principle holds true 
of the other fields of struggle of the 
working class. By championing the 
interests of the proletariat in this 
broad sense, the Party is indeed speak-
ing in the true interest of the whole 
nation. The same is true regarding 
the fight of the Party in behalf of 
the Negro people, the farmers and 
the middle classes. 
A third erroneous idea now being 
circulated in the Party by Browder, 
would have the Party membership 
believe that whereas Comrade Brovv-
der is the champion of Teheran~ the 
Party is now opposed to the Teheran 
decisions. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. In reality, Browder, 
by appeasing American finance capital, 
is surrendering to the worst enemies 
of Teheran; whereas our Party, by 
basing its present policy upon the com-
bined struggle of the democratic forces 
of the world, is taking the only course 
by which the great objectives laid down 
at Teheran can be achieved. Com-
plete victory over fascism can be won 
in this war; peace can be maintained 
for a long period of time, and joint 
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steps can be undertaken by the United 
Nations for world economic rehabili-
tation. However, the way to these 
ends is not, as Browder proposes, to 
turn world leadership over to Ameri-
can finance capital, but through alert 
struggle by the democratic elements 
throughout the world against monop-
oly, especially the most reactionary sec-
tions of A~erican finance capital. 
The fourth and last false conception 
that I wish to speak against is the 
idea being circulated by "Left" sec-
tarian voices in our Party to the effect 
that the present program of the Party 
is only transitory, that we are on our 
way to a much more Left interpretation 
of the present national ~and world sit-
uation. According to these comrades, 
we are going to, or should, denounce 
the war against Japan as imperialist, 
condemn the decisions of Teheran as 
unachieveable, drop the slogan of na-
tional unity, call for a farmer-labor 
government, give up our wartime no-
. strike pledge, abandon the fight for 
60,000,000 jobs, bring forward the 
question of Socialism as an immediate 
issue, and generally adopt a class-
against-class policy. 
But these comrades are indulging 
in wishful thinking. Our Party, if I 
know it, is not going to take any 
such Leftist course. For the Party, 
in its overwhelming majority, under-
stands that Leftist policies of this char-
acter would be no less disastrous to 
us than Browder's Right revisionism. 
The line of the National Committee's 
Resolution is the correct one: in its 
analysis, its formulation of . immediate 
demands, and its placing of the ques-
tion of Socialism. We must hew to 
the line of that Resolution, taking into 
account, of course, necessary amend-
men ~ We are not getting rid of 
Browder' s Right opportunism to fall 
into a swamp of "Left" sectarianism. 
Now, in conclusion, let me say that 
our Party at the present time is pass-
ing through one of the most serious 
crises in all its history. There are 
those who hope that it will lose heavily 
in membership and will fall into a 
bitter and destructive factionalism. But 
such people, whether inside or outside 
of the Party, will be completely disap-
pointed. The Party is making this 
crucial turn in decisive unity. There 
will be no factionalism, nor will our 
Party tolerate any, either from the 
Right or the "Left." Our Party will 
emerge from this situation healthy and 
growing, with its mass contacts broad-
ened and strengthened and with its 
members and leaders refreshed and 
fortified by a deeper understanding of 
the great science of Marxism-Leninism. 
With the economic conditions of the 
workers deteriorating and unemploy-
ment growing, with the N.A.M., the 
U. S. Chamber of Commerce and 
other employers' organizations out to 
weaken or smash the unions, with the 
combined reactionaries planning an 
all-out attempt to capture Congress in 
1946, and with the Government lack-
ing in adequate response to the work-
ers' needs, obviously serious economic 
and political struggles loom in this 
country. The workers will have to 
defend actively their rights, economic 
standards, and unions. The people in 
general will have to fight for the ob-
jectives of Teheran, Yalta and San 
Francisco. This situation will place 
great responsibilities upon us Commu-
nists. But with our Party rejuven-
ated and re-invigorated, and playing 
the vanguard role, we will face these 
oncoming struggles with Communist 
confidence and resoluteaess. 
THE RECONSTITUTION OF 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
By JOHN WILLIAMSON 
Report to the Special. Convention of the Communist Political 
Association, held in New York, July 26-28, I945, 
which reconstituted the Communist Party of 
the United States of A mer£ca. 
The aim of the Constitution Com-
mittee has been to make all the nec-
essary changes to bring the Constitu-
tion into accord with the principles of 
a Marxist political party of the work-
ing class. 
The proposed recomr~endations for 
changes in the Constitution are as · 
follows: First, we propose to add 20 
new sections that deal explicitly with 
-many questions we consider necessary 
to insure the proper functioning of 
our Party and especially to guarantee 
the full participation of the member-
ship in the work of the Party, clearly 
defining the rights and duties of the 
members. Secondly, we propose the 
deletion of three old sections which 
in our opinion are not in accord with 
the effective functioning of our organi-
zation~ Thirdly, we have made addi-
tions to five existing sections. And, 
finally, we have strengthened eight 
anc;l reformulated three of the existing 
sections. Each of these you will note 
as we go along. . . . 
NAME AND PURPOSES 
The first two Articles dealing with 
the Name and Purposes are obviously 
of prime importance. Our Constitu-
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tion must reflect in the proposed name 
and purposes the distinguishing c~ar­
acter of our organization-namely, 
that it is the Marxist political party of 
the working class. As you will note, 
we definitely propose changing the 
name of the organization to Commu-
nist Party. We recognize that the 
change of name from Communist 
; arty to Communist Political Associa-
tz"on in May, 1944, was basically incor-
rect. We say this, not because a 
Marxist political party of the work-
ing class must at all times have the 
"P " I h . name arty. n t e c1 rcumstances 
of May, 1944, however, the change 
of name was fund amen tally unsound 
and incorrect, because it had its ori-
gin and motivation in our revisionist 
policies. Here for instance, is what 
Earl Browder gave as the reasons for 
dissolution: 
The Communists foresee that the 
practical political aims they hold 
will for a long time be in agreement 
on all essenial points with the aims 
of a much larger body of non-Com-
munists, and that therefore our po-
litical actions will be merged in 
such larger movements. The ex-
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istence of a separate political PC!rty 
of Communists, therefore, no longer 
serves a practical purpose but can 
be, on the contrary, an obstacle to 
the larger unity. (Teheran: Our 
Path in War and Peace, p. n7.) 
This meant destroying rhe whole 
concept {)f the indispensability of the 
Communist Party as an independent 
political force. This meant the li-
quidation of the political and organi-
zational role of the Communists. Pre-
cisely because the dissolution of the 
C.P. symbolized our revisionist er-
rors, we definitely propose returning 
to the name Communist Party. It is 
our firm conviction that: 
r. The question of re-establishing 
the name and form of Communist 
Party is a question of principle con-
nected with the proper role and func-
tioning of the Party. The necessary 
political and organizational corrections 
that we must accomplish will defin-
itely be aided by resuming the name 
Communist Party. 
2. It is necessary to resume the name 
Communist Party to restore the cor-
rect Marxist concept and role of a 
vanguard party of the working class; 
and, furthermore, 
3. It is necessary to complete in all 
its aspects, including the name, the 
job we are doing at this Convention, 
thus leaving no room for further spec-
ulation and any "unfinished business." 
As to the purposes of our Commu-
nist Party. These are outlined with 
precision in the completely rewritten 
Prnamble, which will be presented 
later since it is still in the hands of 
a sub-committee. Let me merely re-
iterate certain prerequisites of a Marx-
ist Party. 
1. The Party must constitute itself 
and function as the vanguard of the 
working class. Some people think 
that we can fulfill our vanguard role 
today by merely reflecting and putting--
into more precise and correct form 
what the democratic masses are think-
ing. Obviously, this is not correct. 
This does not mean giving leadership 
t:o the mass movement, for it can only 
result in tailing behind the mass move-
ment. While we must constantly feel 
the pulse of the people, and remain 
an integral part of the mass move-
ment, we can never forget that the 
Party, as one of the Marxist classics 
emphasizes, "cannot be a real party 
if it limits itself to registering what 
the masses of the working people 
think or experience. . . ." In fulfill-
ing the vanguard role of the Party, 
we must be able to project ideas often 
not yet fully accepted or understood 
by the masses, and do so in such a con-
vincing and effective manner that we 
can influence labor and the people to 
accept them as their own. We must 
constantly strive to develop the po-
litical understa~ding and consciousness 
of the working class. We must at 
all times maintain an independent po-
sition aimed at influencing in the first 
place the most decisive force within the 
nation, the working class, while vigi-
lantly criticizing and overcoming hesi-
tations and vacillations within the 
camp of our allies. In my sub-report 
to the National Committee meeting, 
I outlined a series of independent ac-
tivities of the Communist Party in the 
field of public relations, electoral ac-
tivities and mass campaigns which ex-
plain in a practical immediate way 
how we are to function. 
The correct emphasis we place on 
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the independent role of our Party is 
not to be interpreted to mean the 
weakening of our ties with the masses 
or their organizations. Nor, should it 
be distorted to mean the breaking of 
alliances and close working relation-
ships with other democratic forces. It 
should not be interpreted to mean 
replacing leadership of broad masses 
with the self-satisfied leadership of a 
small but advanced group of workers. 
Fulfilling the independent role of the 
Party means to strengthen our ties 
with the masses; for it must be clearly 
realized that without our contributions 
and activity, the masses would be left 
to the influence of all the currents 
and counter-currents of non-Marxist 
forces and ideologies. Developing the 
independent activities of the Commu-
nist Party means activating larger num-
bers of Communists, involving them 
more fully in the mass movement and 
setting in motion ever greater num-
bers of non-Communists. 
In its broader and more funda-
mental aspects, the essence of the 
whole concept of a vanguard working 
class organization is that we become 
more and more the Party of the work-
ing class, in fact as well as in pro-
gram, helping to free the working 
class of all bourgeois influences and 
ideologies, strengthening its unity, or-
ganization and class consciousness. 
In the past, people always had re-
spect for us as a pioneering organiza-
tion-a trail blazer-an organization 
which always raised and defended the 
needs of the working class while ce-
menting ever closer ties with the whole 
mass movement. People had respect 
for us as an organization of action, 
an organization that got things done. 
While individual non-Communist 
leaderst might like us to limit our ac-
tivity to that of political advisers, the 
masses of the people, and first of all 
the workers, see in the Communist 
Party an organization of struggle. 
That concept must be fully re-estab-
lished again in the months to come. 
· 2. The second prerequisite for a 
Communist Party is the mastery of 
Marxist-Leninist theory. This may 
appear a truism, yet it was in the 
name of Marxism that we entered the 
road of revisionism. During these 
last eighteen months particularly we 
fell victim to a superficial understand--
ing of Marxism. We repeated that 
"Marxism is not a dogma but a guide 
to action," and that "Marxism needs. 
enriching and developing," but we for-
got that to master Marxist-Leninist 
theory means above all to assimilate its. 
substance. We neglected the substance 
-and clung to the appearance of the 
letter. Without the rudder of sub-
stance we swam into the revisionism 
that we discussed and officially acted 
upon yesterday. In emphasizing that 
we adhere to the principles of Marx-
ism we should never forget that this 
means: 
a. That we must fight untiringly 
for the everyday interests of the work-
ers and all other oppressed sections. 
of the population; that we must give 
consistent leadership to the national 
struggles of the Negro people and the 
struggle for the liberation of the vic-
tims of U. S. imperialism; 
b. That the working class, upon-
which the Communist Party bases it-
self, is the bulwark and most consist- · 
~nt champion of democracy, the na-
tion and social progress, and that -
therefore the organization, unity and 
independent role of the working· class . 
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is in the interest of our nation; 
c. That wile carrying forward all 
the democratic traditions of our coun-
try and the .fighting traditions of the 
working class of all nations, we al-
ways keep before the masses the aim 
of Socialism as the historic solution of 
the contradiction between the social 
character of production and the private 
ownership of economy by a small 
group of monopolists. 
The effort to understand and master 
Marxism is not just a task for the lead-
ershi p--but a necessary task of the en-
tire membership. We must achieve 
the understanding that the higher the 
political level and the Marxist-Lenin-
ist knowledge of our members and 
cadres, irrespective of whether they be 
Party functionaries or active in trade 
unions, the more effective will be the 
result of their work and leadership. 
Let us never forget the emphasis of 
Lenin that "the role of the vanguard 
can be f.ulfilled only by a Party that is 
guided by an advanced theory." 
However, this is not the first time 
we have said this, and merely to re-
peat it, even under the circumstances 
of today, does not in itself give us 
the guarantee that our organization 
will meet this test. To fulfill this ob-
jective will require that we break with 
the historic underestimation of the 
real significance of Marxist theory 
within our ranks so crassly dem-
onstrated in the recent past. It will 
mean, furthermore, that practical meas-
ures must be adopted of aiding our 
membership and leadership in their 
day-to-day activities to equip them-
selves with the science of Marxism-
Leninism. 
3. The third prerequisite is that the 
Communist Party must understand 
that the determin£ng factor in all our 
organizational and educational work 
is to help influence and lead the 
workers and the people in · struggle. 
Organizational work is not some inner 
activity, but is directed essentially to-
ward the strengthening of our ability 
to influence and lead the masses in 
their activities and struggles. Educa-
tional work is not mere study groups, 
established for the sake of study but is 
aitned at equipping our members with 
the knowledge and experience to know 
how, in the course of all struggles, to 
adopt the most effective strategy and 
tactics, helping the workers themselves 
to arrive at a correct undertsanding 
of the questions involved. Agitational 
work is the abiilty to speak, to write, 
to formulate demands that will rally 
masses in struggle.. Training of cadres 
is to make available to the working 
class the most experienced, tested, 
trained and loyal leaders, so as to have 
the greatest possible assurance of vic-
tory over the enemies of the workers 
and the people. 
4. The fourth prerequisite for a 
Communist Party is to have firm 
roots in the working class and to guar-
antee that industrial workers comprise 
the majority of its members. Success-
ful leadership and ability to influence 
the course of our nation require above 
all that we maintain and greatly ex-
tend our ties with the working class, 
especially in the basic industries. I 
understand that some people have 
posed the question somewhat in this 
manner: under Browder's leadership 
we became a political force and influ-
enced the life of our nation, but under 
Foster's leadership we will merely be 
a sounding board for the working-class 
sentiments. Obviously this is wrong. 
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Under Browder's leadership, as a re-
sult of our liquidationist practices, we 
became less an influence in the nation 
than before, precisely because we 
weakened our connections with the 
most important force within our na-
tion-the working class. In actuality, 
we were influenced by other class 
forces in the nation. To influence sue-
. cessfully the political life of the na-
tion, the center or gravity of the Com-
munist organization should be in the 
main cities and especially in the cen-
ters of large industry. This means 
our strongest roots must be among the 
industrial workers-particularly in the 
steel, auto, coal, marine, electrical 
equipment, shipbuilding, and metal in-
dustries. This is not so today. Being 
slow in reco,gnizing changes in the 
situation and failing to quickly adjust 
our slogans and tactical line to new 
problems and conditions, we many 
times, even if only temporarily, for-
feited leadership to the Reuthers and 
other radical phrase-mongers. How-
ever, the Party has great reserves 
among the workers of basic industry, 
and if we work correctly we can win 




For all of these reasons, I urge you 
to act favorably upon Articles I and 
II of our Constitution. It is precisely 
by this action now that we will be 
acting upon the expressed will of our 
membership to change the name of 
the present organization, the Commu-
nist Political Association to the correct 
name, the Communist Party of the 
Uni'ted States of America. 
I propose now to comment on the 
next two Articles, III and IV. These 
deal with Membership and the Rights 
and Duties of Members of the Com-
munist Party. We cannot be satisfied 
with the correction of our program and 
policies alone. An understanding of 
our errors also must reflect itself in a 
development of Communist conscious-
ness expressed in greater activity, bet-
ter attendance and larger participa-
tion at club meetings, with the mem-
bership everywhere helping to ham-
mer out policy and fulfilling our new 
responsibilities. 
Acceptance of program and poli-
cies is only the expression of the will 
to become a Communist. The first 
condition for carrying out the program 
is participation of all the members in 
the daily work of the Party. While 
recognizing that there can be no 
equality of service and activity, the 
Communist Party must strive to have 
within its ranks only really active 
members. Every member must find 
his or her place, however small the 
contribution, in the overall picture 
of activity. This of course should not 
be distorted to mean withdrawing 
members active in mass organizations 
for community mass work, important 
as that may be, or, far less, for some 
inner club activity. As far as is practi-
cal there should be a merging of such 
activities. Members active in mass or-
ganizations must attend their club 
meetings. Leadership of Party clubs 
shall be considered of equal importance 
with leadership in community mass 
organizations. 
'Vhile all conditions of membership 
are equally important, we emphasize 
at this convention "activity" and the 
new clause "attendance at club meet-
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ings," because in the past we incor-
rect! y encouraged the idea of two 
categories of members-active and 
supporting members. This was both 
an expression of liquidationism, a 
distortion of the high and singular role 
of Communist leadership, as well as 
a distortion of democratic centralism. 
Attendance at club meetings for all 
members, and not just 30 per cent as 
in the past, is indispensable if we are 
to have an active membership un-
der organized political direction. This 
also requires that we correct the ex-
clusive emphasis placed on the purely 
educational activity of the clubs. By 
developings independent Communist 
activities side by side with our par-
ticipation in the broader mass move-
ments of the communities or cities we 
will demonstrate that the Comm~nist 
Party has distinctive qualities which 
?iff~rentiat~ us from all other organ-
izat10:°s with whom we cooperate in 
fulfilling one or another immediate 
perspective. We will make clear by 
what the club says, by what the club 
does, exactly how the Communist 
Party. di~ers from other progressive 
orgamzat10ns. 
It is nec.essary to comment briefly 
on other conditions of membership. 
Take the question of reading our 
press. If all our members would read 
th_e Daily Worker each day, we would 
without ex~ggeration increase the politi-
cal effectiveness of the Party in 
the mass movement several-fold. On 
the question of dues payments-instead 
of a 60 per cent dues payment, as we 
have had in the C.P.A., reflecting 
both looseness as well as dissatisfaction 
with our policies, we must again aim 
for a rno per cent dues payment and 
reach at least an over-all average of 
over 90 per cent. 
I ·call your attention to two new 
sections-4 and 5. The first re-states, 
in accord with the principles of dem-
ocratic centralism, the right of un-
restricted discussion in the pre-con-
vention period. Section 5 meets a 
need that we thought should be em-
phasized, that of involving the mem-
bership in the formulation of major 
policies between convention~ when 
we do not have the same unrestricted 
right of reviewing and discussing all 
our policies and work as in the 60 
days prior to conventions. 
This does n~t mean that our pres-
ent discussion shall, as Comrade Earl 
Browder implied last evening, con-
tinue after the authoritative action of 
this convention. Our Constitution in 
later articles correctly restates a tradi-
tional Communist concept that the 
hig?est authority of the Party is the 
national convention and that its de-
cisions are binding on every member. 
Browder's conception that after the 
participation of our membership in 
the most thorough-going discussion in 
our Party's history and after the de-
liberations of this Convention, that all 
this has little significance and that the 
decision will not be rendered here, is, 
firstly, a reflection on the capacity of 
our membership and of ourselves as 
delegates, and, secondly, a crass ex-
ample of Browder's American excep-
tionalism-an exceptionalism in the 
face of the well-established organiza-
tional principles of the Communist 
movement everywhere. 
Finally, as regards these two Ar-
ticles. You will see we have a number 
of new sections. Some of these are to 
clarify more specifically certain obliga-
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tions of Communist membership, but 
most of them are an effort to empha-
size especially the rights of Party mem-
bers. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
I will now comment on Articles 
VI, VII, and the new Article VIII. 
The structure and functioning of 
the Communist Party must be con-
sidered in connection with the con-
cept of membership which we have 
already established. The structure 
must provide the means by which to 
assure the most effective mobilization 
of the membership, guarantee ade-
quate opportunity for full membership 
participation in formulating and ham-
mering out the policies of the organi-
zation, develop the necessary member-
ship responsibility for carrying through 
decisions and tasks, create the condi-
tions for mastering the principles and 
the program of the organization, and 
thus enable the Party to fulfill its role 
as a vanguard organization. 
In recognizing how the revisionist 
policies we pursued also expressed 
themselves in the character and func-
tioning of the organization, we must 
now quickly overcome all Social-Dem-
ocratic practices and methods that 
developed during this period and 
hindered the Communist organization 
from fulfilling its vanguard role. Our 
mistake was not in trying to "stream-
line" or Americanize our organiza-
tional form. The decisive thing is the 
political content of our organization, 
and that is precisely where our re-
visfonist line had its foundations. But 
organizational forms ar.e indissolubly 
bound up with content, and therefore 
decisive changes in organization must 
be made simultaneously as we correct 
our revisionist policies. The proper 
combination of political content and 
form will enhance our influence and 
prestige as an organization of Ameri-
can Communists. 
The Community Club shall remam 
a major and important form of the 
organization. However, since the size, 
the practices and the content of the 
existing clubs have greatly under-
mined the independent le3:ding role of 
the Party, weakened the ties with the 
membership and distorted the Commu-
nist concept of the rights, responsibili-
ties and duties which accompany mem-
bership in our organization, immediate 
steps shal be taken to adapt the or-
ganization of the Community Club to 
the main objective of re-establishing 
the vanguard role of the Party. 
The size of the Community Club 
shall be greatly reduced to make pos-
sible the establishment of more homo-
geneous and dead y-defined Com-
munist Club, clubs which can readily 
secure a knowledge of their member-
ship and develop greater mobility in 
carrying through their decisions and 
tasks. 
The establishment of smaller clubs 
shall not be regarded as a return to 
the units of years ago. The opening up 
of club headquarters, the development 
of more popular forms of bringing 
the position of the Communist Club 
to the people of the community, is to-
day more essential than ever before. 
But there is no reason why Com-
munity headquarters cannot be main-
tained under these conditions with a 
number of clubs utilizing central head-
quarters, known to the community as 
the dub-rooms of the Party in a given 
area or town. Furthermore, the public 
political character of the dub must be 
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greatly expanded so as to win the ac-
ceptance of the club in the community 
mass movements. Only a club which 
speaks out regularly to the people in 
the community on the burning issues 
of the day, develops a many-sided ac-
tivity program which will give leader-
ship to the solution of these issues; 
strengthens as an organization its re-
lationship with other leaders and or-
ganizations in the community; rea~hes 
the community regularly through 
forums, leaflets, literature and the 
Daily Worker-can hope to win the 
respect and confidence of the com-
m unity and become an accepted par-
ticipant of the anti-fascist democratic 
community movement. 
During the past period, the elimi-
nation of the shop form of organiza-
tion has greatly weakened the ties of 
the C.P.A. with the workers in the 
basic industries, thereby actually 
hindering our working-class members 
from making their maximum contri-
bution to our own organization and 
the labor movement, influencing nega-
tively our ability to win the labor 
movement for correct policies. The 
trend, for the first time in many years, 
of a decline in the industrial composi-
tion of our membership, is due in no 
small measure to the fact that the shop 
form of organization was dissolved 
and the community club did not 
provide the trade unionists with the 
necessary guidance for the solution of 
the complex problems they faced daily. 
While we must not ignore the con-
sideration which led to the dissolution 
of the shop form, namely, the str.ength-
ening and maintenance of our ties 
with the progressive forces within the 
labor movement, we must simultane-
ously strengthen our organization 
among the decisive sections of the 
working class and provide a medium 
through which the shop workers can 
be involved in the development of 
policies that affect the labor mo' e-
ment and our nation. For this reason 
your committee is firmly convinced 
that the shop branch shall be recon-
stituted . as a basic form of Communist 
organization. 
In the opinion of your committee, 
emphasis shall be placed upon the 
shop and not the industrial form of 
organization. We say this because the 
shop form of organization has the ad-
vantage of enabling the Communists 
to influence and raise the working 
class understanding and consciousness 
of their fellow-workers with whom 
they are in constant contact. This is 
not so in the industrial branch. An 
industrial branch does not decisively 
facilitate these objectives. Its members 
are not able to be in closer and more 
effective daily contact with masses of 
workers. Of course, the industrial 
branch may serve the purpose of bring-
ing the Communists of a given in-
dustry together to exchange opinions, 
but that is far from the full role 
and purposes of a Communist club. 
Furthermore, shop clubs are one of 
the keys to concentration in the basic 
industries. Shop clubs, as distinct from 
industrial clubs, will also prevent 
depleting the community club of all 
its trade union and shop workers, 
which could only lead to further weak-
ening the effectiveness of the commu-
nity club as an organization which 
must react to and defend the needs of 
the working class within the commu-
nity. We shall consider establishing 
shop clubs espec.ially in the large shops 
in the basic industries where such or-
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ganization will strengthen the role 
and activity of the workers, guarantee 
more effective mobilization of our 
membership and more consistent 
growth of our organization, and in 
industries where the Communist or-
ganization is especially weak and must 
be rapidly strengthened. 
With the establishment of smaller-
sized community clubs, many of the 
main cities and regions will have a 
larger number of clubs than heretofore. 
To provide more direct leadership, 
state organizations shall take under 
consideration the re-establishment of 
organizations on a county, Congres-
sional or Assembly district basis. 
To provide a direct link with the 
membership and help to involve the 
active members from the clubs in the 
direct formulation of policies, the state 
organizations shall give serious con-
sideration to the establishment in the 
counties, or other subdivisions, dele-
gated bodies representative of the 
clubs-County Councils-as the key 
leading body within the subdivision. 
Such delegated Councils are not to be 
viewed as merely functionaries' meet-
ings, which convene at given intervals 
to listen to a report, but shall become 
working bodies which have the op-
portunity of discussing and determin-
ing policies with the delegates drawn 
into committees, and regularly report-
ing back to their clubs the problems 
discussed and decided upon in the 
Council. · 
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM 
Because we erred so heavily in 
neglecting the time-tested Communist · 
principle of democratic centralism, we 
must emphasize that these principles 
are embodied in Articles VI and VII. 
Let me restate briefly our concept of 
democratic centralism. 
Democratic centralism is the meth-
od of functioning of the Communist 
organization which combines the 
maximum democracy in the shaping 
of policy and the election of all lead-
ership with sufficient centralization 
of committee authority to guarantee 
immediate reaction to problems and 
speedy mobilization of the entire 
membership and organization around 
the fulfillment of key tasks. Demo-
cratic centralism thus guarantees that 
all leading committees are elected by 
the membership and all basic problems 
are discussed and shaped by the mem-
bership. The elected leadership has 
the responsibility to report systema-
tically to the membership on the 
actions and decisions taken by the 
higher committee. But once decisions 
are made in the higher committees, 
these decisions become the line of 
activity for the membership as a 
whole. 
Centralization with formal democ-
racy can never be successful. The 
fusion of democracy and centralism 
can only be achieved on the basis of 
constant common activity and strug-
gle of the entire membership of the 
Party, operating through clubs where 
general policies are discussed and 
elaborated to meet the specific condi-
tions and problems of that area. 
We recognize the failure of our 
leadership to provide true democracy 
in the Party. Equally important, how-
, ever, was our failure to help the mem-
bership equip itself theoretically in 
our Marxist-Leninist science so that 
is could most effectively exercise 
initiative and take part in formulating 
and executing policies. 
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We must be alert to distortions of 
democratic centralism, whether it be 
in the form of restating an old I.W.W. 
syndicalist theory that leaders should 
not hold office longer than one year, 
or the pure-and-simple trade union 
theory that everything must be sub-
mitted to a referendum vote before the 
Party leadership can institute or carry 
through a policy or campaign. On the 
other hand, it is not practicing demo-
cratic centralism for a State Commit-
tee to send out a series of questions to 
all Clubs on a very vital subject, and 
expect answers, without indicating the 
thinking of that leadership as to what 
the policy on the given subject should 
be. 
Much has already been said about 
methods of leadership. Suffice it here 
to emphasize that in the Constitution 
we place before you we propose that 
the National Committee shall meet at 
least three times a year, instead of per-
mitting a lapse of ten months as was 
the case between our 1944 Convention 
and the first meeting of the National . 
Committee elected there. Policies shall 
be worked out in consultation with 
the key Communists concerned, even 
if they are not on the Committee. New 
major policies shall be brought to the 
membership for discussion. Efforts 
shall be systematically made to recheck 
the correctness of policies through the 
National Committee members having 
close contact with the members in key 
shops, basic industries and decisive 
areas. A committee system of work 
involving most of the members of the 
National Committee shall be estab-
. Iished. The most important weapon 
in improving both the policies and the 
functioning of the membership and 
leadership of a Communist Party is 
that of self-criticism. Only an organi-
zation of Communists can make skill-
ful use of this important weapon and 
not injure itself. It is well to recall 
the experiences of the C.P.S.U. on 
this question as stated in the History 
of the C.P.S.U.: 
A party is invincible if it does not 
fear criticism and self-criticism, if it 
does not gloss over the mistakes and 
defects in its work, if it teaches and 
educates its cadres by drawing the 
lessons from the mistakes in Party 
work, and if it knows pow to cor-
rect its mistakes in time. 
A party perishes if it conceals its 
mistakes, if it glosses over sore prob-
lems, if it covers up its shortcomings 
by pretending that all is well, if it is 
intolerant of criticism and self-
criticism, if it gives way to self-
com placency and vainglory and if it 
rests on its laurels. 
Many of us, including myself, who 
used to' know and use e.ff ecti vel y the 
weapon of self-criticism, began to com-
mit precisely the things warned 
against in this quotation. I think the 
entire Party will watch <.:arefully every 
leader to see that his future actions 
square with his words. 
Let me call your attention to a dif-
ferent concept of officers proposed in 
this amended Constitution. The old 
Constitution provided for the election 
of officers by the State and National 
Conventions. We propose that the 
State Committees and the National 
Committee shall elect not only their 
Executive Board but all the officers 
they deem necessary. The Constitution 
indicates by name only the post of 
Chairman, leaving the balance of of-
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ficers to be decided upon by the Na-
tional Committee and each State Com-
mittee, although it is clear that several 
secretaries and a treasurer will be 
needed in every case. 
This concept of leadership empha-
sizes that the authority rests in com-
mittees and not in individuals. It 
builds upon the premise of the collec-
tive, rather than the individual of-
ficers. It makes the officers responsible 
to the committee, with the committee 
having authority to change officers 
without waiting for a convention. 
This works out for a greater demo-
cratic practice. It is the practice in all 
other Communist Parties. 
Lastly, we have added a new Arti-
cle entitled National Review Com-
m1ss10n. Section I of that article thus 
explains its purpose: 
In order to strengthen, as well as 
review, the integrity and resoluteness 
of our cadres, to guard against viola-
tions of Party principles, to maintain 
and strengthen discipline, to supervise 
the audits of the financial books and 
records of the National Committee of 
the Party, the National Convention 
shall elect a National Review Com-
m1ss10n. 
Suffice it to add that during this 
past period when there was great 
looseness in organizational concepts 
and functioning, there was also a 
complete dulling of all vigilance. 
Numerous problems exist or have 
arisen, that have never been followed 
through. With proper alertness, seri-
ous consequences could be averted by 
preventative methods. . . . 
THE. PRESENT SITUATION 
AND THE NEXT TASKS 
Resolution of the National Convention of the Communist Party, U.S.A., 
adopted July 28, 1945 
PART I 
I. 
The military defeat of Nazi Ger-
many is a great historic victory for 
world democracy, for all mankind. 
This espochal triumph ·was brought 
about by the concerted action of the 
Angla-Soviet-American coalition-by 
the decisive blows of the Red Army, 
by the American-British offensives, 
and by the heroic struggle of the re-
sistance movements. This victory 
opens the way for the complete des-
truction of fascism in Europe and 
weakens the forces of reaction and fas-
cism everywhere. It has already 
brought forth a new anti-fascist unity 
of th.e peoples in Europe marked by 
the formation in a number of countries 
of democratic governments represen-
tative of the will of the people and by 
the labor-progressive election victory 
in Great Britain. 
The crushing of Hitler Germany 
has also created the conditions for the 
complete defeat and destruction of 
fascist Japanese imperialism. The win-
ning of complete victory in this just 
war of national liberation is the first 
prerequisite for obtaining peace and 
security in the Far East, for the dem-
ocratic unification of China as a free 
and independent nation, and for the 
attainment of national independence 
by the peoples of Indonesia, lndo-
China, Burma, Korea, Formosa, the 
Philippines and India. The smashing 
of fascist-militarist Japan is likewise 
essential to help guarantee the efforts 
of the United Nations to build a dur-
able peace. 
All these crucial objectives are of 
vital importance to the national in-
terests of the American people, to the 
struggle for the complete destruction 
of fascism everywhere. Now with the 
defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis, 
the possibility of realizing an enduring 
peace and of making new democratic 
advances and social progress has b~en 
opened up for the peoples by the 
weakening of reaction and fascism on 
a world scale and the consequent 
strengthening of the world-wide dem-
ocratic forces. 
2. 
However, a sharp and sustained 
struggle must still be conducted to 
realize these possibilities. This is so 
because the economic and social roots 
of fascism in Europe have not yet been 
fully destroyed. This is so because the 
extreme! y powerful reactionary forces 
in the United States and England, 
which are centered in the trusts and 
cartels, are stnvmg to reconstruct 
liberated Europe on a reactionary basis. 
Moreover, this is so because the most 
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aggressive circles of American im-
perialism are endeavoring to secure 
for themselves political and economic 
domination in the worid. 
The dominant sections of American 
finance capital supported the war 
against Nazi Germany, not because 
of hatred for fascism or a desire to 
liberate suffering Europe from the 
heel of Nazi despotism, but because it 
recognized in Hitler Germany a 
dangerous imperialist rival determined 
to rule the world. From the very incep-
tion of the struggle against fascism, 
American finance capital feared the 
democratic consequences of defeating 
Hitler Germany. 
This explains why the monopolists 
opposed the concept of collective se-
curity in the days when the vvar still 
could have been prevented and instead 
chose the Munich policy which inev-
itably led to war. Later, even after the 
anti-Hitler coalition was forged, the 
forces of big capital who supported 
the war continued to hesitate and 
delay, to make vital concessions to 
the worst enemies of American and 
world democracy-to the sworn foes 
of the Soviet Union and to the bosom 
pals of Hitlerism. That is why Amer-
ican capitalism gave aid to Franco 
Spain; why it preferred to support the 
Petains and Darlans and the reaction-
ary governments-in-exile as against the 
heroic resistance movements of the 
pe'ople. And that is also why it hoped 
that the Soviet Union would be bled 
on the battlefields of Europe and why 
it tried to hold off the opening of the 
Second Front until the last possible 
moment. 
Only when these policies proved to 
be bankrupt, meeting growing opposi-
tion from the ranks of the people, 
from the millions of patriotic Ameri-
cans fighting in our heroic armed 
forces and working in war production; 
only when it became obvious that the 
Soviet Union was emerging from the 
war stronger and more influential than 
ever precisely because of its valiant 
and triumphant all-out war against 
Nazisn:i, did American capital reluc-
tantly and belatedly move toward the 
establishment of a concerted military 
strategy and closer unity among the 
Big Three. 
Now that the war against Hitler 
Germany has been won, the American 
economic royalists, like their British 
Tory counterparts, are alarmed at the 
strengthened positions of world labor, 
at the democratic advances in Europe 
and at the upsurge of the national 
liberation movements in the colonial 
and dependent countries. T 1.erefore, 
they seek to halt the march of democ-
racy, to curb the strength of labor and 
the people. They want to save the 
remnants of fascism in Germany and 
the rest of Europe. They are trying to 
organize a new cordon sanitaire 
against the Soviet Union, which. bore 
the main brunt of the war against the 
Nazis, and which is the staunchest 
champion of national freedom, de-
mocracy and world peace. 
This growing reactionary opposition 
to a truly democratic and anti-fascist 
Europe, in which the people will have 
the right to choose freely their own 
forms of government and social sys-
tem, has been reflected in many of the 
recent actions of the State Department. 
This explains why, at San Francisco, 
Stettinius and Connally joined hands 
with Vandenberg-the spokesman for 
Hoover and the most predatory sec-
tions of American finance capital. This 
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explains the seating of fascist Argen-
tina as well as the aid given to the pro-
fascist forces of Latin-American; the 
British-American reluctance to live up 
to the Yalta accord on Poland; the 
.A...merican delegation's refusal to join 
with the Soviet Union in pledging the 
right of national independence for 
mandated territories and colonies and 
to give official recognition to the repre-
sentatives of the World Labor Con-
gress. 
These facts reflect the current shift 
Qf hitherto win-the-war sections of 
American capital to closer political col-
laboration with the most reactionary 
and aggressively imperialist groupings 
of monopoly capital. 
It is ,.,this reactionary position of 
American big business which explains 
why powerful circles in Washington 
and also London are pursuing the 
dangerous policy of trying to prevent 
a strong, united and democratic China; 
why they bolster up the reactionary, 
incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime 
and why they harbor the idea of a 
compromise peace with the Mikado 
in the hope of maintaining Japan as a 
reactionary bulwark in the Far East. 
It accounts, too, for the renewed cam-
paign of anti-Soviet slander and incite~ 
ment calculated to undermine Ameri-
can-Soviet friendship and cooperation. 
On the home front the big trusts 
and monopolies are blocking the dev-
elopment of a satisfactory program to 
meet the human needs of reconversion, 
of the problems of economic disloca-
tions and severe unemployment, which 
is beginning to take place and will 
become more acute after the defeat of 
Japan. Reactionary forces--espcciall y 
the NAM and their representatives in 
government and Congress-are be-
ginning a new open-shop drive to 
smash the trade unions. They also 
endeavor to rob the Negro people of 
their wartime gains. They are trying 
to prevent the adoption of govern-
mental measures which must be 
enacted at once if our country is to 
avoid the most acute consequences of 
the trying reconversion period and the 
cyclical economic crisis which is bound 
to arise after the war. Likewise, they 
are vigorously preparing to win a reac-
tionary victory in the crucial 1946 elec-
tions. 
Already the reactionaries are using 
the increased cutbacks to lower wages 
and living standards and to provoke 
strikes in war industry. They are ob-
structing the enactment of necessary 
emergency measures for federal 
and state unemployment insurance. 
They are sponsoring vicious anti-labor 
legislation, such as the new Ball-Bur-
ton-Hatch labor relations bill, and are 
blocking the passage of the FEPC and 
anti-polltax bills. They are trying to 
scuttle effective price and rent control 
and to exempt the wealthy and the big 
corporations from essential tax legis-
lation. They are endeavoring to place 
the entire cost of the war and · the dif-
ficulties of reconversion upon the 
shoulders of the working people. 
If the reactionary policies and forces 
of monopoly capital are not checked 
and defeated, America and the world 
will be confronted with new aggres-
sions and wars and the growth of reac-
tion and fascism in the United States. 
3· 
However, the conditions and forces 
exist to defeat this reactionary threat 
and tQ ~n~ble our country to play a 
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more progressive role in world affairs 
in accord with the true national in-
terests of the American people. For 
one thing, the military defeat of Nazi 
Germany has changed the relationship 
of world forces in favor of democracy. 
It has enhanced the role and influence 
of the Land of Socialism. It is bringing 
into being a new, democratic Europe. 
It has strengthened those forces in our 
country, and elsewhere which seek to 
maintain and consolidate the friend-
ship and cooperation of the United 
States and the Soviet Union-a. unity 
which must now be extended and 
reinforced if a durable peace is to be 
secured. 
This is evidenced by the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of the 
American people, and in the first place 
the labor movement, which has grown 
in strength and maturity, is opposed 
to reaction and fascism, and supports 
the foreign and domestic policies of 
the late President Roosevelt as em-
bodied in the decisions of Crimea and 
in the main features of the Second Bill 
of Rights. 
This is demonstrated by the great 
mass support for the San Francisco 
Charter and by the determination of 
the American people to guarantee that 
the United Nations security organiza-
tion shall fulfill its historic objectives 
-that the amity and unity of action 
of the American-Soviet-British coali-
tion shall be consolidated in support 
of the agreements of Teheran, Crimea 
and Potsdam, shall be strengthened in 
the postwar period and made more 
solid and effective, in order to prevent 
or check the recurrence of new ag-
gressions and wars. 
This majority of the American peo-
ple must now speak out and assert its 
collective strength and will. The 
united power of labor and of all dem-
ocratic forces, welded in a firm anti-
fascist national unity, must express 
itself in a decisive fashion so as to 
influence the course of the nation in a 
progressive direction. 
It is imperative that the American 
people insist that the Truman Ad-
ministration carry forward the policies 
of the Roosevelt-labor-democratic coa-
lition for American-Soviet friendship; 
for the vital social aims of the eco-
nomic bill of rights; for civil liberties; 
for the rights of the Negro people; 
and for collective bargaining. It is 
equally necessary that labor and tlile 
people sharply criticize all hesitations 
to apply these policies aad vigorously 
oppose any concessions to the reac-
tionaries by the Truman Administra-
tion, which is tending to make certain 
concessions under the increasing pres-
sure of the reactionary imperialist com-
bination led by the monopolies. 
The Truman Administration, like 
the Roosevelt government from which 
it is developing, continues to receive 
the support of the Roosevelt labor-
democratic coalition, and responds to 
various class pressures. While it seeks 
to maintain contact and cooperative 
relations with labor and the more 
democratic forces of the coalition, its 
general orientation in both domestic 
and foreign policies tends, on some 
vital questions, to move away from 
the more consistent democratic forces 
in the coalition and tries to conciliate 
certain reactionaries. Hence, it is of 
central importance to build sy!t:emati-
cally the political strengtk. and influ-
ence of labor, the Negro people, and 
all true democratic forces within the 
general coalition for the struggle 
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against imperialist reaction, for com-
batting and checking all tendencies 
and groupings in the coalition willing 
to make concessio.r:is to reaction. The 
camp of reaction must not be ap-
peased. It must be isolated and rou~ed. 
Toward this end it is necessary, as 
never before, to strengthen decisively 
the democratic unity of the nation, to 
create that kind of national unity for 
the postwar period which will be able 
to facilitate the destruction of fascism 
abroad and to prevent fascism from 
ccming to power in the United States. 
Therefore, it is essential to weld to-
gether and consolidate ·the broadest 
coalz'tion of all anti-/ ascist and demo-
cratic forces as well as all other sup-
porters of Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies. 
To forge this democratic coalition 
most effectively and to enable it to 
exercise decisive influence upon the 
affairs of the nation, it is essential that 
the working class-especially the pro-
gressive labor movement and the Com-
munists-strengthen its independent 
role and activities and display far 
greater political and organizing initia-
tive. It is imperative that maximum 
unity of action be developed among 
the C.I.O., the A. F. of L. and the 
Railroad Brotherhoods and that their 
full participation in the New World 
Federation of Trade Unions be 
achieved. It is necessary to rally and 
imbue the membership and lower of-
ficials of the A. F. of L. with confidence 
in their ability to fight against and de-
feat the reactionary policies and leader-
ship typifie_d by the Greens, Walls, 
Hutchesons and Dubinskys. 
While cooperating with the patriotic 
and democratic forces from all walks 
of life, labor must, in the first place, 
strengthen its ties with the veterans, 
the working farmers, the Negro peo-
ple, youth, women, intellectuals and 
small business men, and with their 
democratic organizations. At the same 
time, while forging the progressive 
unity of the nation, labor should co-
operate with those capitalist groupings 
and elements who, for one or another 
reason, objectively at times, promote 
democratic aims. But in so doing, la-
bor must depend first of all upon its 
own strength and unity and upon its 
alliance with the true democratic and 
anti-fascist forces of the nation. 
The current war and postwar needs 
of · the working class and the nation, 
including the adoption of an effective 
reconversion program and the main-
tenance of workers' living standards, 
also demand the initiation of large 
scale mass campaigns to ·organize the 
millions of still unorganized workers. 
This is imperative if organized labor 
is to achieve its full strength and ful-
fill its role as the leading democratic 
force of the nation. 
In the vital struggle to crush 
0
feudal-
fascist-militaristic Japan it is necessary 
that American labor reaffirm its no-
. strike pledge and give the necessary 
leadership to mobilize the people for 
carrying the war through to final vic-
tory and for national liberation aims. 
In so doing labor must collaborate in 
the prosecution of the anti-Japanese 
war with all democratic forces who 
favor and support complete victory 
over Japanese imperialism. 
However, labor and the other anti-
fascist forces must take cognizance of 
the fact that amongst those big busi-
ness circles who desire military . vic-
tory over Japan, there are influential 
forces, including some in the State 
Department, who are seeking a com-
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promise peace whicti will preserve the 
power of the Mikado after the war, 
at the expense of China and the other 
Far Eastern peoples, and directed 
against the Soviet Union. Similarly, 
there are powerful capitalist groupings 
including many in Administration 
circles, who plan to use the coming 
defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, 
for maintaining a reactionary puppet 
Kuomintang regime in China, for ob-
taining American imperialist domina-
iton in the Far East. 
Labor and the people should and 
will continue to do all in their power 
to hasten complete victory over J ap-
anese militarism and fascism. And to 
do this, labor and the popular forces 
must fight for and rally the people for 
a consistent anti-fascist and an anti-
imperialist policy, and must rely, first 
of all, upon the people and their dem-
ocratic organizations and aspirations. 
4· 
To achieve the widest democratic 
coalition and the most effective anti-
fascist unity of the nation, it is vital 
that labor vigorously champion a pro-
gram of action that will promote the 
complete destruction of fascism, speed 
victory over Japanese imperialism, 
curb the powers of the trusts and 
monopolies, and thereby advance the 
economic welfare of the people and 
protect and extend American democ-
racy. 
In the opinion of the Communist 
Party. such a program should 'be based 
on ~he following slogans of action: 
I. Speed ~he defeat of fascist-mili-
tarist Japan! 
Prosecute the war against Japan re-
solutely to unconditional surrender. 
Rout a'nd defeat the .advocates of a 
compromise peace with the Japanese 
imperialists and war lords. Curb those 
who seek American imperialist control 
in the Far East. 
Strengthen United Nations coopera-
tion to guarantee postwar peace in the 
Pacific and the world and to ensure 
a free democratic Asia with the right 
of national independence for all colo-
nial and dependent peoples. 
Press for a united and free China 
based upon the unity of the Commu-
nists and all other democratic and anti-
J a panese forces so as to speed victory. 
Give full military aid to the Chinese 
guerillas led by the heroic Eight and 
Fourth armies. 
Continue uninterrupted war pro-
duction and uphold labor's no-strike 
pledge for the duration. Stop employer 
provocations. 
II. Complete the destruction of fas-
dsm and build a durable peace! 
Cement American-Soviet friendship 
and unity to promote an enduring . 
peace and to carry through the destruc-
tion of fascism. 
Carry out in full the decisions made 
by the Big Three at Teheran, Crimea 
and Potsdam. 
Punish the war guilty without 
further delay including the German 
and Japanese staffs and monopolists. 
Death to all fascist war criminals. 
Make Germany and Japan pay full 
reparations. 
Strengthen the World Labor Con-
gress as the backbone of the unity of 
the peoples and the free nations. Ad-
mit the ·world Labor Congress to the 
Economic and Social Council of the 
¥l orld Security Organization. 
Support the San Francisco Charter 
for an effective international security 
I 
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organization, based upon the unity of 
the Big Three. 
Guarantee to all peoples the right 
to determine freely their own destiny 
and to establish their own democratic 
form of government. Put an end to 
Anglo-American political and military 
intervention against the peoples, such 
as in Greece, Belgium and Italy. Ad-
mit Italy to the ranks of the United 
Nations. 
Grant the right of self-determination 
to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. 
Support the Puerto Rican and Filipino 
peoples in their demand for immediate 
and complete independence. 
Break diplomatic relations with fas-
cist Spain and Argentina. Full sup-
port to the democratic forces fighting 
to reestablish the Spanish Republic. 
Support the struggles of the Latin 
American peoples for national sover-
eignty and against the encroachments 
of American and British imperialism. 
Remove from the State Department 
all pro-fascist and reactionary officials. 
Help feed and reconstruct starving 
and war-torn Europe. Reject the 
Hoover program based on reactionary 
financial mortgages, and political in-
terference. 
Use the Bretton Woods Agreement 
in the interests of the United Nations 
to promote international economic co-
operation and expanding world trade. 
Grant extensive long term loans and 
credits, at low interest rates, for pur-
poses of reconstruction and industriali-
zation. Expose and combat all efforts 
of monopoly capital to convert such 
financial aid into means of extending 
imperialist control in these countries. 
Ill. Push the Fight for Sixty Mil-
lion /obs-Meet the Human Needs of 
Reconversion/ 
Make the right to work and the 
democratic aims of the Second Bill of 
Rights the law of the land. Support 
the Murray Full Employment Bill. 
Increase purchasing power to pro-
mote maximum employment. No re-
duction in weekly take-home pay 
when overtime is eliminated. 
Revise the Little Steel Formula to 
increase wages so as to meet the rise 
in the cost of living. Pass the Pepper 
65-cent Minimum Hourly Wage Bill. 
Support the Seamen's Bill of Rights~ 
H. R. 2 346. Defend the wartime gains 
of the Negro workers in industry. 
Establish the guaranteed annual 
wage in industry. 
Establish a shorter work week ex-
cept where this would hamper war 
production. 
Enforce the right to work and to 
equality in job status for women. 
Guarantee the exercise of this right 
by adequate training, upgrading, sen-
iority rights, as well as by providing 
day nurseries and child-care centers to 
aid all working mothers. Safeguard 
and extend existing social legislacion 
for women, as workers and mothers, 
and abolish all discriminatory legisla-
tion against women. 
Support President Truman's pro-
posals for emergency federal legisla-
tion to extend and supplement present 
unemployment insurance benefits as a 
necessary first step to cope with the 
current large-scale cutbacks and lay-
offs. Start unemployment insurance 
payments promptly upon loss of job 
and continue until new employment is 
found. Provide adequate severance. pay 
for laid-off workers. 
Prevent growing unemployment 
during the reconversion and postwar 
period by starting lar~e-scale federal, 
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state, municipal and local public 
works programs-( rural and urban) 
-slum clearance, low rental housing 
developments, rural electrification, 
waterway projects (such as the St. 
Lawrence and the Missouri Valley), 
the building of new schools, hospitals, 
roads, etc. 
No scrapping of government-owned 
industrial plants. Guarantee the opera-
tion of these plants, at full capacity for 
peacetime purposes. 
Establish public ownership of the 
munitions, power and utility indus-
tries to place them under democ-ratic 
control. 
Support all measures for full farm 
production. Defeat the advocates of 
scarcity. Extend and strengthen the 
farm price support program. Establish 
low-cost credit and adequate crop in-
surance. Safeguard the family-sized 
farms. Help tenant farmers to become 
owners. End the semi-feudal sharecrop-
ping system in the South. 
Maintain and rigidly enforce rent 
and price control and rationing. 
Strengthen the law enforcement pow-
ers of the OP A. Smash the black 
market. 
Prosecute the war profiteers. No 
reduction or refunds in corporate, ex-
cess profit and income taxes for the 
millionaires and big corporations. 
Lower taxes for those least able to pay. 
Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell so-
cial security bill. 
IV. Keep Faith With the Men Who 
Fight for Victory! 
Raise substantially dependency allot-
ments to families and relatives of men 
in the Armed Forces. 
Extend and improve the system of 
democratic orientation and discussion 
in the Armed Forces. Draw more per-
sonnel from labor's ranks into orienta-
tion work. Eliminate all anti-labor and 
anti-democratic material and teachings 
from the education services conducted 
in the Armed Forces. 
Guarantee jobs, opportunity and se-
curity for all returning veterans and 
war workers, regardless of race, creed 
or color. 
Extend the scope and benefit of the 
GI Bill of Rights and eliminate all red 
tape from the Veterans' Administra-
tion. Guarantte adequate medical care 
to every veteran. 
Press for the speedy enactment of 
legislation providing for substantial 
demobilization pay, based on length 
and character of service, and financed 
by taxes on higher personal and cor-
porate incomes. 
Insude full benefits of all veterans' 
legislation to Negro veterans. 
V. Safeguard and Extend Democ-
t"acy! 
Enforce ~c;iual rights for every 
American c1t1zen regardless of race, 
color, creed, sex, political affiliation or 
national origin. 
End Jim Crow. Establish a permanent 
FEPC on State and National scales. 
Abolish the poll-tax and the white 
primary. End every form of discrimi-
nation in the Armed Forces. Protect 
the rights of the foreign-born. 
Outlaw anti-Semitism, one of the 
most pernicious and damaging of fas-
cism's ideological weapons. Support 
the just demands of the Jewish people 
for the immediate abrogation by the 
British government of the illlperialist 
White Paper. Support the upbuilding 
of a Jewish National Home in a free 
and democratic Palestine in collabora-
tion with the Arab people, on the basis 
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of the agreement of the Big Three in 
the Near East. · 
Protect and extend labor's rights, 
especially the right to organize, strike 
and bargain collectively. Repeal all 
anti-labor laws sµch as the Smith-
Connally Act. Defeat the Ball-Burton-
Hatch anti-labor bill. 
Outlaw and prohibit all fascist or-
ganizations and activities and every 
form of racial and religious bigotry. 
Rescind all anti-Communist legis-
lation. 
Curb the powers and policies of the 
monopolies and trusts which jeopard-
ize the national welfare and world 
peace. Prosecute and punish all viola-
tions of the anti-trust laws. Demand 
government dissolution of all monop-
olies and trusts found guilty of at-
tempting to restore the Anglo-Ger-
man-American cartel system. Revoke 
their patent rights and prosecute their 
officials .. Enact new legislation subject-
ing the monopolies to a greater meas-
ure of public control with labor, farm 
and small ·business representation on 
all go~e.rnment bodies exercising such 
superv1s10n. 
Protect and extend federal aid to 
small business. 
VI. Safeguard the Future of Amer-
ica's Youth! 
Guarantee full and equal oppor-
tunity for education and jobs for all 
youth. 
Establish an adequate program of 
training and retraining in new and 
higher skills during the period of re-
convers10n. 
Fix adequate minimum wage stand-
ards and guarantee equal pay for equal 
work to young men and women work-
ers. 
Reestablish and strengthen minimum 
working standards for working minors 
which have been relaxed during the 
war. Abolish child labor. 
Pass legislation tor adequate federal 
aid to schools and students especially 
in the South. Establish full and equal 
opportunity for schooling, including 
college education. Guarantee full aca-
demic freedom. 
Enact federal legislation to safe-
guard the health and well-being of the 
youth. Develop adequate recreational, 
cultural and social programs for dem-
ocratic citizenship in schools and com-
munities as a means to prevent juve-
nile delinquency. 
Establish the right to vote at 18 by 
State legislation. 
Establish a federal government 
agency, including representation of 
youth and labor, to develop and co-
ordinate planning to meet the nation's 
responsibility to youth. 
Adopt special safeguards for guaran-
teeing education, vocational training 
and job opportunities for Negro youth. 
This program meets the most urgent 
immediate interests of the American 
people and nation. It is a program of 
action around which all progressive 
Americans can unite today. It is a pro-
gram of action which will advance the 
struggle for the moral and political 
defeat of fascism, leading to its final 
destruction and eradication. It will 
help create the conditions and guaran-
tees for a stable peace and for a larger 
measure of economic security and dem-
ocratic liberties for the masses of the 
people. The anti-fascist and democratic 
forces of our nation, being the over-
\Vhelming majority of our people, can 
become strong enough to check and 
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defeat imperialist reaction and to 
realize the great objectives of this pro-
gram of action. 
As class-conscious American work-
ers, as Marxists, we Communists will 
do all in our power to help the Ameri-
can working class and its allies to fight 
for and realize this program. At the 
same time we will systematically ex-
plain to the people that substantial 
gains for the masses secured under 
capitalism are inevitably precarious, 
unstable and only partial and that 
Socialism alone can finally and com-
pletely abolish the social evils of capi-
talist society, including economic in-
security, unemployment and the 
danger of fascism and war. 
However, this program of action 
will help the working class and the 
people as a whole to meet their urgent 
immediate practical needs, enhancing 
generally their strength and influence 
in the nation. In the struggle for the 
program for peace and democracy, 
jobs and security, favorable conditions 
are created for the masses of our peo-
ple to recognize, on the basis of their 
own experiences, the need for the 
eventual reorganization of society 
along socialist lines. 
We shall assist this process by every 
available educational means, taking 
full cognizance of the growing interest 
of the American people and its work-
ing class in the historic experiences of 
the Soviet people in the building of a 
new socialist society, which has played 
the decisive role in the defeat of Hit-
ler Germany and the Axis. We shall 
aim to convince the broad masses that 
the eventual elimination of the profit 
system and the establishment of So-
cialism in the United States will usher 
in a new and higher type of democ-
racy and a free road to unlimited and 
stable social progress because it will 
end exploitation of man by man and 
nation by nation, through the estab-
lishment of a society without oppres-
sion and exploitation. 
While not yet accepting Socialism as 
an ultimate goal, the American people 
today agree that fascism must be des-
troyed, wherever it exists or wherever 
it raise its head. The American people 
are ready to protect and extend the 
Bill of Rights and all democratic liber-
ties. They are determined to fight for 
greater peace and democracy, for the 
right to work, greater job and social 
security. 
Therefore, Communists and non-
Communists, all progressives and anti-
fascists can be rallied in support of the 
above program of immediate action. 
For this program meets the immediate 
desires of the American people upon 
which the majority can unite today to 
prevent the rise of fascism and to as-
sure victory in the 1945 municipal 
elections and in the fateful r 946 con-
gressional elections which must be or-
ganized and prepared for now. This 
is a program which must be cham-
pioned in every factory and industry, 
in every community and state, through 
the medium of labor's political action; 
through labor's joint and parallel 
action locally, and through broad shop 
steward conferences and united com-
munity movements, as well as through 
other broad united peoples and demo-
cratic front activities. 
PART II 
5· 
Th~ foregoing program demands a 
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resolute struggle. The reactionaries 
will seek desperateiy to divide the 
ranks of the people, to pit one group 
against the other-veterans and farm-
ers against labor, Gentile against Jew, 
white against Negro, Protestant against 
Catholic, A. F. of L. against C.1.0. 
They will strive to break the Anglo-
Soviet-American coalition and foment 
bitter class, racial, partisan and sec-
tional strife. For these purposes they 
will use Hitler's secret weapon of 
"white supremacy" and anti-Commu-
nj sm, and make maximum use of the 
David Dubinsky and Norman Thomas 
Social-Democrats, the Trotskyites, as 
well as the John L. Lewises and Mat-
thew Wolls. 
To meet this situation the people 
need a great strengthening of every 
one of their progressive organizations 
and particularly the organizations of 
labor-the trade unions. They need 
loyal, courageous and honest leader-
ship, men and women who combine 
clarity of vision with the qualities of 
firmness in principle and flexibility in 
tactics. Above all, they require a larger, 
stronger, more influential and more ef-
fective mass Communist Party. 
The Communists have a greater re-
sponsibility to labor and the nation 
than at any other time in their history. 
And these greater responsibilities can 
be fulfilled by us with honor because 
of our long record of devotion and 
service to the cause of the working 
class and the people, and by our adher -
ence to the scientific pri nci pl es of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
The American Communist move-
ment confidently faces the future. We 
are proud of our consistent and heroic 
struggle against reaction and fascism 
over the years. We draw strength 
from and are particular! y proud of our 
efforts to promote victory over Nazi 
barbarism and Japanese imperialism. 
On the field of battle and on the 
home front, we Communists have 
been in the forefront of the fight to 
defend our country and our people. In 
the struggle for the establishment of 
the anti-Hitlerite coalition, for the 
opening of the Second Front, for de-
feating fascist-militarist Japan, for na-
tional unity, for the re-election of 
Roosevelt, for the rights of the Negro 
people, for building a strong and pro-
gressive labor movement, for uninter-
rupted war production and for the 
attainment of international trade 
union unity-the contributions of the 
Communist have been vital and sec-
ond to none. 
6. 
We recognize that the future of the 
labor and progressive movements and 
therefore the role of the United States 
in world affairs will depend to no 
small extent upon the correctness of our 
Communist policy, our independent 
role and influence, our mass activities 
and organized strength. 
That is why today we Communists 
must not only learn from our achieve-
ments in the struggle against fascism 
and reaction, but also from our weak-
nesses and errors. In the recent period, 
e~peciall y since January, 1944, these 
mistakes consisted in drawing a num-
ber of erroneous conclusions from the 
historic significance of the Teheran ac-
cord. Among these false conclusions 
was the concept that after the military 
defeat of Germany, the decisive sec-
tions of big capital would participate 
in the struggle to complete the des-
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truction of fascism and would co-
operate with the working people in 
the maintenance of postwar national 
ufiity. The reactionary class nature of 
finance capital makes these conclusions 
illusory. This has been amply demon-
strated by recent events revealing the 
postwar aims of the trusts and cartels 
which seek imperialist aggrandize-
ment and huge profits at the expense 
of the people . 
This revision of Marxist-Leninist 
theory regarding the role of monopoly 
capital led to other erroneous con-
clusions, such as to utopian economic 
perspectives and the possibility of 
achieving the national liberation of the 
colonial and dependent countries 
through arrangements between the 
great powers. It also led to tendencies 
to obscure the class nature of bourgeois 
democracy, to false concepts of social 
evolution, to revision of the funda-
mental laws of the class struggle and 
to minimizing the independent and 
leading role of the working class. 
In consequence, we Communists be-
gan to carry on the historic struggle 
against fascism, for democracy and na-
tional freedom, in a way that was not 
always clearly distinguishable from that 
of bourgeois democra~s and bourgeois 
nationalists, forgetting the class charac-
ter and limitations of bourgeois de-
mocracy and nationalism. Finally, this 
right-opportunist deviation also tended 
to ignore, revise or virtually discount 
the fundamental contradictions of cap-
italism, declaring wrongly that the 
changed and changing forms of their 
expression indicated that they had 
ceased to operate in the period of the 
general crisis of capitalism. 
Furthermore, the dissolution of the 
Communist Party and d~~ form~timi 
oi the Communist Political Associa-
tion were part and parcel of our re-
visionist errors, and did in fact con-
stitute the liquidation of the inde-
pendent and vanguard role of the 
Communist movement. As a consequ-
ence, our base among the industrial 
workers was seriously weakened. This 
further resulted in a general weaken-
ing of Communist activities and in ad-
versely affecting the role and policies 
of other Marxist parties in the West-
ern Hemisphere. Far from aidir:g the 
carrying out of such correct policy as 
support for Roosevelt's re-election, the 
dissolution of the Communist Party 
weakened the democratic coalition be-
cause it weakened the m1ttatlve, 
strength and contributions of the Com-
munist vanguard. 
A flagrant expression of this liquida-
tion was the abolition of the Commu-
nist organization_ in the South through 
its transformation into non-Commu-
nist, anti-fascist organizations. This 
action undermined the foundation for 
consistent and effective struggle for 
the needs and aspirations of the 
masses of the South, especially the Ne-
gro people. This glaring example of 
the logical outcome of our revisionist 
errors reveals the direction in which 
our policy was leading. The dissolu-
tion of the Communist Party of Amer-
ica and the formation of the C.P .A. 
was in fact the liquidation of the inde-
pendent Marxist Party of the working 
class. 
The correction of our revisioist er-
rors demands the immediate reconsti-
tution of the Communist Party and 
guaranteeing the re-establishment of 
the Marxist content of its program, 
policies and activities. 
The source of our past revisionist 
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errors must be traced to the ever active 
pressure of bourgeois ideology and 
influences upon the working class. 
The failure on our part to be vigilant 
and to conduct a sustained struggle 
against these bourgeois and petty-bour-
geois influences permitted their infil-
tration into our own ranks and sapped 
our proletarian vitality. One of the 
most harmful and far reaching conse-
quences of this bourgeois influence 
upon our organization was the devel-
opment over a period of years of a sys-
tem of bureaucratic practices and 
methods of leadership. 
This found expression in a failure 
to analyze and re-examine constantly 
our policies and methods of work in 
the spirit of Marxist self-criticism; to 
check our policies with the experiences 
cf the masses in the class struggle; to 
develop a correct cadre policy; and to 
draw our full membership into the 
shaping and clarification of basic 
policy The crassest example of this 
was the suppression of the Foster let-
ter from the membership. Another 
example of this bureaucratic method 
of work was the manner in which the 
former National Board proceeded to 
liquidate the Communist organization 
in the South. 
The growth of revisionism was 
helped by bureaucracy. While the 
main responsibility for the bureau-
cratic regime rests upon Browder in 
the first place, the former National 
Board and National Committee must 
assume a heavy responsibility for the 
bureaucratic system of work which 
prevailed in all Party organizations. 
The former National Board, in ac-
cepting the Browder system of leader-
ship, set a bureaucratic example and 
did not carry on a struggle to establish 
genuine democracy in the organiza-
tion. This was also reflected by the 
former Board's inadequate self-criti-
cism during the pre-convention period~ 
The incoming National Committee 
and Board, by example, and with the 
active assistance of the membership1 
must undertake an ideological and or-
ganizational struggle to root out all 
vestiges of bureaucracy, and be con-
stantly on guard against relapses to old 
bureaucratic methods of work and op-
portunistic practices, which could only 
obstruct the most rapid and complete 
correction of our revisionist errors. 
7· 
The opportunist errors of our 
former general policy limited the ef-
fectiveness of Communist work on 
the Negro question. This was especial-
! y expressed in our glossing over the 
national character of the Negro ques-
tion, and in our unwarranted illusion 
that the big bourgeoisie themselves 
would carry forward after· V-E Day 
the wartime gains of the Negro peo-
ple. 
It -is true that we continued to 
proclaim our uncompromising demand 
for full Negro democratic rights, and 
in many instances fought hard and 
effectively against Jim Crow practices, 
especially in the interests of the war 
effort. However, the struggle for the 
national liberation of the Negro peo-
ple as fundamentally related to the 
whole struggle of the working class 
against capitalist exploitation and op-
pression was often lost sight of. 
Moreover, our revisionst policies 
narrowed the scope and weakened the 
vigor of such struggles, even causing 
us at times to soft-pedal the struggle to 
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eliminate Negro discrimination in the 
armed forces. 
The results of this opportunist 
policy are all too apparent. We have 
not adequately prepared the labor 
movement and the Negro masses to 
combat current efforts of reaction to 
create sharp Negro-white conflicts 
within the ranks of labor and to wipe 
out the wartime democratic gains of 
the Negro people. Despite limited 
gains we have had serious weaknesses 
and inconsistencies in our work in the 
Negro communities and have been 
unable to consolidate our thousands of 
new Negro recruits into a stable mem-
bership. We completely liquidated the 
Communist organization in the South. 
\Ve failed to develop . a substantial 
corps of Marxist-trained Negro work-
ers for leadership in the labor move-
ment. 
It is now incumbent upon us to give 
militant leadership to the struggle for 
Negro democratic rights on all fronts, 
especially intensifying our educational 
work among white trade unionists. 
We must rebuild the Communist or-
ganization in the South. We must 
develop and bring forward a strong 
corps of working class Negro Commu-
nist cadres in the great industrial 
centers of the nation. 
Above all, we must deepen the 
theoretical understanding of all Com-
munists, both Negro and white, on 
the fundamental nature and far-reach-
ing implications of the Negro question 
and conduct a vigorous struggle to 
root out every manifestation of open 
or concealed white chauvinism in our 
own ranks. As one step torward this 
end, we should create a special com-
mission to undertake a basic study of 
the conditions and trends of the Ne-
gro people in relation to the broad 
social, economic and political move-
ments in America and the world to-
day, and, 'in the light of Marxist-
Leninist theory, to formulate a com-
prehensive definition of . Communist 
policy and program on the Negro 
question. 
8. 
The opportunist errors which we 
were committing adversely influenced 
our work during the war, limited the 
effectiveness of our anti-fascist activi-
ties, and were disorienting the Com-
munist and the progressive labor 
movement for the postwar period. 
Our Communist organization was 
moving toward a crisis, among other 
things, because of ' its inability to an-
swer · the growing complex problems 
arising out of the present world situa-
tion. This developing crisis could not 
be resolved without the full recogni-
tion and correction of our former 
revisionist policies. 
In this connection, therefore, we 
must recognize the sterling leadership 
and the important contributions which 
Comrade Faster made in the struggle 
against opportunism. Likewise, we 
can appreciate the basic correctness of 
the sound fraternal, Marxist opinions 
expressed in the recent article of 
J 2cques Duclos, one of the foremost 
leaders of the Communist Party of 
France. 
Life itself, especially our recent ex-
periences in the struggle against the 
forces of fascism and reaction on both 
the foreign and domestic fronts-in 
the trade unions, in the struggle for 
Negro rights, in the struggle against 
the trusts-has fully confirmed the 
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validity of Comrade Duclos' criticism our organization. We must refresh 
and of Comrade Faster' s repeated and strengthen the personnel of all 
warnings, and has fully exposed the responsible leading committees in the 
basic revisionist errors of American organization, and establish real col-
Communist policy since January, 1944. lective leadership in all Party commit-
In ascertaining the grave responsi- tees. In doing this we must combat all 
bility for the opportunist errors and tendencies toward factionalism, to-
mistakes committed in the recent pe- ward distortions and toward weaken-
riod, it is necessary to state that while ing the basic unity of our Communist 
Comrade Browder, who was the fore- organization. 
most leader of the C.P .A., bears a pro- At the same time, we Communists 
portionately greater share of responsi- must avoid all sectarian tendencies 
bility than any other individual leader and boldly and energetically expand 
or member, the former national lead- our own Marxist working class and 
ership, and in the first place, the anti-fascist mass activities and our 
former National Board, must and does most active participation in the broad 
assume a heavy responsibility for these labor and democratic movements. W c 
errors. must resolutely strengthen our inde-
9· pendent Communist role and mass 
Clearly, the single, most essential 
pre-condition necessary to enable us 
to perform effectively our Communist 
duties in the postwar period as the 
vanguard and champion of the in-
terests of the working class and the na-
tion, is to overcome quickly and de-
cisively our errors and mistakes, espe-
cially to eradicate all vestiges of op-
portunism in our policies and mass 
work. 
Toward this end the entire Commu-
nist organization must immediately 
make a thorough and self-critical ex-
amination of al policies and leadership. 
We must establish genuine inner-de-
mocracy and self-criticism throughout 
activities. We must develop a con-
sistent concentration policy and build 
our Communist organization especial-
ly amongst the industrial workers. We 
must wage a resolute ideological 
struggle on the theoretical front, 
enhancing the Marxist understanding 
of our entire organization and leader-
ship. 
We Communists renew our pledge 
to do everything to destroy fascism 
and reaction, to advance the cause of 
American and world democracy, the 
cause of national freedom and social 
progress. We are determined to co-
operate with all anti-fascists and all 
democratic forces to achieve these 
great objectives. 
FOR A FIGHTING COMMUNIST PARTY! 
By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 
Summary Remarks, National Committee Meeting, C.P.U .S.A., Nov. 18, 1945. 
Comrades Dennis, Williamson and 
others have outlined to us the main 
line of policy. The National Commit-
tee has thoroughly" agreed with this 
line. What I want to stress here in 
behalf of the Secretariat is the role of 
the Party in meeting the many tasks 
that confront us. 
In the disturbed situation following 
the war, we have seen the Party and 
the nation face a host of complicated 
and urgent problems. Never in the 
history of our Party did we have so 
many great problems to meet. Many 
of these problems are literally of a life 
and death character, and through 
them all runs the common thread of 
necessity for struggle against reaction. 
First, we face a tremendous educa-
tional problem in the sense that we 
have to help the masses of the Ameri-
can people understand that the United 
States has embarked on an imperialist 
policy aimed at domination of the 
world. The American people do not 
have this idea at all, and it is a very 
difficult one to give them. But it is 
very fundamental that this be done. 
We have to explain that the real policy 
of the Truman government is im-
perialist, and to show the dangers in 
this to our country and the world. We 
also have to explain to the masses that 
the essence of the foreign and domestic 
policy of the leadership of the A. F. 
of L. is also imperialist. If we had 
nothing else to do, this one task of 
teaching the people the significance of 
American imperialism would be suf-
ficient to tax the strength of our small 
Party. 
But, of course, there are all sorts of 
other huge and urgent problems-the 
fight for full employment, for 60,-
000,000 jobs. There is no need for me 
to stress how vital this fight is, and 
what a tremendous struggle it in-
volves. At other times, if we had 
nothing else to do, this one issue 
would be enough to occupy every par-
ticle of strength we have. 
• • • 
Then, there may also be mentioned 
the problem of the organization of the 
unorganized. Some comrades here 
have pointed out that now is an ex-
tremely favorable opportunity to or-
ganize the unorganized workers, of 
whom there are many millions. This 
is correct. Once again I will say, if 
our Party had nothing else to do we 
could make this problem a central task 
of our Party. 
There is further the tremendous 
wage campaign, which threatens to 
develop into a gigantic strike move-
ment, arraying millions of workers in 
the basic industries against the great-
est trusts in the United States. It is 
one of the most fundamental and far-
reaching movements in the country. 
This movement, if handled correctly 
can result in a great victory for the 
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workers of this country, but on the If I haven't already given you 
other hand the workers can suffer if enough tasks, I can add a few more. 
mistakes are made. We have lots of There is also the great problem of the 
tasks in connection with this great internationalization of the atomic 
struggle. In fact, the wage movement bomb. We know the tremendous. 
literally clamors for our leadership and struggle going on in this country, in 
support. There are many dangers that fact all over the world, over this ques-
the workers face and must be organ- tion of the atomic bomb. Here I might 
ized against. The most serious of these say in the spirit of self-criticism that I 
i~ an underestimation of the serious- do not think we have paid enough at-
ness of the situation, of the sharpness tention to the atomic bomb question 
of the resistance the unions will have either in our general report, or our 
to face. There is also an underestima- discussion at this National Committee 
tion of the dangerous attitude of the meeting. 
Truman government, marked by ten- Finally, to cite a problem of decisive 
dencies to rely on the Truman govern- world importance, there is the ques-
ment as on the Roosevelt government tion of the intervention of the United 
in the past period. There is also not States in the Chinese civil war, a crime 
yet a realization of the extent to which which threatens the peace of the whole 
the A. F. of L. leadership is knifing world, and one which calls for the ut-
the wage movement. To educate the most activity of our Party in every 
workers to all these dangers calls for sphere of action. 
great activities on our part. If our There are also a whole series of 
Party was ten times as big as it is at other very urgent problems. Among 
present, this task would be big enough these problems may be mentioned the 
to occupy our entire attention. campaigns for world trade union 
But I must add still other important unity, activities to resist the imperialist 
problems to those I have already noted. maneuvers of our government in Ger-
There are the vital elections of 1946- many and Japan and in the Balkans, 
the Congressional elections-in which to abrogate the White Paper in can-
not only the fate of our country, but nection with Palestine, to organize 
to a very great extent that of the whole great relief campaigns for the war-
world is involved. If the reactionaries ravaged countries in Europe, to com-
succeed in winning a victory in this bat the government demands for un-
election, it will bode ill for the rest of iversal military training, to defend 
the world as much as for us. Con- the threatened interests of the Negro 
sequently, preparations . for carrying people, to fight against the rising cost 
through the 1946 election campaign of living, to fight the outrageous pro-
will call for the greatest mobilization fascist activities of the Rankin Cam-
on the part of labor in the history of mittee, to bring about practical work-
the United States and this naturally ing relations between the workers and 
throws upon the shoulders of our the veterans, and to tackle the funda-
Party very heavy tasks which we can- mental problems of developing better 
not possibly ignore. relations between the workers and the 
• ,. • farmers. 
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The mere listing of this formidable 
array of problems indicates at once 
the terrific struggles developing in this 
period we are now living through. It 
also emphasizes the tremendous tasks 
placed upon our Party as a vital part 
of the people's democratic forces. -None 
of these tasks that I have cited can be 
neglected without our running the 
danger of suffering serious defeats, if 
not actual catastrophe. 
This situation, with all these urgent 
problems, should teach us two funda-
mental lessons, both of which have 
been expressed in the reports of Com-
rades Dennis and Williamson. 
The first of these fundamental les-
sons that we have got to grasp is the 
necessity for concentrating our efforts 
upon the most crucial of the many 
problems confronting us. We must, as 
Lenin taught us, seize the key links 
which will enable us to move the 
whole chain. On the domestic field , 
as the resolution we have just adopted 
indicates, the key problem that con-
fronts us is the fight for wage in-
creases. To this we must devote our 
major attention .... 
On the international scale, the key 
task, as emphasized in Comrade Den-
nis' report, is to stop American inter-
vention in China. This war on China 
by the American forces is growing 
more menacing. In today's paper we 
note that Gen. Wedemeyer is quoted 
as saying that the United States is now 
prepared to fire on the Chinese Com-
munists unless they abide by rules laid 
down by the American military lead-
ers in China. The war in China is the 
key of all problems on the interna-
tional front and it is here, above all 
else, where we have to deal the hardest 
blow to reaction. 
There are millions of workers, mil-
lions of Americans in various classes, 
~1ho are ready to go into action on 
these great issues. But we all know 
from past experience that to a large 
extent the struggle of the people will 
depend very largely upon the extent 
to which our Party is able to give lead-
er ship to these huge masses of the peo-
ple. On the question of China, which 
is our key concentration, as Comrade 
Dennis pointed out, we want to hold 
500 meetings all over the country to 
mobilize all the forces of the people 
that we can reach to put a stop to the 
intervention in China. Our Party must 
use every ounce of its strength and 
skill and organizational ability to 
make these 500 meetings a success. 
• • • 
These struggles will be a supreme 
test of the ability of our Party to fun c-
tion effectively in such a complicated 
and difficult situation as we now con-
front. We must keep clearly in mind 
that if we concentrate on these two 
key problems of the wage movement 
and American intervention in China 
as the most burning and urgent of all 
the tasks confronting us, this does not 
mean that we can neglect the ma ny 
other vital problems I have mentioned, 
that we can disregard them, or wait un-
til we have first made a success of the 
tvvo particular major concentration 
campaigns before we undertake any-
th ing else. To do this would be a fataI 
mistake on our part. For example, 
would it not be a big mistake to neg-
lect the fight over the atom bomb r On 
the contrary, we must find the ways 
and means to participate to a mucli 
greater extent than we are now doing 
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precisely in the mobilization of the 
people over this vital issue. We must 
also, at all costs, prepare for an all-
out participation in the 1946 elections. 
We must, while concentrating on these 
two key questions of domestic and 
foreign policy-the wage movement 
and intervention in China-learn how 
to link '!P all the other struggles we 
are carrymg on. 
• * • 
Never in all its history was our 
Party called u pan to use such general-
ship. It must make the most effective 
use of its limited forces as never be-
fore. It must find more and more effec-
tive ways to ally itself with the broader 
masses in motion. This is a supreme 
masses of tht people and to set these 
test of the maturity of our Party. 
The second fundamental lesson we 
have to learn from this situation is the 
imperative need for a stronger and 
better functioning Communist Party. 
We are now at the stage of develop-
ment in the United States where we 
must have a far more powerful Com-
munist Party. History will not take 
"No" for answer in this matter, con-
sidering all the tremendous problems 
that the American people are now 
facing, and in the solution of which 
the activity of the Communist Party 
i~ indispensable. 
Comrade Williamson in his report 
outlined many of the most important 
tasks in the building of the Party. I 
want to stress just a few of them. For 
one thing, and it appears to me this is 
the starting point, we must strengthen 
cur democratic centralism. We must 
have more democracy in our Party. 
And we are building our Party democ-
racy. This was well illustrated by the 
discussion over the veterans questions 
which we have just concluded. I think 
that everybody who was present here 
must have sensed from the course of 
this discussion that we have a new 
spirit in the life of the Party. 
There is a new democracy, a new 
Communist democracy, developing in 
cur Party. One of the manifestations 
of this, is that we are beginning to 
develop a really collective leadership. 
The report presented here was not 
prepared by someone who went off to 
the country and wrote in an ivory 
tower, and then rammed it down our 
throats. It was fully discussed and 
everyone on the National Board con-
tributed to it. Dennis wrote most of 
the report and contributed, in my 
opinion, many of the principal points. 
We are, I repeat, developing a collec-
tive leadership. Our National Board is 
now a democratically functioning 
body. 
We are also beginning to cultivate 
some new cadres, new leading cadres 
in the Party. I think that is pretty ob-
vious from what's been happening 
here in this National Committee meet-
ing. Under the general head of de-
,doping collective leadership, we in 
the center are setting up committees 
in all spheres of activity, and the dis-
tricts are beginning to do this as well. 
This committee system, instead of the 
one-man system we had before, is fun-
damental to the development of real 
democracy in our Party. 
Comrades, actually, we in the center 
who are well acquainted with the 
Party, have been astonish~d to note the 
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wreckage that was caused by the re-
visionist policies that the Party had 
been affiicted with in the recent past. 
Since the convention we have actually 
been reconstituting the Party from the 
ground up and we have had to carry 
on this reconstruction in the face of 
many political and organizational 
problems piling in on us from every 
direction. 
Together with more Party democ-
racy we must have an improved 
discip1ine in the Party. The two are 
not incompatible. Indeed, there can be 
no real Communist democracy without 
firm Communist discipline. 
Here at this National Committee 
meeting we have had an example of 
the need to discipline a comrade. I 
refer to the Comrade Donchin case. I 
hope that the comrades will not in-
terpret the penalty we have applied as 
some kind of punishment because 
Donchin had the temerity to rise up 
and criticize the National Board, or 
members of the Secretariat. Such is not 
the meaning of this case. Donchin, if 
he had merely criticized the National 
Board, would have met with no objec-
tion. If the District Committee in 
Philadelphia had spontaneously ex-
pressed a criticism of the National 
Board that would be a legitimate ex-
pression of democracy in the Party. 
But what Donchin did was something 
entirely different. His actions were a 
violation of both Party democracy and 
Party discipline. He accused the Na-
tional Board, particular! y some mem-
bers, of deliberate! y falsifying the re-
solution of the Convention for the pur-
pose of shielding themselves from 
responsibility for the revisionism and 
bureaucracy of the past. When the 
Board did not agree with this point of 
view, Donchin instead of appealing to 
the National Committee, as was his 
right, went back to the District and 
undertook to mobilize the member -
ship of Eastern Pennsylvania against 
the Board. 
That is factionalism, not democrac) . 
Donchin thought that the opportune 
moment had arrived for him to de-
velop a factional fight. We all know 
how unsettled the Party was after its 
radical change in line and leadership. 
We know that the Party was going 
through one of the most critical pe-
rjods in its life. It was just at that mo-
ment, when every Communist had the 
ciuty to rally the Party and put it on 
an even keel, that Donchin proceeded 
to strike. Consequently he had to be 
disciplined. Obviously such a com-
rade has no place on our National 
Committee. 
We have got to have a more dis-
ciplined Party. We are going into a 
difficult period, and this will require 
a firm, united and disciplined Party. 
The second thing we have to do in 
order to strengthen our Party is to 
overcome the passivity in our ranks. 
It is a well-known fact that only a 
small percentage of our membership 
is active in carrying out our cam-
paigns. This passivity is one of the 
special heritages that we have from 
the Browder period of revisionism. 
Of course, there was considerable pas-
sivity before that, but the revisionist 
period particularly, cultivated this pas-
sivity. We must make the most serious 
efforts to overcome it. We must raise 
the morale of our Party and put the 
whole Party to work. If we can do 
this, if we can really enthuse the Party 
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with a fighting and a working spirit 
the effectiveness of our Party will be 
increased manifold. This is no routine 
matter. We have got to mobilize 
our Party. We cannot stand for pas-
sivity in our ranks. We have got to 
bring thjs matter home to our com-
rades by an intensive ideological cam-
paign, by a systematic mobilization of 
our membership for the big tasks con-
fronting us. We must get our whole 
Party into action. Overcoming pas-
sivity in the Party is one of the most 
fundamental things that we have to 
de. at the present time. 
A third basic necessity for us is to 
recruit more members, especially basic 
workers, into the Party. We must take 
this job in hand as never before. We 
have said this many times before in 
the history of our Party, but we have 
got to do it in a new way now. All 
over the world the Communist Parties 
are growing, and we must grow too. 
Of course, the conditions are not as 
favorable for us to grow as they are 
in Europe, but we all know there are 
plenty of opportunities for our Party 
to grow in the United States, and we 
must see to it that the Party does grow. 
In our campaign to build the Party, 
the registration campaign must be 
taken up in a new and more urgent 
way in the light of the immense prob-
lems that confront us. We must also 
pay special attention to the returning 
Party veterans. We must not assume 
that all these comrades will automati-
cally resume membership in the Party. 
Let me also ~ay that we must find 
ways to broaden the financial base of 
the Party. This is a major question. 
There is too much underestimation of 
the financial side of our work. Neglect 
of Party finances was one of the 
?1arked aspects of Browder's rev1s10n-
1sm. 
The fourth and last point I want to 
stress on the question of Party build-
ing is that we must transform the 
Party into a Party of struggle. Every-
thing depends upon this. One of ·the 
worst manifestations of Browder's revi-
sionism was to kill the fighting spirit 
of our Party and to tend to turn it 
merely into a propaganda or agita-
tional organization. His general idea 
of Communist Party action seemed to 
be · that he should make a big speech 
and that the Party should spread it 
over the country in huge quantities. 
\Ve must, of course, not lessen our 
agitational activities, but we must at 
all costs throw our Party into strug-
gle. 
It was on this question of weal~en­
ing the Party as a fighting organiza-
tion that I first came into conflict with 
Browder, as much as ten years ago. 
Browder was not a fighting leader and 
he did not cultivate a fighting party. 
Perhaps the first roots of Browder's 
revisionism were precisely his weaken-
ing of the Party's fighting spirit. We 
must get over that and learn that we 
have got to have a fighting and work-
ing Party. Our Party now is beginning 
to become a fighting Party again. But 
there is still much passivity and hesi-
tancy. At our Eastern Conference on 
the question of the wage movement 
and the fight for full employment, 
when we checked over what the Party 
had done in the preceding weeks, I 
was surprised at the t~ntativeness and 
the amateurish way that many sections 
of the Party approached the task of 
developing this struggle. This showed 
how much out of practice the Party 
was in actually conducting active mass 
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struggles jointly with our allies, and 
how badly Browder's revision had un-
dermined the Communist militancy of 
our Party. 
Now take the question of the inter-
vention in China. I don't know what 
you comrades think about it, but I 
cannot for the life of me understand 
how the leaders of a district can see 
such a situation as this developing 
without immediately taking action 
and proceeding to call meetings, to get 
in touch with our allies, and try to 
get resolutions of protest adopted, etc. 
I think there was a fairly good lead 
on this matter given from the Center. 
We spoke out early, gave correct 
slogans, and here in New York a very 
substantial mass meeting of protest 
was held. Yet numerous districts 
seemed to pay no attention to the 
whole business and displayed no initia-
tive. Such moods of inactivity must · 
be radically overcome. We have got 
to re-a waken the Party and transform 
it quickly into a party of mass strug-
gle. 
,:· . 
I cannot stress too much the burn-
ing necessity of making our Party a 
party of struggle. By improving the 
activity of our Party we can enor-
. mously increase its strength and recruit 
large numbers of new members into 
it. This increased strength is impera-
tive for our Party in view of the great 
problems we and the other forces 
in the domocratic coalition now face. 
In conclusion, let me say that we 
have had a good National Committee 
meeting. It shows that the Party is 
unified, that it is basically absorbing 
the new line adopted by our Conven-
tion, and that it is once more active! y 
getting into the mass struggle. Now 
let us go back to our respective dis-
tricts, and on the basis of the correct 
policies adopted here, mobilize our 
Party around the issues we have 
darified, strengthen systematically our 
contacts with our mass allies, and real-
1 y build our Party into the powerful 
mass Communist Party that it should 
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